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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the appHcabiHty of recommended software 
development techniques defined in lEC 1508 [8] to PLC (Programmable Logic 
Controller) code developed for offshore oil platforms. The draft standard lEC 1508 
contains specific recommendations which have the objective of improving the safety 
characteristics of safety critical code. The recommended techniques could have one of 
the fol lowing characteristics with regard to offshore PLC code:-
• They are already used in the development of code. 
• They could be used in the development of the code. 
• They could not be used due to the application domain. 
• They could not be used due to the specific programming environment analysed. 
I t was the aim of the thesis to characterise a subset of the lEC 1508 techniques into the 
above categories. The analysis was requested by the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) Offshore Division. 
The analysis has been performed using two major case studies, taken from live 
industrial safety-critical systems operating on a North Sea Oil Platform; they both 
comprise 300K lines of code in total. Both systems were written in three high level 
PLC languages. I t was decided to translate the code into one language, so the analysis 
was undertaken in terms of a single language. A translator has been written, and a 
number of static analysis tools, therefore allowing all the code to be analysed. 
The key twenty two recommendations f rom lEC 1508 have been selected, and the case 
study systems correspondingly analysed, using a modified Goal Question Metric 
(GQM) approach as a unified framework. 
The overall analysis method has been found to be successful in supporting the detailed 
analysis of lEC 1508 recommendations. The thesis presents detailed conclusions on 
each analysed technique, as well as more general observations on the PLC code. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Computers are an integral part of today's society. Software is inherently complex and 
must perform to very high standards if it is to operate correctly. However there are 
many reports of failures of industrial scale applications in the computer literature. [ 1 ] 
The most serious of these failures are perhaps those that occur in life threatening, safety 
critical, systems which are the concern of this thesis. The size and diversity of 
problems that software solves ensures that failure will be an ever increasing problem. 
"Many solutions have been proposed which tackle a wide variety of issues such 
as: management of software projects; better software languages and tools; and methods 
for mapping high level descriptions of systems into executable code" [ 2 ] . This thesis 
spans development solutions and translation technology for safety critical systems using 
Programmable Logic Controllers. 
The three main software engineering topics discussed in this thesis are:-
1. Safety Critical systems 
"A system is safety critical i f failure of the system would result in loss of human 
life, personal injury or significant material loss" [ 3 ] . It is normally accepted from a 
software engineering point of view that the software is safety critical i f failure of the 
software would result in the loss of human life. 
2. PLCs 
"A Programmable Logic Controller(PLC) is an electronic device that controls 
machines and processes. It uses a programmable memory to store instructions and 
execute specific functions that include On/Off control, timing, counting, sequencing, 
arithmetic and data handling"[4]. A PLC "is in essence a device that is specifically 
designed to receive input signals and emit output signals according to the program 
logic"[5]. PLCs were developed as basic computers that could replace relay circuits. 
As such they were developed so they could be programmed in a similar way to the 
design of a relay circuit. "It was possible to use them to take over all of the logic 
functions from relays and replace hundreds of relays with a more compact, solid-
state unit." [5] 
3. Translation Technology 
A translator is "a program which converts statements written in one language to the 
format of another programming language"[6]. 
1.1 PROJECT AIMS 
PLC systems are widely used in safety-critical and safety-related applications. 
Hardware reliability can be predicted by recognised techniques [7]. With respect to 
software reliability the situation has been less clear. The operating systems are given 
extensive onsite testing due to their use in many sites. The application software is 
normally developed for only one application so has had much less testing. In 
recognition of this, Standard lEC 1508[8] has defined the concept of Safety Integrity 
Levels (SILs), for PES-based systems (Programmable Electronic Systems). The SILs 
are organised as a series of levels of increasing rigour. Discrimination between levels is 
expressed in terms of the average time expected between failures (i.e. the system does 
not perform within its defined specification). SIL 1 is the least rigorous level while SIL 
4 is the level of highest rigour. 
For each SIL, recommendations are made in lEC 1508 for highly recommended, 
recommended and not recommended techniques which can be employed to achieve the 
SIL. These techniques include specification methods, design methods, programming 
techniques, languages and quality assurance techniques. Hence the system designer will 
decide the SIL, based on an analysis of the application and its domain, and then 
IEC1508 should list a selection of appropriate development techniques along with 
techniques that are deprecated. The concern of this thesis is entirely with the developed 
software and not the specification or hardware decisions. 
A selection of techniques associated with SILs 1,2 or 3 were then analysed with respect 
to two different systems. The techniques were chosen on their relevance to the data 
available. The analysis was performed to identify if the technique:-
• had been used 
• could have been used 
• could not be used due to the application or the programming environment 
The code that was analysed for this thesis is the Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT) 
source code for the safety systems that have been operational on a North Sea Platform 
for over two years. The code was the BSD (Emergency Shut Down) code and F&G 
(Fire and Gas) code on the platform. It was written using Siemens APT (Application 
Productivity Tool, version 1.6) which is designed to run on a PLC on the platform. The 
F&G and the BSD code were run on different PLCs. The code was developed using the 
three languages supported by the Siemens APT. It was chosen as it is thought to be 
representative of BSD and F&G systems on other oil platforms. 
The project was divided into two separate parts - translation and then analysis of the 
code. 
1.1.1 Translation 
The code was translated from three languages to one language. The translation was 
beneficial for two reasons; the translation provided much useful data and the resulting 
code was in one language for the analysis. The PLC languages that were translated 
were:-
1. Sequential function charts (SFC) 
2. Continuous function charts (CFC) 
3. Math language 
Three languages posed problems for analysis of and reasoning about PLC programs, 
because tools and methods would need to be developed for all three representations. It 
was thus decided to use a common single representation to ease analysis. The choice 
made was to use WSL, a Wide Spectrum Language with formal semantics, designed 
and used at Durham [9]. This had several potential advantages:-
1. The representation would allow a single 'language of discourse' i.e. one 
representation for all subsequent analysis based on IEC1508 recommendations 
2. Tools need only be built for the one language -WSL - not three languages, and there 
were tools already in existence for manipulating WSL. 
3. Defining a mapping document from the informally defined PLC languages to the 
formally defined WSL would highlight any language problems e.g. omissions, 
contradictions, ambiguity etc. 
4. The suitability of WSL for representing PLC code could be assessed. 
WSL is a Wide Spectrum Language (see section 3.2 for more detail), which is a high 
level language. It supports externally defined functions and procedures without needing 
them to be included in the code. None of the variables have a specific type nor do they 
have to be pre-declared. The fact that declaration of variables is not required enables 
blocks of code from within a program to be manipulated by MA (Maintainers 
Assistant). MA is a tool produced locally at Durham for aiding restructuring of code 
written in WSL. 
WSL supports a construct known as an action system which takes code that contains 
GOTOs and makes each GOTO jump a block of its own. In reverse engineering it is 
necessary to deal with code as it is and not in ideal format. So representing GOTOs in a 
form for restructuring is mandatory. The action system construct avoids the problems 
of continuation semantics which are not suitable for transformation based analysis tools. 
The two pictorial languages (SFCs and CFCs) were translated into WSL to provide the 
structure and the framework of the program. The SFC was represented as an action 
system, while the CFC was represented as function calls from each unit to CFB 
(Continuous Function Block) procedures. CFBs are similar to procedures and are 
located in the CFCs. When the PLC is compiled by the Siemens APT system the 
ordering of each of the CFBs is automatically generated. Unlike most text based 
languages the programmer cannot specify the ordering of CFBs or CFCs. Once 
compiled, the code runs in that order until recompiled. The translated code was only 
generated once and not in all the possible different orderings. The CFBs, CFCs and 
SFCs were maintained as procedures. The code internally within the CFBs and SFCs 
retained their internal ordering. 
The translated BSD and F&G code was too large to be handled by the tool MA so it 
was necessary to partition the code. The code was sliced procedurally (see 1.1.2.1) 
along an output variable. A record of the dependent variables was stored so the output 
could be deemed dependent on the set of input variables. A list of the procedures 
relating to a CFB was maintained and then these were reassembled to form the sliced 
code. 
1.1.2 Analysis 
The second phase of the project was the analysis of the code. 
IBC1508 defines a set of highly recommended techniques for each SIL level. The 
analysis was to assess the extent to which the highly recommended techniques (for SIL 
1,2 or 3) were effective, considering in particular the BSD and F&G PLC software from 
the offshore platform. This involved assessing whether the technique could have been 
used, was used, or why it was not used. It was also beneficial to see i f the technique 
could theoretically affect the safety of the system. Only techniques recommended for 
SIL 1,2 or 3 were analysed as SIL 4 was regarded by the HSB as inappropriate for 
software systems on an offshore platform. The code was chosen because it was felt by 
the HSE that the two systems were representative of other ESD and F&G PLC systems 
on Offshore Platforms. 
It was not feasible to undertake dynamic analysis of the software. So the problem was 
expressed in terms of the static analysis of the PLC code. It was decided that the set of 
IEC1508 analysed techniques should be analysed using a unified framework to answer 
the following questions:-
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any of the safety features? 
During the analysis process, the code, in both its original format, and WSL was used. 
During the translation process valuable information was obtained including names and 
types of variables, number of CFCs, number of CFBs and lengths of blocks of code etc. 
The analysis was structured so that the above two questions could be answered for each 
technique. Various further questions about the code were used to answer the two main 
questions. The final conclusions made were regarding the viability of the technique and 
whether it would aid the development of safety critical ESD and F&G PLC systems on 
Offshore Platforms. 
To perform the analysis on the code, data collection techniques were used. These 
included:-
1.1.2.1 Program slicing 
Program slicing was used to slice the code along an output variable. Al l the inputs that 
were dependent on an output were recorded and all of the procedures that were relevant 
to the output were put into the sliced code. [10] The number of inputs on which an 
output was dependent could then be studied. A slicing tool was developed to assist the 
analysis process. 
1.1.2.2 Graph tool analysis 
Graph tool analysis was used so that call graphs of the code could be drawn. Call 
graphs were also drawn of the SFCs to demonstrate the structure and to demonstrate 
that the translation agreed with the SFC description. 
1.1.2.3 Transformations 
A transformation is the re-ordering of code so that the meaning and overall outcome of 
the code remain the same but the syntax or form is different. This is beneficial if it 
enables easier understanding of the meaning of the code. Subsets of the code were 
transformed using MA to determine how the code could have been restructured and to 
determine if it made the code more understandable. In the case of nested conditional 
statements experiments were undertaken as to how they could be transformed. 
1.1.2.4 Frequency of variable usage 
One in ten global variables were studied to see in how many units the variables had 
been read, written and used. The programs were divided into units which are 
equivalent to modules. 
1.1.2.5 Variable usage 
All the variables were analysed (automatically) to determine which ones had been read 
but not written, written but not read, and not used. This was done using the information 
provided by the intermediate representation used within the slicing tool. 
1.2 CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS 
The top priorities of the thesis were:-
1. To identify key highly recommended techniques from SIL 1,2 or 3 that can be 
analysed using the data available. 
2. To analyse the code to assess the feasibility of using the technique with the specific 
safety critical PLC code. 
3. To identify the general characteristics of the BSD and F&G PLC code on an offshore 
platform. 
The secondary priorities of the thesis were to determine:-
1. I f a single language could be used to replace the three PLC languages. 
2. I f any language deficiencies were identified in the PLC languages. 
3. I f it is helpful to perform analysis in this way and what the benefits and problems 
were. 
1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter 2 introduces the three main subjects areas around which the project was 
developed. These were:-
2.1 Safety critical systems 
2.2 PLCs 
2.3 Translators 
Chapter 3 discusses phase one of the project. An introduction to the source and target 
languages is given. The chapter gives an overview of how the source language is 
mapped onto the target language. The final part of the chapter describes the result of 
building the translator. 
Chapter 4 summarises the characteristics of the code that was analysed. This includes 
the numbers, types and usage of variables. The number of units (modules) and the 
number of functions in each unit. The length of the code, the types of statements used 
and the level of nesting of the conditional statements. Control flow diagrams of the 
code can also be found in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 discusses phase two of the project; it details all the analysis that was 
performed on the code against lEC 1508 (section 2.1.4 gives an introduction to lEC 
1508). The safety critical techniques are discussed separately within the chapter. Each 
technique is defined, the analysis process described and then the conclusions were 
discussed. 
Chapter 6 compares the achievements of the project against the criteria for success 
from section 1.2. 
2. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
The three software engineering areas that are used during this thesis are now discussed. 
2.1 Safety Critical systems 
2.2 PLCs 
2.3 Translation Technology 
2.1 SAFETY CRITICAL SYSTEMS 
"The use of software in safety critical applications has grown rapidly in the last decade 
and continues to increase. Prominent applications such as railway signalling, nuclear 
power stations, chemical plants and fly by wire aircraft"[ll] and the ESD or F&G 
system on a North Sea Oil platform, are all high prominence examples of safety critical 
systems. "A system is safety critical i f failure of the system would result in loss of 
human life personal injury or significant material loss." [3] 
A more general definition of a "safety critical system is one that has at least one safety 
critical service"[12]. A "service is judged to be safety critical in a given context if its 
behaviour could be sufficient to cause the control equipment to inflict or prevent the 
equipment from inflicting, absolute harm on resources for which the organisation 
operating the system has responsibility"[12]. 
A safety critical system does not necessarily involve computers, but the safety critical 
systems discussed here required computer software. Many safety critical systems were 
in use before the wide spread availability of computers. The PLC (section 2.2) replaced 
relays and hardwired circuits. A computer system though can only be safety critical i f 
it reacts with the outside world. "Safety critical software is any software that can 
directly or indirectly contribute to the occurrence of a hazardous system state" [13]. 
Where "safety critical systems must strive to maintain safe behaviour even in the 
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presence of failures of system components and when the behaviour of the environment 
deviates from that expected"[14]. "Software on its own cannot cause harm - only when 
it is embedded in a system and put into use can it be hazardous" [15]. 
An accident is "an incident with detrimental consequences (due to insufficient control 
of one or more hazards)"[16]. An incident is "a significant occurrence or event with 
potential detrimental consequences"[16]. A hazard can be defined as "a source of 
energy, or combination of factors that can lead to an accident if inadequately 
controlled"[16]. 
An accident can also be defined as "an undesired and unplanned (but not necessarily 
unexpected) event that results in (at least) a specified level of loss"[17]. An accident 
should be avoided if at all possible, an incident though is acceptable but not desirable, 
where an "incident is an event that involves no loss (or only minor loss) but with the 
potential for loss under different circumstances" [17]. 
There are two different types of safety critical systems. The first is primary safety 
critical software, which is "software embedded in a hardware system used to control or 
monitor some other process. Malfunctioning of such software can result directly in 
human injury or environmental damage"[17]. The BSD and F&G systems studied are 
both primary safety critical software. Secondary safety critical software is very 
difficult to identify and is "software which can indirectly result in injury"[17]. A 
design tool used in a safety critical system's design or a database storing records 
important to a safety critical system, are both examples of secondary safety critical 
software. 
A system provides safety for the users and those around only i f there is "freedom from 
accidents or losses" [13]. Often when manufacturing is involved extra safety aspects 
are thought to be too difficult or too expensive to implement until they are insisted upon 
by standards or laws. A prime example is that children used to become stuck in fridges 
because they could not be opened from the inside but manufacturers insisted it was not 
possible and too expensive to implement it otherwise. A law was passed that fridges 
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had to be able to be opened from the inside so magnets were used, which was cheaper 
than the previously used latch. 
There are many standards in existence that cover all forms of safety critical system 
development. They include:-
• l E C 1508 Functional safety: safety related systems[8] 
• UK MoD 00-56 Safety management requirements for defence systems containing 
programmable electronics [18] 
• MIL-STAN 882C System safety program [19] 
• MISRA Motor Industry Software Reliability Association Report 2: 
Integrity [20] 
• STANAG Safety design requirements and guidelines for munition related 
safety critical computing systems [21] 
[22] (lEC 1508 will be discussed in more detail in 2.1.4) 
Standards are in existence to ensure that those who would be affected by a system are 
safe. Without standards it is easier to justify cost cutting exercises that are detrimental 
to the system safety. 
When developing safety critical software it is important to remember that the entire 
system has to be built with safety in mind during the whole life cycle. Safety has to be 
given a priority by the entire development team. "One way management can 
demonstrate true commitment to safety goals is through assignment of resources" [13]. 
This commitment has to be demonstrated during the life of the system as well as during 
its development. Lord Cullen's report into the Piper Alpha disaster observed "The 
safety policy and procedures were in place: the practice was deficient" [23]. 
"System safety deals with systems as a whole rather than with subsystems or 
components"[13]. It is easy as a software engineer to think only of software but 
"software does not harm directly; but only as part of an overall system; it is important 
to assess the software contribution to and responsibility for; overall system safety" [22]. 
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At all times during the development of the system, safety should be considered. In the 
waterfall life cycle model (Figure 2:1) it would be from the specification phase to the 
maintenance phase. 
Specification 
Design 
Implementation 
Testing 
Maintenance 
Figure 2:1 
Waterfall Model 
It is much easier and more reliable to plan safety originally than to tag it on at the end. 
"Barly detection of errors significantly reduces the cost of the production process" [14]. 
This implies that "Requirements analysis plays a vital role in the development of safety 
critical systems since any faults in the requirements specification will corrupt the 
subsequent stages of system development" [24]. The "early phases in the development 
life-cycle, such as requirements and specification, are extremely relevant for 
dependability. It is crucial to identify hazards early in the design process, then to take 
appropriate design measures to eliminate or control these hazards"[14]. Many errors 
that percolate through to the final product can be traced back to an incorrect 
specification. 
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2.1.1 Characteristics of An Ideal Safety Critical System 
A safety critical system must be safe, should be available, reliable, dependable and run 
in real time. The system has to be tolerant of hardware, software and human errors or 
faults. The software should be free of errors. The system should be true to the 
specification and the specification should be correct. (All terms are described below.) 
Safety is the state of a system that cannot cause any harm. In ideal situations all safety 
critical systems should always be safe. The system would be intrinsically safe "when 
there is no possibility of it causing or failing to prevent absolute harm"[12]. But in a 
safety critical system the possibility of harm will be there so engineers strive for 
engineered safety which is "when a system has been designed to minimise risk or to 
reduce it to an acceptable lever'[12]. A safe system is one that will produce the correct 
output or that an incorrect output will be detected[25]. A safe system has an acceptable 
amount of risk where risk is a function that identifies the chances of a hazard occurring, 
and what the probability is of the hazard leading to an accident. This is known as the 
ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Possible) principle - where the cost of reducing the 
risk is too great in comparison to the amount of risk reduced. 
Reliability is a measure of the delivery of a proper service even i f parts of the system 
are failing, or there should be no delivery of the service at all. Output of the system is 
correct, and the output that is being delivered at a time of failure is as specified. [26], 
[25]. A system cannot be 100% reliable, so it is up to the designer to determine what an 
acceptable level of reliability is and try and measure it. Reliability is also defined as 
"the probability that a piece of equipment or component will perform its intended 
function satisfactorily for a prescribed time and under stipulated environmental 
conditions" [13]. 
Availability is defined as a measure of the service being delivered irrespective of 
whether it is giving a correct or incorrect output. [26] Safety is not possible without 
reliability and availability, as a safe system is required to be correct and always 
functioning. 
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Dependability is the property that allows the system to be relied upon to provide a 
continuous, reliable and safe system that will be available for an acceptable amount of 
the time. [26] 
Correctness is defined as the system behaves exactly as it is specified to behave. This 
implies that a correct system will not necessarily be dependable or safe. It will only be 
dependable i f the specification is correct and error free. [26] 
Many safety critical systems are required to run in real time. "A real time computer 
system may be defined as one that controls an environment by receiving data, 
processing it and returning the results sufficiently quickly to affect the functioning of 
the environment at that time"[27]. The real time factor is crucial as safety critical 
environments often use computer systems to enable high speed reaction times. An 
aeroplane system that took even an hour to detect a faulty engine would be worthless. 
The software should be error free where an error is the divergence of the state of the 
system from that expected or required of it, (adds two numbers rather than subtracts, or 
in a case statement does not consider an important case etc.). In theory it is possible to 
make software error free, with respect to a specification. This is very difficult; so 
failing fault free software, the system should be fault tolerant, of both hardware and 
software faults. A fault tolerant system is one that is resistant to faults in the system 
and can continue producing correct output. A fault is "a defect in the system which 
may, under certain operational conditions, contribute to a failure"[16]. A fault can lead 
to an error but the system should be designed in such a way that the error can be 
prevented or removed. Being fault tolerant enables the system to provide a dependable 
service even i f there are faults in the hardware or software. 
A safety critical system is one that could cause irrecoverable harm to persons or 
property. The aims of safety critical software is for it to be dependable, run in real 
time, be error free or at least fault tolerant. The system should also deliver a continuous 
service that is free from failures [26]. 
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2.1.2 Accidents - Why Do They Happen 
an Accidents are often dependent on the safety culture within an industry, or 
organisation. The safety culture "is the general attitude and approach to safety reflected 
by those who participate in that industry: management, workers and government 
regulators. Major accidents often stem from flaws in this culture especially (1) over 
confidence and complacency, (2) disregard or low priority for safety, or (3) flawed 
resolution or conflicting goals."[13] 
Although accidents are often preceded by warning signs that are ignored they do tend to 
fall into one of the following categories :-
1. Human error - humans make mistakes either omissions where something is not 
done, i.e. testing was not carried out on all the data. Or commissions where a 
human does something but wrongly. In the Bhopal accident "employers were 
apathetic about routine mishaps and about the value of emergency drills"[13]. 
2. Unpredicted combinations of events- accidents often happen when events occur in 
an unexpected sequence of events, or there are multiple faults. Al l the faults 
individually may have been catered for but when they combine it is more difficult to 
prepare for them. 
3. Worn out components - i f the hardware fails then there is likely to be an accident. 
The hardware in safety critical systems should be regularly checked for faults. 
4. Poor or incorrect design- i f the design is wrong then even i f the system is correct 
with respect to the design accidents will still happen. Examples of poor design can 
be in user interfaces where not enough information is provided to the operator. 
Alternatively where a designer has made incorrect assumptions e.g. in a nuclear 
power station the dial relating to a control switch was out of sight at the switch. 
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5. Complexity- as systems get more complex humans can no longer understand them 
and as understanding decreases, so the chances of faults entering the system 
increases. 
"A common thread in most accidents involving complacency is the belief that a system 
must be safe because it has operated without accident for many years"[13]. "There is 
an awful sameness about these incidents, they are nearly always characterised by lack of 
forethought and lack of analysis and nearly always the problem comes down to poor 
management"[23], was stated by Tony Barrell an expert in offshore safety. 
2.1.3 Why Computers? 
"Hardware backups, interlocks and other security devices are currently being replaced 
by software in many different types of systems, including commercial aircraft, nuclear 
power plant and weapon systems. Where hardware interlocks are still used, they are 
often controlled by software"[13]. Some of the reasons for replacing hardware systems 
and human controllers with software systems are that "software does not exhibit 
random wear out failures as does hardware"[13]. The computer can control and read a 
device with greater frequency and accuracy than a human. It does not make mistakes 
due to tiredness. Computer control systems can perform calculations faster than their 
human counterparts, and speed can be very important in safety critical systems. 
The software replacement is not all beneficial because software is not always as reliable 
as the mechanical parts it is replacing. We make better software today by using tools 
but the size and complexity is also increased.[28] "Many basic mechanical safety 
devices invented long ago are tested, cheap, reliable and failsafe, and they are based on 
simple principles of physics"[13]. This is unlike the craft of building software which is 
based on trial and error[28]. 
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2.1.4 IEC1508 
l E C 1508 is a draft standard that is aimed at improving the safety of systems built in 
conjunction with Programmable Electrical Systems (PES). The standard identifies 
many ways of creating safe code. One important feature identified in lEC 1508 is its 
use of SILs (safety integrity level). "Safety Integrity (SI): The probability of a safety 
related system satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all the 
standard conditions within a stated period of time The higher the level of safety 
integrity of the safety related systems the lower the probability that the system will fail 
to carry out the required safety functions." [8] 
"Safety Integrity Level (SIL): One of four possible discrete levels for specifying the 
safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the safety related 
systems. Safety integrity level 4 has to be the highest level of safety integrity; safety 
integrity level 1 has the lowest" [8]. It has been suggested that no computer system 
should be expected to be SIL 4 and most should not be required to be SIL 3. I f a 
system needs to be of SIL 4 (and sometimes SIL 3) then there should be a hardwired 
system around the software system so the entire system is not totally dependent on 
software. 
lEC 1508 provides a number of definitions including:-
"Fault: The cause of an error is a fault (e.g. hardware defect, software defect) which 
resides, temporarily or permanently in the system. 
Error: An error is that part of the system state which is liable to lead to failure. A 
failure occurs because the system is erroneous. 
Failure: A system failure occurs when the delivered service deviates from the intended 
service. A failure is the effect of an error on the intended service" [8]. 
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lEC 1508 also suggests many techniques that are recommended, highly recommended 
and not recommended so the SIL can be reached. This is done by listing all the 
techniques and stating how recommended they are for each level. A complaint about 
lEC 1508 is that there is "little or no guidance on how to assess whether the desired 
levels of integrity have actually been achieved" [22]. 
"Safety critical systems (scs) normally need to be certified for use, and this certification 
is usually done on the basis of a safety case. A safety case presents a reasoned 
argument that a system meets its safety requirements and will be safe for use" [29]. A 
safety case is something that is written to prove for an authorising body that the system 
is safe to be put into operation. "The purpose of a safety case is to present the 
argument that a system, be it physical or procedural, is acceptably safe to operate. 
Safety cases will ultimately be specific to a particular system"[30] Kelly also 
suggested that patterns emerge about what should be put into a safety case. There will 
always be specific evidence that has to be included and known when developing a 
safety case; the ordering and layout, etc. will generally be the same. [30] How lEC 
1508 was followed would be put into the safety case. "The argument within the safety 
case is normally based on engineering judgement rather than strict formal logic. This is 
generally supported by some form of probabilistic risk assessment"[31]. 
"For safety critical systems it is essential that various aspects of the dependability of the 
complete system e.g. probability of failure per unit time, either be assessed or predicted 
before deployment"[32]. 
2.1.5 Developing Safety Critical Systems 
When developing a safety critical system the aim is to remove as much complexity as 
possible since "complexity is a source for design faults. Design faults are often due to 
failure to anticipate certain interactions between a systems components"[28]. The 
system should be made as reliable as possible, but care has to be taken because 
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"software reliability can be increased by removing software errors that are unrelated to 
system safety thus increasing reliability while not increasing safety at air '[13]. 
As many faults as possible should be removed from the code. It is rarely i f ever 
possible to remove all the faults. Similarly it is not possible to remove all the hazards 
from a system and have it still perform beneficial work. The desire therefore is to 
provide a system that can deal with and counteract the hardware hazards. "A hazard is 
a state or set of conditions of a system (or an object) that, together with other conditions 
in the environment of the system (or object) will lead inevitably to an accident"[13]. 
Before a system is commissioned the risk should be reduced as much as possible. 
"Risk is the hazard level combined with (1) the likelihood of the hazard leading to an 
accident (sometimes called danger) and (2) hazard exposure or duration usually 
the most likely hazards are controlled but hazards with high severity and (assumed) low 
probability are dismissed as not worth investing resources to prevent"[13]. 
The methods of providing safety in a safety critical system is divided into two parts, 
fault prevention and fault tolerance. Fault prevention is an "attempt to ensure that a 
computer system is, and remains free from faults"[33]. Potential faults are avoided and 
those that are present are removed before the system becomes operational. The second 
approach is fault tolerance and "accepts that an implemented system will not be 
perfect, and that measures are therefore required to enable the operational system to 
cope with the faults that remain or develop"[33]. 
2.1.6 Fault Prevention 
Fault prevention is used in all of the stages of the waterfall and other development 
model and is divided into the following methods:-
L Safety Analysis 
2. Fault Avoidance 
3. Fault Detection 
20 
2.1.6.1 Safety Analysis 
This is required very early on in the development process. It is required to identify the 
safety critical parts of the system. It can identify statistics and levels of safety for the 
design. This method can be used to set targets for the reliability and availability of the 
system. Safety analysis is also used after the implementation phase to estimate the 
likelihood of failure and what the impact of failure is likely to be. [16] 
There are various methods of safety analysis including:-
i . Hazard analysis 
i i . Fault tree analysis 
i i i . HAZOP analysis 
iv. Safety assurance. 
2.1.6.2 Fault Avoidance 
Fault Avoidance is used to avoid faults being introduced into the process rather than 
relying on removing them later. This method should be used in three of the waterfall 
stages, specification, design and implementation. This method minimises the design 
faults and "it is generally accepted that a higher quality and cheaper product can be 
produced if design faults can be avoided altogether rather than removing them 
later"[16]. 
Some of the methods of fault avoidance are:-
i . Formal Methods - VDM, Z 
i i . Quality Assurance 
i i i . Structured Programming 
iv. Walk throughs 
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2.1.6.3 Fault Detection 
Faults can be introduced during the design and implementation of the system, so it is 
beneficial for them to be removed as soon as possible. This involves techniques of 
identifying the fault and then removing them. [16] Care has to be taken to assess the 
impact of fault removal as it is essential not to introduce more faults. Software does not 
wear out with time (unlike hardware) but maintenance can introduce faults. [28] 
Methods of fault detection are:-
i . Testing 
i i . Inspections and walk throughs 
i i i . Prototyping 
iv. Verification and Validation 
2.1.7 Fault Tolerance 
In fault tolerance it is accepted that there will be faults in the delivered system and so a 
method of dealing with these faults must be built into the design of the system. When a 
fault has occurred in the running system there is a four tier process that has to be 
performed by the system so that normal running can recommence. There is an accepted 
method of performing fault tolerance which consists of the following:-
1. Failure Detection. 
2. Failure Containment and Diagnosis. 
3. Fault Recovery. 
4. Fault Repair. 
[33] 
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2.1.7.1 Failure Detection 
Once the system has been completed there will still be faults present. [34] There will 
also be random hardware failures. To reduce the effect of these faults, the fault has to 
be identified by the system. These faults are normally revealed by additional run time 
checks to detect errors. 
There are various methods of carrying out these checks including:-
i . Redundancy - hardware, software 
i i . Control flow checks 
i i i . Self testing 
iv. Plausibility checks 
2.1.7.2 Failure Containment / Damage Assessment 
Once a failure has been detected in a system then the fault should be contained. Errors 
tend to propagate from where they originate (known as the domino effect). An ideal 
software failure would lead to human intervention but in many cases this is impractical. 
This is known as fail safe. Most modern systems are fail operational which is where 
the computer has to continue running the system for a limited length of time. An 
example would be an aeroplane system where the pilot cannot take over entirely nor can 
the aeroplane stop flying. The closer a system is to a fail safe system the easier it is to 
design and implement. [12] The system must also identify which parts of the system 
have been affected by the failure. [17] 
Methods of failure containment are:-
i . Defensive programming 
i i . N-version programming (diversity) 
i i i . Redundancy - voting 
iv. Return to manual operation 
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2.1.7.3 Fault Recovery. 
"The system must restore its state to a known 'safe' state. This may be achieved by 
correcting the damaged state (forward recovery) or by restoring the system to a known 
'safe' state (backward error recovery). Forward error recovery is more complex"[17]. 
2.1.7.4 Fault Repair. 
Fault repair "involves modifying the system so that the fault does not recur. In many 
cases, software failures are transient and due to a peculiar combination of system inputs. 
No repair is necessary as normal processing can resume immediately after fault 
recovery."[17] 
2.1.8 Fault Avoidance and Fault Tolerance 
With all the above methods the aim is to have simplicity, intelligibility and traceablity. 
These reduce the complexity of the system, as complexity makes it more difficult to 
understand which increases errors. 
It is also accepted that the "human factor issues which encompass all aspects of human 
involvement are always the weakest link in the chain"[35]. This includes the 
human involved with the design, fault tree analysis, maintenance and the end user 
interacting with the interface. The "very high standards of reliability can only be 
achieved through application of fault prevention and fault tolerance; despite the 
application of fault prevention, complex systems will always be affected by faults"[33]. 
"Glitches in computer programs are annoying when they cost an hour's work. In 
critical applications such as telephone networks, nuclear power plants or missile 
guidance systems, insidious faults can spell disaster. Since even the best proof cannot 
pinpoint the extent of vulnerability the use of computers should be restricted 
wherever safety is a primary consideration"[34]. 
24 
2.1.9 Summary 
A computer system can never be made 100% safe. The hardware can fail, the software 
can fail or the operator can fail. "Problems in human machine interactions have been 
identified as a major cause in safety critical computer systems"[36]. Safety cannot 
always be a key design feature since "safety acts as a constraint on the possible system 
designs"[13]. An important factor that should be noted is that "carrying out an 
operation in a particular way for many years does not guarantee that an accident cannot 
occur. Yet informal risk assessments appear to decrease quickly when there are no 
serious accidents" [13]. 
In conclusion it is interesting to note that "an engineer once compared designing a new 
passenger ferry or an aeroplane to throwing knives in a circus act. I f everything works 
that is fine, that's what you are paid for. But one fatal slip-up and your knife throwing 
days are over"[37]. 
2.2 P L C S 
"A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is an electronic device that controls 
machines and processes. It uses a programmable memory to store instructions and 
execute specific functions that include On/Off control, timing, counting, sequencing, 
arithmetic and data handling"[4]. It "is in essence a device that is specifically designed 
to receive input signals and emit output signals according to the program logic" [5]. 
PLCs were developed as basic devices that could replace relay circuits. As such they 
were developed so they could be programmed in a similar way to the design of relay 
circuits. "It was possible to use them (PLCs) to take over all of the logic functions from 
relays and replace hundreds of relays with a more compact solid-state unit"[5]. 
PLCs are much easier to change and maintain than the counterpart hardwired relay 
system, even so "many PLC systems are designed for one off applications in process 
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control and industrial plant applications. They are bespoke and often need changing as 
the plant is upgraded"[38]. 
Today PLCs have taken over much of the logic functions from relay circuits in machine 
and control applications. The PLC is more compact, cheaper, more reliable, easier to 
identify faults and to perform maintenance on than the relay circuit. Also it is much 
easier to change the logic of code than of a hardwired system. [5] The great benefit of 
the PLC is that "nowadays PLCs have outgrown their rather limiting name, and can do 
many things that logic relay circuits cannot, such as text handling, sophisticated 
communications and mathematics"[39]. 
It is normal to design a PLC in such a way that, should there be a power failure, the 
logic will return the system to a safe mode. A safe mode is a state where the system 
cannot allow an accident to occur even though the system has failed, e.g. turn on 
sprinklers in case of a fire when it is not possible to detect i f there is a fire. When PLCs 
are used in safety critical applications this is even more important and it is normal for it 
to be taken one step further. There is often a relay circuit hardwired around the PLC 
software so i f there is a failure the hardwired system can prevent an accident from 
occurring and take the application to a safe mode. This is the practice in many 
industries, oil platforms or modern cars that are 'drive by wire'. 
2.2.1 Structure of a PLC 
A PLC consists of 6 parts:-
• CPU (Central Processing Unit) 
• Memory 
• Power supply 
• Analogue input and output cards 
• Digital input and output cards 
• Programming port 
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There are two types of PLCs. One type is the 'brick' which has a specific number of 
I/O ports and cannot be extended. The other type is the 'bus' which is built on a rack 
so more I/O cards can be continually added and hence the number of I/O ports can be 
increased. 
2.2.1.1 CPU (Central Processing Unit) 
The CPU enables the communication between the input, output, memory and the 
programming terminal. The user's program (which is stored in memory) is executed 
one rung of the ladder at a time (see 2.2.2) Background programs such as timers are 
also run at the same time effectively in parallel. The CPU executes all of the user's 
program and then returns to the start of the program. 
2.2.1.2 Memory 
There are two types of PLC memory and in each part is stored the following:-
• In ROM (Read Only Memory) is the system program which is basically the 
operating system. 
• In battery protected RAM (Random Access Memory) are the:-
• PLC variables which are system variables and cannot be seen by the user 
• User's program; this can be changed by input from the programming 
terminal. Often once the program is finalised the program is copied onto 
EEPROM (Electrical Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory) 
• User variables, which contain the results of calculations. 
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System program ROM 
System variables 
Battery -
User program protected 
RAM 
User variables 
Optional read 
User program only memory 
area EEPROM 
User fixed data 
Figure 2:2 
PLC Memory Allocation [5] 
2.2.1.3 I/O 
Inputs and outputs are either analogue or digital. The analogue inputs are always read 
into a buffer at the start of each execution. In some systems this is also true with digital 
inputs, in other systems the digital input is read in from the hardware as and when 
required. Reading the inputs into the buffer means that they are consistent throughout 
the life of a scan, this is one execution of the program as the PLC operating system 
continually loops the program. 
2.2.1.4 Programming Port 
The programming port is used to download the software onto the PLC since programs 
are often written using PC packages. 
The response time of a PLC is taken to be the time taken between a rung being executed 
and then re-executed. 
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2.2.2 Relay Ladder Logic (RLL) 
PLCs were originally coded using Relay Ladder Logic. "A ladder logic program is 
written in graphical notation and is directly equivalent to the circuit diagram that would 
be used to interconnect a set of relays to perform the same function". [39] Ladder logic 
is drawn as a ladder, the power rails are vertical bars on the left hand side and right 
hand side of the diagram (see Figure 2:3). The link between the power rails can either 
be on or off and represents the flow of power. The left hand rail is on at all times. A 
vertical link represents an or with the horizontal link that it is joining. The state of the 
vertical link is copied to all horizontal links on the left hand side of it. Contacts will 
take the value of the left hand side, and it with itself and pass the value to the right 
hand side link. Coils will take the value of the link for themselves and then copy the 
value to the left side. I f power reaches an output then it is turned on while the power is 
reaching it. The output can either be a hardware device or an internal variable. 
Input A ) Input B 
Input A and Input B gives output L 
Input D ) Input E 1 
Input D and Input E gives output M or 
Output L gives output M 
Figure 2:3 
Ladder Logic Diagram 
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In Figure 2:3 input A and input B produce the output L. Input D and input E will give 
the value of output M or output L will give the value of output M. The logic of the 
system is as follows :-
L = (A and B) 
M = (D and E) OR (L) 
which implies M = (D and E ) OR (A and B) 
The ladder diagram is the program that is executed by the PLC. It reads the inputs and 
affects the outputs. 
When dealing with relay circuits the current flowed and outputs (valves, coils etc.) were 
all effected simultaneously. With ladder logic each rung is executed sequentially so this 
can cause ordering and delay problems. It may require an entire loop of the program 
before an output that is dependent on an input is changed. Care also has to be taken 
about the ordering; it may require more than one loop of execution of the logic before 
an internal variable is actually set by the operating system. 
Due to the delay that can occur preventing inputs from being read some PLC systems 
allow interrupts. Where code can be written to execute immediately inputs are 
changed. Interrupts introduce problems; i f they occur too frequently code may be 
starved. Interrupt driven code may overwrite non interrupt driven code. 
2.2.3 IEC1131-3 
Since ladder logic was first conceived, manufactures have all developed their own 
syntax and semantics for programming PLCs. Languages have developed from RLL to 
high level languages of both textual and graphical format. In many cases it is possible 
to program the code in more than one PLC language. This has increased the problems 
for system developers, since with each new system developed requiring a different type 
of PLC, the programmer has to learn a new language. Also code cannot be easily 
understood by programmers of differing languages. 
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l E C 1131 was introduced as a standard to attempt to counteract these problems. The 
aim was to generate an 'open system' for PLC programming that would allow:-
• Lessen the training time 
• easier online support and maintenance 
• reduced errors and thus improved safety 
• flexibility to tackle a wide range of monitoring and control problems. 
In some circles it is also felt that this should be taken further and provide portability 
between development environments and maybe in the future portability between PLCs. 
[40] 
lEC 1131 defines the syntax and semantics of five PLC languages. The high number of 
languages described is due to the diversity of PLC languages that were on the market 
prior to lEC 1131.[31] The standard defines a program as a "logical assembly of all the 
programming elements and constructs necessary for the intended signal processing 
required for the control of a machine or process by a programmable controller 
system"[41]. The f i f th language is SFC (Sequential Function Charts) and defines how a 
program written by a combination of the other programming languages can be 
combined to one program. The other languages are:-
• Instruction lists (IL) 
• Structured text (ST) 
• Ladder diagrams (LD) 
• Function block diagram (FBD) 
IL and ST are both text based languages while LD, FBD and SFC are graphical 
languages. 
Al l of the diagrams and text are made up of characters. Identifiers can be characters (at 
least one), numbers and the underscore. There are defined keywords which are not 
allowed as variables. The literals of the language are Boolean, reals, integers, character 
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strings and time. The integer can be represented in either base 2, 8, 10 or 16. 
Predefined and user defined types are made up of the above literal types. The access of 
a variable is assigned when declared i.e. global, externally changed only, constant etc. 
In all the languages a function is defined as something that when executed yields one 
external data value and contains no internal state information. Functions are defined 
graphically or texturally, dependent on the language. A function may have many inputs 
but only one output. 
A l l the languages have the same functionality and constructs that can be represented in 
one language can be represented in all of the others. They all have the same common 
functions that are pre-declared. They are combined to form a program by using the 
SFC. 
An informal review of each of the languages is now given. 
2.2.3.1 Sequential Function Chart 
The SFC is written using a combination of the other languages. "The SFC elements 
provide a means of partitioning a programmable controller program organisation unit 
into a set of steps and transitions interconnected by directed links. Associated with each 
step is a set of actions, and with each transition is associated a transition condition"[41]. 
A step is either active or inactive so the state of the program can be defined by which of 
the steps are active. Execution of an SFC always starts at an initial step. Each step 
contains zero or more actions. Actions are instructions in IL, statements in ST, rungs 
in LD or a collection of networks in FBD or an SFC. 
"A transition represents the conditions where by control passes from one or more steps 
preceding the transition to one or more successor steps along the corresponding directed 
link."[41]. Each transition contains a single Boolean condition written in either LD, IL, 
FBD or ST. The transitions provide divergence where the highest priority true 
transition is followed, convergence, or parallel execution (all the transitions must be 
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true for parallel execution to converge). Convergence and divergence of parallel 
execution is represented by a parallel line. A step remains active and continues to 
execute until a transition condition from a step becomes true. The flow of control is 
from the bottom of one step through a transition to the top of the next step. 
Start step 
Divergence Start step 
Path a 
Path, 
Parallel 
Execution 
Path b 
b t h b 
one path 
one path 
Convergence 
Figure 2:4 
Graphical representation of an character drawn SFC 
2.2.3.2 Instruction Lists 
An IL is composed of a sequence of instructions. Each instruction begins on a new line 
and contains an operator with optional modifiers (e.g. not) and one or more operands 
separated by a comma dependent on the operator. The instruction may be preceded by 
a label followed by a colon (:). The label can be jumped to by putting the name as the 
operator. A function block can be called using the same method. A comment is an 
optional extra at the end of each line. With most operators the result of the previous 
operation provides the first operand of that operation. 
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Label Operator Operand Comment 
START: LD % I X 1 (* PUSH BUTTON *) 
ANDA^ % M X 5 (* NOT INHTOITED *) 
ST %QX2 (* FAN ON *) 
Figure 2:5 
An example of instruction list. 
A definition of Figure 2:5 would be given as:-
set current result to be equal to operand % I X 1 
new current result = old current result and not % M X 5 
store result in location % Q X 5 
i.e. 
% Q X 2 = % I X 1 and not % M X 5 
2.2.3.3 Structured Text 
This is a textural high level language that allows:-
• assignments 
• case / i f statements 
• for loops 
• while loops 
• repeat loops 
• exits (from loops) 
• function calls with returns. 
Figure 2:6 gives an example of the structure of each piece of code scanned in from lEC 
1131-3 [ 4 1 ] . 
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Table 56 - ST Jajiga^9 slatern'ents 
No. St4lomi9nt typO/n«f<»ranc<i > Examploa 
1 A > B ; CV :.,,CV*1 ; C :^ SlN(X): 
2 Function blackiflvoaal^ CM&_TMR(IN;> 141X5. PT T#3»0ms); 
A :i» CMO^TMR.O : 
3 HETURH ^,a,2.2} RETURN; 
4 D > B*e -4'A*C ; 
IF D < 0.0 THEN NROOTS > 0 ; 
ELSIF D - 0.0 THEN 
NROOTS :« 1 ; 
Xt - B/ (Z.O'A); 
a . s E 
NftOOTS;-2; 
XI > (-e+SC!RT(D))/(2.0-A); 
ENDJF; 
G CASe^3.3.a.9) TWl-BCD TO INTfTHUMBWHEEL) ; 
TW EftFtoS v O ; 
CASE TW OF 
1.S : OlSPtAY:-OVEM TEMP ; 
21 OlSPtAYMOT(JR_Sf»eeD; 
3 : DISPLAY:- GROSS TARE : 
4.e., 10: DJSPLAY > STATUS (TW-4): 
ELSE DISPLAY > 0 ; 
TW_ERaOR;«1 ; 
END CASE ; 
QWlOO s- lffr_TO_BCD(DISPLAY) ; 
6 : POB {3:3.2.4> J > 101 1 
POB 1 :- 1 TO 10* BY 2 DO 
if WORDSfll- 'KeY'THBJ 
J r . ) ; 
EXIT; 
ENOJFi 
eND_,FOR; 
7 VWILE (3-9.Z.4) J 1 : 
WHILE J <- 100 a, WOROS[J1 o 'KEY' DO 
J > J+S i 
END_WHILE: 
e REPEAT (a,a.2.4) 
REPEAT 
J > J+2 : 
UNTIL J - 101 OR WORDS! - 'KEY' 
6Nt>_REPEAT: 
9 EXIT (8.^^.4) EXIT : 
10 Empty 5Ut«m(»At ; 
OTE - H tt» EXIT *t«t«i«i»irt {9) H *vppon»a, Iheis It shall be «opport*d ter «ll o< Kwaflon 
liitam*trt* (FOfl, WHILE, REPEAT) whfch ar« supported In the lmp4etneti«allofl. 
Figure 2:6 
Example of structured text [41] 
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2.2.3.4 Ladder Diagrams 
The principle of ladder diagrams is as described in 2.2.2 although the diagrams are 
defined using characters. "A ladder diagram enables the programmable controller to test 
and modify the data by means of standardised graphic symbols. These symbols are laid 
out in networks in a manner similar to a 'rung' of a relay ladder logic diagram. LD are 
bound on the left and right by power rails." [41] Power flow is from left to right. A 
function block diagram can also be put on the rung of a ladder. 
closed 
Figure 2:7 
A ladder diagram with power rails, links, coils and contacts 
2.2.3.5 Function Blocl< Diagrams 
Signals flow from the output at the right hand side of a function to the input of the left 
hand side of the next function block. Each function is a box with inputs on the left 
hand side and one output on the right hand side and has no side effects. The 
functionality of the function is described within the block. Outputs can only be joined 
together via blocks i.e. they cannot be connected. 
Ladder logic diagrams can be converted into function block diagrams. Figure 2:9 
shows the equivalent function block diagram of the ladder logic diagram in Figure 2:8. 
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key 
auto one two drive 
+ 1 I + i / i i / i ( ) + -I I- open 
I man I I " ' ^ l - ^lose 
+ 1 I + I -( )- coil 
Figure 2:8 
Ladder logic diagram 
+ + 
auto-I O R I-
man -1 I 
+ + 
key 
I + + 
I input- 1 name I - output 
I I ' W l + + *"P"^- ' ' 
I I I = I 
o n e — o l I I 1—drive 
two —-o I I I I 
+ + + + 
o not 
Figure 2:9 
Function block diagram equivalent to Figure 2:8 
lEC 1131-3 also defines the grammars of the language in its appendix, and examples of 
all the functions. [41] Appendix IV provides an example of the weigh function in each 
of the lEC 1131-3 languages, but not the formal semantics. 
2.2.4 lEC 1131-3 and Safety Critical Code 
When dealing with safety critical code it is felt by Maisey [42] that the language 
definition should be strict. After his study he felt that "none of the (lEC 1131) 
languages has been specifically designed for safety critical applications"[42]. He felt 
that all the languages were close to the application domain which is important. Much of 
the definition of the language though was by example many of which were "unclear, 
ambiguous, contradictory or lacking"[42]. lEC 1131 "concentrates on the syntax of the 
language, but is often less definitive about their semantics. This may lead to problems 
of ambiguities and implementation differences" [31]. 
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Maisey's studies indicated that the languages had the following characteristics. 
• They supported modularization but allowed side effects 
• Al l apart from IL were relatively easy to understand (which is beneficial) 
• They did not support traceability 
• Checkability was lacking due to 
• lack of strong typing 
• lack of parameter checking 
• lack of boundary checking 
• Analysability was lacking due to direct addressing of hardware. 
[42] 
"Another limitation of lEC 1131-3 is its basis in global variables Global 
variables are not the best way of providing for communications between functions or 
PLCs." [40] 
2.3 TRANSLATORS 
A translator is "a program which converts statements written in one language to the 
format of another programming language"[6]. 
2.3.1 Why Translate 
Code is translated for a variety of reasons; the main reason though is to compile it. 
Compiling occurs when the code is translated from a high level language to machine 
readable format so that the code can be executed. Code can also be translated from one 
language to another language; so new compilers for different languages can be used that 
are more efficient without having to manually rewrite the source code to obtain the 
benefit of the new compiler. Code is translated so that tools that are available for one 
language can be used on the code. Building a translator can be more cost effective and 
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beneficial than recreating a large analysis tool base that is language dependent. The 
translation technology is a well researched and developed technology. 
2.3.2 How to Translate 
Code is translated from the source language to the target language. A thorough 
understanding of the languages, syntax and semantics has to be gained before 
translation can commence. 
Syntax of a language is the "structural or granmiatical rules that define how the 
symbols in a language are to be combined to form words, phrases, expressions, and 
other allowable constructs" [43]. Semantics of the language are the "relationships of 
symbols or groups of symbols to their meanings in a given language"[43]. 
The grammar of a language is defined by a set of rules identifying how a sentence 
(expression) can be built. Just as in English a sentence contains various types of words 
in a set order, so does a programming language. So the translator can automatically 
translate the code. One method of describing the grammar of a language is by using 
BNF (Backus Naur Form)(see Figure 2:10). The semantics can be described in terms of 
the target language. 
Once the languages are defined a 'mapping document' can be written. A mapping 
document is a document that formally defines all the constructs of the source language 
and then the associated constructs of the target language. This is normally done using 
natural language, examples and a formal definition of the language. The mapping 
document (Appendix IV) uses BNF to define the syntax of language; BNF "is a 
syntactic metalanguage commonly used as notation for presenting language 
generation" [44]. 
The grammar defines legal expressions, and how they can be built from a top down 
approach. 
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e.g. 
<assignment> ::= <variable> ' :=' <expression> 
An assignment (non terminal) is built up of an expression which is a non 
terminal followed by an ":=" then an expression which is also a non terminal. 
I f a non terminal can produce two or more legal expressions then they are 
divided by a '1' which means or. 
Expression in [] brackets are optional 
Expressions in {} brackets are optional and recursive i.e. there can be more 
than one of them. 
Expression in <> are non terminals 
Terminals are in ' ' marks 
Figure 2:10 
Definition of BNF syntax used 
A non terminal is an expression which can be expanded further, whereas a terminal 
cannot be expanded any further i.e. it is there in that format. 
Grammars that are used in automatic translators have to be 'unambiguous', they are 
sentences that can only be decomposed in one way when working from left to right 
along a production rule. "A sentence (or expression) is unambiguous if only one 
canonical parse exists for that sentence. Computer languages must be defined so that all 
sentences in the language are unambiguous"[44]. 
2.3.3 Build an Automatic Translator 
Building a compiler is divided into two parts. The first is the front end which is 
responsible for the analysis of the structure and semantics. The second part is the back 
end which generates the target language and performs the optimisation see Figure 2:11. 
With a translator from one high level language to another an intermediate representation 
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of the code such as a tree may not be required. In this case the front end and back end 
can be combined. A tree would be necessary if the structure and layout of the target 
language were significantly different from that of the source language. 
F r o n t 
end 
Back 
end 
Source 
language 
L e x i c a l 
a n a l y s i s 
S yntax 
a n a l y s i s 
I n t e r m e d i a t e 
language 
T 
rmed 
code 
;imii 
I n t e r m e d i a t e 
code 
o p t i m i s e r 
Code 
g e n e r a t o r 
T a r g e t code 
o p t i m i s e r 
T a r g e t 
language 
Figure 2:11 
Diagram of a Compiler [45] 
The lexical analysis identifies all the tokens sequentially in the code. A token is a 
keyword, a variable, or an operator. "A keyword is a reserved word and may not also 
be used as a programmer chosen identifier"[46] in most languages. The lexical analyser 
was a C program, that identified all the tokens. This was done by looking them up in a 
symbol table and then passing the syntax analyser the token, its type and any value 
associated with it. e.g. a keyword 'then' would only have to return type 'THEN' (which 
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is assigned an integer value) a variable 'hello' would have a type and the name 
associated with it. 
The syntax analysis identifies i f the stream of tokens form a valid sentence including 
type checking of variables. Then the semantic analysis is performed to build the 
translated code. There are tools available such as 'YACC (Yet Another Compiler 
Compiler) and BISON that allows the grammar of the language to be represented. 
Associated with each terminal and non terminal is the action to be taken to produce the 
target language. The compiler compiler then automatically generates the code that can 
be used to translate the source language. 
A translator can parse a representation of the code one or more times. A one parse 
translator has a simple intermediate representation whereas a two or more parse 
translator will have a more complex representation. The greater the number of parses 
the longer translation tends to take but it should result in improved optimisation. 
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3. TRANSLATION 
The translator was built with the aim of translating all the code automatically from the 
three PLC languages into WSL. This was to be done so the translation could be 
completed in considerably less time than would have been required for the operation to 
be performed manually. The translation is also easily repeatable if performed 
automatically. The process was divided into the following six stages:-
1. Define the source language 
2. Define the target language 
3. Write the mapping document defining how the source language maps to the target 
language. 
4. Build the translator 
5. Translate the code 
6. Test the translation 
The source languages were the Siemens languages used on the Siemens TI PLC using 
the APT (Application Productivity Tool). The grammar used by the BISON translator 
is located in Appendix I . The target language was WSL (Wide Spectrum Language), 
the grammar can be found in Appendix I I . The formal semantics of the language can 
be found in [9]. The mapping document was written using natural language, formal 
grammars and examples and can be found in Appendix I I I . Translation of PLC 
languages into WSL had not been previously undertaken, so new research had to be 
carried out at this stage. The remainder of this chapter provides an introduction to the 
source and target languages, it also summarises the remainder of the six stages of 
translation. 
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3.1 SIEMENS LANGUAGES 
The programs studied in this project were written using the Siemens T I PLC using the 
APT. The tool predates lEC 1131-3, so the languages are described below, paying 
attention only to the functionality used by the studied code. 
The programs were written using a combination of the following three Siemens APT 
languages. 
• Sequential function chart (SFC) 
• Continuous function chart (CFC) 
• Math language (Structured text) 
SFCs and CFCs are both graphical languages while math language is a text based 
language. The math language can only be used within one of the other two languages. 
The code is developed to run on one PLC. 
3.1.1 Modularity 
Al l the code written in each of the languages combines to make the program. The 
program can be divided into units, which are similar to modules. The SFCs and CFCs 
can be built in each of these units, the code is normally divided into units on the basis of 
the hardware functionality e.g. fire zones in the F&G system. In both samples of 
analysed code each unit contains at least one CFC, but only one unit contains a SFC. 
The two graphical languages contain blocks into which the math language is coded. 
This in effect compartmentalises the code into modules and procedures. 
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3.1.2 Variables 
Variables can be declared in one of two ways, within the math language text or 
externally to the programming languages within the environment. Variables declared in 
a math language block are defined in the declaration section at the beginning of the 
code. They are local to that math block and can only be of the following types: integer, 
real, timer. Boolean, or arrays of the above except timers. 
The remainder of the variables are declared in tables provided by the environment. The 
variables are declared in tables within a unit and are global to all CFCs and SFCs within 
that unit or in tables outside all the units in which case they are global to the entire 
program. Variables declared in the tables can be given a hardware address so they can 
be accessed externally, ie via a data link. The types of variables that can be declared in 
the tables are: Analogue and Digital I/O, Word I/O, Valves, Integers, Reals, Flags, 
Booleans, Timers, Arrays (of a variety of types). Text, Recipes and other types that 
were not used in the analysed code. 
45 
-lU/90 12:24 
[>rogram 
name 
LOUISE 
Unit 
name 
PROGIMI D 
CONFIG 
CONTROL [ ] Configuration for coapile 
OBJECT [ ] Successfully coiipiied progran 
TABLES 
10 I 1 I/O synbolic nunc table 
NODULE [ ] Nodule definition table 
DEUICE [ ] Device definition Ubie 
DECLARE [ I Declaration table 
RECIPE I ] Recipe usage table 
SUBROUTINE I 1 Subroutine table 
UNITS 
Tables for 
declaring 
L/variables in 
AAA_UER [ ] SoftHare version log. 
DIA6S [ ] Systea diagnostics. 
^IIA [ ] Process bay - Cellar deck 
FZ IIB [ ] Uellbay - Cellar deck / Nezz 
FZ_11C [ 1 U t i l i t y area - Cellar deck. 
FZ.llD [ 1 Fire puiip roan A. 
FZ_11E I 1 Fire punp rooM B. 
FZ_11G [ 1 CCR. a CER. 
A 
Description 
V of unit 
Figure 3:1 
Screen print of the upper level of a program allowing variables and units to be declared 
As can be seen from Figure 3:1 the variables are declared in one of the following tables. 
Input / Output 
Devices 
Declare 
Recipes 
both analogue and digital 
input and outputI/0 is supported 
a device is an object that uses a collection of I/O points to monitor 
and manipulate a field device 
this is the table in v^ i^ich most variables are declared, integers, flags, 
arrays, timers etc. 
user defined structures (records) for associating numerous variables 
of possibly different types to a single variable. 
The CFCs, SFCs and CFB (a block within a CFC) do not call each other directly. The 
only interaction between blocks and charts is via global variables i.e. parameter passing 
is not allowed. It is possible though to affect vs^ ether a SFC or CFB is on and hence 
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able to execute on the current loop of the code, this is possible because each CFB or 
SFC is treated as a variable name that can either be on or off. 
3.1.3 Sequential Function Charts 
Pictures are easier to understand than text. The charts also provide an overview of how 
the code interacts. SFCs are used to specify a sequence of events during the control 
process. These charts are made up of steps and transitions. "Each step can contain one 
or more commands, each transition contains one conditional expression."[47] Parallel 
branches are steps that execute concurrently; as such more than a single branch can be 
followed at a given time (parallel branches were however not used in the analysed 
code). A selection branch allows a choice to be made as to which branch to follow. 
The first transition that is true indicates the path that should be followed. Transitions 
are tested from left to right. Figure 3:2 gives an example of a SFC. 
1 1 
S2 
Sn 
Step, 
numbered as 
drawn not 
executed 
Transition, 
numbered as 
drawn not 
executed 
1^ 5 
S5 
Figure 3:2 
Sequential Function Chart 
The charts are drawn using the picture icons supplied; each of the boxes are steps while 
a transition is the line between the steps. A step can contain a math language program 
or it can be empty. A transition contains a math language condition that i f true allows 
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the next step to be called. I f all the transitions from a step are false the active step is re-
executed. (The active step is the one that has control at any given time.) 
Actions and steps are either predefined or written in the math language. Note that this 
is similar to the lEC 1131-3 sequential function chart and as such branching (i.e. 
decisions are made) and then convergence of the code are allowed which is in effect 
providing a conditional statement. Loops can be written by drawing a transition to end 
above a previously executed step. 
The code in each step is divided into an initial part (optional) and a body part. The 
initial part of the code is always executed once, but the body of the code may not 
necessarily be executed. This is because transitions from the active step are tested after 
the initial section and then again after each execution of the body section. 
The SFCs in the BSD and F&G code have a safe SFC associated with them. A safe 
SFC is associated with one SFC and it has a Boolean expression associated with it. I f at 
any point during the execution of the main SFC the safe SFC has been activated and the 
expression becomes true, the execution of the main SFC is stopped and the safe SFC 
takes over execution. After the safe SFC, flow of control passes to a predefined 
position in the main SFC - often towards the end. Before the main SFC completes its 
final step the safe SFC has to be deactivated so that it cannot be called while the main 
SFC is not executing. This enables the code to be skipped which may be dependent on 
external interaction with the code such as a manual opening of a valve that the code 
within the SFC will check is shut. This would cause problems if the code was to be 
executed at the given time. 
Figure 3:3 and Figure 3:4 are the main SFCs in the F&G and BSD code 
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iStart Node 
Transition 
Diverging 
transition 
lEnd Node 
Converging 
transition 
Figure 3:3 Main S F C from tiie F & G code 
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Figure 3:4 
Main S F C from tiie ESD code 
1.1.1 Continuous Function Chart 
A CFG consists of CFBs; in the defined language they may have inputs and outputs and 
can be connected via lines drawn on the chart The contents of 45 blocks are predefined 
and the meanings cannot be changed. The sub language that was used in the analysed 
code only had two types of blocks: mathblocks and interlocks, neither of >^ch were 
predefined. The CFBs used were defined by the programmer using math language. 
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Figure 3:5 is an example of a CFC containing only interlock CFBs. 
^ ^ ^ ^ 
^^Si^ Hjl ^l^^uo^ ^ T ^ ^ o ^ ^ j T ^ ^ o ^ ^ ^ ^ o ^ ^I^BtL^UJ 
^ ^ ^ ^ b ^ ^ ^ ^ b ^ ^n^^^ ^|f^^2 ^ j T ^ u o ^ ^i^^a^ 
^ T j ^ ^ H ^ ^ ^ ^ n j ^ ^ ^ U ^ ^ ^ ^ U J ^ ^ ^ U j J ^ ^ W L U ^ 
• ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
CF 3o Fty le 
int< irlo 
^ ^ ^ ^ 1 1 . / 
r — / 
^ 
/ 
^ ^ ^ ^ 
> 1 1 1 
1 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
I 
I 
I 
1 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Figure 3:5 
A C F C from tlie F & G code 
1.1.1.1 Intertocks 
Interlocks are used extensively in the F&G and ESD PLC logic. An interlock contains 
math language (see 3.1.6); it has no inputs or outputs. It cannot be turned on/off from 
within the code. It is continually on i.e. available to be executed. The interlock begins 
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executing as soon as the controller is in run mode. Interlocks are given either high or 
low priority. The priority indicates execution order, all high priority CFBs are executed 
before low priority ones. An interlock can be compiled to either Relay Ladder Logic 
(RLL) or special function program (SFPGM); RLL executes faster. There is a subset of 
math language that cannot be compiled into the Relay Ladder Logic. The first time 
each interlock is run it can be initialised and then the initialising code is not executed on 
further iterations. 
3.1.4.2 Math Blocks 
A math block is similar to an interlock except that it can have inputs and outputs and 
many are predefined so cannot be coded directly. Some types of mathblocks can be 
turned off from within the code, although the mathblocks used in the analysed code 
cannot be. The mathblocks are connected via outputs of one block being the input of 
another. The mathblocks that were used did not have any inputs or outputs, so were 
stand alone, and were all of the same type with no predefined functionality, i.e. the 
functionality was defined by the programmer using math language. 
3.1.5 Compilation Order 
Unlike most programs the order that code is executed cannot be specified. Al l the code 
is executed once before any part is re-executed in the PLC loop. Code that is declared 
within a unit may not necessarily remain together at compile time. Bven code that is 
declared within a CFC may not remain in a block after compilation. Once compiled 
though, the execution order remains the same. The ordering of the code is as follows:-
• high priority interlocks 
• SFC 
• CFB math blocks / low priority interlocks 
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3.1.6 Math Language 
The Math Language is a text based language for performing mathematical calculations. 
It can be used in the step of a SFC, the transition of a SFC or in the interlock or 
mathblock of a CFC. As with the structured text of the lEC 1131-3 it is made up of 
expressions that are valid combinations of terms (constants or variables) and operators. 
The language is strongly typed. 
The main statements used in the code are conditional statements and assignments. The 
assignments allow both mathematical expressions and /or Boolean algebra. A number 
of calls are made to the APT defined functions and procedures. There is only one while 
loop in the ESD code. There is no concept of pointers although specific hardware 
addresses can be written to and read from directly. Some of the predefined variable 
types have more than one variable attached to them e.g. analogue inputs and timers see 
mapping document Appendix I I I . 
Each math language block can have an initial part. Within a SFC step the initial part is 
executed during the first run through the step every time the SFC is run. Within a CFB 
the initial part is executed only the first run through the block after the controller is 
switched on, it is never executed again. 
3.2 WSL (WIDE SPECTRUM LANGUAGE) 
WSL is a text based language and "is designed in such a way as to support the forward 
development of programs by stepwise refinement from a specification, or the reverse 
engineering of an executable program to a specification, within the same language. It 
contains both high level specification constructs and executable statements, and allows 
these to be combined within the same program." [48] 
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"The meaning of WSL programs is mathematically defined by formally specifying the 
semantics of WSL statements. Because of this formalism, transformations can be 
mathematically proven to preserve the meaning of programs" [48]. 
WSL was developed for transforming legacy systems. It contains both high level and 
low level constructs. It contains statements which include loops, assignments, 
conditional statements and procedure calls. There is no concept of a type being 
associated with any of the variables. Sub sections of code can be used in conjunction 
with the transformations. A more detailed language introduction can be found in Ward, 
[9]. 
Appendix I I contains a copy of the grammar for WSL while a copy of the semantics 
can be found in [9]. 
3.3 MAPPING DOCUMENT 
The mapping document can be found in Appendix I I I . The first task of writing the 
document was to identify from the manuals how the hardware and the programming 
environment worked. Then to identify i f the translation would be possible. This 
involved being able to automatically identify all the individual blocks of the code, 
CFCs, CFBs, SFCs - steps and transitions. The variable's information including: name, 
type and scope. Extracting the variable information was difficult as it was all stored in 
binary files. 
The next task was to decide how to layout the final WSL program as two graphical 
languages and one text based language had to be converted into a single text based 
language. Each of the blocks in the graphical languages were represented by procedural 
calls. 
Every construct in the math language used had to be defined in BNF and then in the 
corresponding WSL form. This was often problematical as the math language was not 
formally defined and in some places it was ambiguously defined i.e. how the flags 
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worked. Another problem was that not all of the desired constructs were available in 
WSL e.g. there is no XOR function in WSL. Variables such as timers were difficult to 
represent as WSL does not have any concept of time. The math language functions and 
procedures were often not supported within WSL so a decision had to be made as to 
whether a function/ procedure had to be written for each of them. A decision was taken 
to declare them as external functions/ procedures that had an unknown meaning within 
WSL. 
Translating the internal workings of the SFC was then defined. This was not 
automatable as there was no obvious way automatically to understand the graph. Each 
of the individual steps and transitions could be automatically translated and then the 
ordering of the steps and transitions had to be supplied manually. The re-execution of 
steps and the decision making process at transitions was complex to map to text. This 
was performed by putting the SFC into an action system and re calling the step if the 
transitions failed. 
The mapping document was beneficial as it identified all the constructs that had to be 
included in the parser. Once the mapping document was written developing the parser 
and mapping document became an iterative process. When the parser was tested it 
identified flaws in the understanding of both the math language and WSL. The hardest 
part of writing the mapping document was when there was no obvious equivalent 
construct in WSL to a PLC construct. The two major examples of this were timers and 
the SFC. The timers were problematical since WSL lacked time information and the 
ability to represent background processing. The SFC was difficult as the graphics 
represented information that was not possible to represent directly in WSL, so as close a 
representation as possible was used. 
The easier part of the mapping document was that no intermediate representation of the 
code was required since the syntax of the math language and WSL were similar enough 
to provide a direct mapping. The math language also had a relatively small number of 
constructs to define in WSL. The number of different variable types was high and, 
many of them had elements and commands associated with them, all of which had to be 
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defined in BNF and WSL. The syntax was not formally defined so in some instances 
definitions were identified from examples in the code. Mapping the CFCs was straight 
forward as only three types of CFBs were used and they were all distinct. The SFC 
was, as described above, not easy. 
Mapping to WSL was reasonably difficult as many of the constructs were not typical of 
text languages such as the math language or Pascal. 
Eg a := b or c had to be translated to a := if (b or c) then true else false 
The lack of variable declaration and variable type in WSL was difficult to relate to, but 
it meant that it was possible to map all the variables into WSL which may not have 
been possible in other high level languages. The SFC was also possible to map into 
WSL by using the action system construct. 
3.4 BUILD THE TRANSLATOR 
The translation took place in two phases: the SFC was translated to an action system 
(see mapping document Appendix III) and the mathblocks were individually translated 
and then the whole code was assembled. 
3.4.1 Math Language Translator 
BISON was used to write the translator to translate the math language. A C program 
was written to perform the lexical analysis and identify the tokens. The tokens were 
identified from a look up table. As each new variable was identified it was added to the 
symbol table for use at a later date. The variables that were declared in tables were 
stored in files as there were too many to be stored in memory. The grammar of the 
language was entered into BISON to perform the syntax checking. Corresponding to 
each grammar rule a piece of code is written to describe how to generate the target 
language. BISON automatically generates a C program to perform the syntax checking 
and to generate the translated code. The size of some of the statements (conditional 
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statements especially) meant that conventional grammar development in BISON was 
not always possible. 
There were two major problems encountered when building the parser. The first was 
that the last statement of a block in WSL did not end with a The parser had to be 
defined having a first and other statements declared in the parser and if there was 
another statement in the block then the ';' had to be inserted. The second problem 
involved storing the long conditional statements and assignments in memory. Since 
some of the statements were too long they were all written to the file immediately on 
parsing; this was not possible for statements using XOR as XOR was not a primitive in 
WSL. The operands had to be passed to a locally declared function in WSL but this 
was not possible i f the operand had already been printed to file. The solution was for 
the parser to fail to parse the XOR function and a different parser used to parse these 
mathblocks. The major problem during the translation process was memory shortage 
using both a PC with 16M of memory and the UNIX box. 
3.4.1.1 SFC translation 
The SFC in stored as a single file with each step beginning with a '^ Sx where x 
represents a number. Each of the transactions start with a '^Tx. The first stage was to 
separate the file so each step is contained in a different file. Each of the files were then 
translated using the math language translator, the steps are entire math programs and the 
transaction are conditions. The next part of the translation involved building the action 
system this involved building the translated steps into an action system. The splitting 
up of the file and translating each of the files was controlled by a Perl script. The 
building of the action system was controlled by a C program. The order of the steps 
had to be supplied manually to the C program. 
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3.4.1.2 CFB translation 
Each of the math blocks were translated using the translator and stored in a file of the 
math block name in the directory with the name of the CFC in a directory of the unit 
name. This was controlled by another Perl program that would call the translator and 
supply it with the mathblock name and the name of the output file. 
3.4.1.3 Entire program 
All information about variables, names of units, SFC, CFCs and CFBs was obtained. 
Then the SFC was translated, then each of the individual CFBs were translated before 
the entire program was assembled. Each of the individual mathblock procedures were 
inserted in turn as was the SFC block. This whole procedure was automated with a Perl 
script. 
3.5 RESULTS 
The translation was performed in its entirety. The translation identified some very long 
statements. It also identified an instance where a variable had the same name as a 
keyword. There was some trouble understanding how the PLC code should be written 
from the manual but this was sorted by using examples from the code. 
The translation process collected a list of variable names and types. Each CFB was 
translated into WSL and stored in its' own file. A list of variables that were used 
incorrectly was stored as was the a list of CFBs that had failed to parse. I f the block 
had failed to parse then either there was an error in the parser or the math language, 
both were identified using the parser, the first were fixed the second analysed, faults 
included assigning Booleans using the commands to assign flags. 
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The translation process was performed in about 7 stages. This was so stages could be 
debugged and developed individually and also so they could be performed on demand. 
The variable information for each of the systems was only extracted once from the 
binary files. It was necessary only once to identify the names of unit's, CFCs, CFBs 
and their types. The WSL could be rebuilt in a different manner without re-translating 
the code. Since the ESD and F&G code were long each task took hours rather than 
minutes e.g. translating all the math language would take a day. The other advantage 
of staged translation was that the parser could be changed to provide useful data, and 
the whole translation process was not necessary. Data that was collected included 
number of lines of code in each math block, maximum level of nesting of conditional 
statements, where variables of a specific type were used. Calculations performed 
during parsing of the number of if, else and elsif branches provided the number of test 
cases that would be required for analysis in 5.20. Changing the parser was also used to 
determine i f and where various parts of the math language had been used. 
The final WSL contained one action system and a high number of procedure calls. The 
ESD and F&G code looked quite similar in layout and structure. 
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4. THE CODE 
The translation of the code generated much analysis material. The actual translation 
required identification of all the variables and their types. The number and length of 
each of the CFC and CFBs could be calculated. The translation also enabled much 
analysis to be performed on the code. This chapter identifies the general characterises 
of the ESD and F&G code on the offshore system. 
The number of lines of WSL code (including blank lines) is given in Figure 4:1. 
ESD F&G 
With Comments 199,431 88,607 
Without comments 99,757 51,171 
Figure 4:1 
Number of lines of WSL code 
Both of the code samples were predominately CFCs situated in units. These CFCs 
contained CFBs most of which were interlocks although a few were of type mathblock. 
There is one main SFC and one safe SFC in each piece of code in the self test unit. 
The code contained two types of global variables, those global to the entire program or 
those global to a unit. Locally declared variables in the math blocks can only be of the 
type integers, reals, Booleans, arrays or timers. 
The F&G system has 3958 global variables and 35 variables that are global to the units. 
Of these variables 529 are input variables and 168 are output variables, hence 3296 are 
internal variables: although some of these have user defined hardware addressed so can 
be changed externally. The ESD system has 4413 globally variables and 5899 variables 
that are declared global to the units. Of these variables 1567 are input variables and 
1047 are output variables, hence 9792 are internal variables. The quantity of each type 
of variable is detailed Figure 4:2 to Figure 4:5. 
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Fire and Gas system 
Tvno Number 
i ' 
analogue input 201 
Boolean 1698 
Boolean arrav 48 
recipe 3 
digital flag 96 
digital input 325 
digital output 67 
recipe 58 
DO 10 array 41 
fast timer 17 
integer 1235 
integer array 13 
real 3 
recipe 131 
slow timer 14 
word input 3 
word output 5 
single valve 29 
dual valve 2 
Figure 4:2 
Tvoe ' Number 
Boolean 35 
Figure 4:4 
Number of F & G variables global to one unit 
Number of F & G global variables 
ESD system 
1 vnc Number 
analogue input 229 
Boolean 9(W 
Boolean array 68 
digital flag 364 
digital input 1337 
digital output 682 
DOlO array 19 
flag 478 
integer 259 
integer array 2 
slow timer 4 
text 59 
text array 1 
word input 1 
word output 1 
Figure 4:3 
Number of ESD global variables 
ffvoe Number 
Boolean 3487 
Boolean array 19 
DO 10 array 44 i ' 
flag 663 
integer 884 
integer array 4 
real 5 
slow timer 51 
text 100 
text array 1 
recipe 5 
recipe 55 
recipe 71 
recipe ^3 
recipe 10 
word input 6 
word output 4 
Figure 4:5 
Number of ESD variables global to one unit 
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The ESD code has 38 units. 1 main SFC with 1 safe SFC connected to it. There are 184 
CFCs containing 1990 CFBs of which 1253 are high priority interlocks, 734 low 
priority interlocks and 7 active mathblocks. The F&G code has 55 units. 1 main SFC 
with 1 safe SFC connected to it. There are 263 CFCs containing 1791 CFBs of which 
1789 are high priority interlocks and 2 are active math blocks. Math language was used 
to provide the functionality of the CFBs and the steps in the SFC. 
The math language statements that were used are:-
• Assignment statements 
• Conditional statements 
• While loop 
• Procedural and function calls (APT defined procedures and functions) 
• Comments 
Although while loops were available they were only used once in the ESD system and 
not at all in the F&G system. This was unusual for a large application in a 'normal' 
domain. Even small pieces of code tend to have a high number of loops. Analysing 
code is theoretically easier the less loops that it contains. 
Following are graphs giving CFC and unit information. Graphs Figure 4:6 and Figure 
4:7 demonstrate the number of continuous function charts per unit. The graphs Figure 
4:8 and Figure 4:9 show the number of CFBs per unit. Notice how the number of CFBs 
is dependent on the number of CFCs that are situated in each of the units. There is a 
high correlation between the number of CFBs and the number of lines of code in each 
of the units, this is demonstrated by graphs Figure 4:10 and Figure 4:11. 
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F&G count of CFC per unit 
10 12 
Figure 4:6 
Graph showing number of C F C ' s in each unit of the F & G program 
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E S D count of C F C per unit 
YELL SD 
W DOG 
UTI.S 
TEST SEP 
SOFT PB 
SELFTEST 
REtil C 
RED SD 
PROC SD 
OP ALM 
MOL BP MP 
M C INJ 
LP SEP 
LP c or 
HYD POWR 
HP2 COMP 
HPl COMP 
HP SEP 
GLYCOL R 
GLYCOL C 
FLOWLME 
FLASH 
FDB SYS 
F UP 
ELEC BO 
DX XFER 
DEC R 
DIAOS 
D F GAS 
CYR TOP 
C SUBSEA 
C SERV 
AW 6 10 
AW 21 24 
AW 16 20 
AW I I 15 
AW 1 5 
10 12 14 
Figure 4:7 
Graph sliowing number of CFC's in eacli unit of the ESD program 
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F&G count of C F B per unit 
S^TEST 
M1SC_CPC 
UX3,Y_SD 
LOO.UAOD 
LOO_SWtll 
LOO^SP.C 
LOO.PISO 
LOO.PAO) 
L0Q_HE1J 
LOO^CVA 
LOa_FWRM 
LOO.FT^O 
LOQ_DRIL 
F2.FL0T 
FZ_55A 
FZ_S4A 
FZ_S3A 
FZ_52A 
FZSI 
F2.51A 
F2_14A 
F Z . H L 
FZ_IJK 
FZJ3J 
FZ_UF 
FZ.UE 
F2_I3D 
FZ_13C 
FZ_11B 
FZ_I3A 
FZ_I2L 
FZ^12K 
FZ I2H 
FZ_I20 
FZ_12F 
FZ^I2E 
FZ_I2D 
FZ_12B 
F2_I2A 
FZ. I IT 
FZJIS 
FZ^IIQ 
F Z U M 
F Z J I L 
F Z J I K 
FZ_11J 
F 2 _ l l H 
F Z J i a 
F Z J I E 
FZ_UD 
F Z . l l C 
F Z J I B 
FZ_I1A 
OIAOS 
AAA.VER 
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 
Figure4:8 
Graph showing number of CFB's in each unit of the F&G program 
65 
E S D count of C F B per unit 
YELL_SD 
W_DOG 
UTILS mm 
TEST^SEP • 
SOFT_PB 
SELFTEST 
REINJ_C L 
RED_SD 1 
PROC_SD 1 
OP.ALM 1 
OIL_EXP 
MOL_BPMP 
• 
M_C_INJ 
LP_SEP 
LP_C_OT 
HYD_POWR 
HP2_C0MP 
HPl_COMP 
HP.SEP 
0LYCOL_R 
GLYCOL_C 
FLOWLiNE 
FLASH 
FDB_SYS 
F_UP 1 
ELECJSO 
DX_XFER 
DISC_R 
DIAOS 
D_F_GAS 1 • i i 
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Figure 4:9 
Graph showing numlier of CFB's in each unit of the ESD program 
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F G count of lines of code per unit 
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Figure 4:10 
Graph showing the number of lines of code in each unit in the F&G program 
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E S D countof lines of code per unit 
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Figure 4:11 
Graph showing the number of lines of code in each unit of the ESD program 
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Data about the number of lines of code in each of the CFB is given in Figure 4:12. This 
was interesting as much of the start code was taken up by comments. The majority of 
the code is less than 100 lines long which is in keeping with the suggestions in lEC 
1508. [8] 
ESD F&G 
Maximum length of CFB 373 344 
Minimum length of CFB 6 8 
Average length of CFBs 49 41 
no. CFBs 1 ^ 50 lines 59 732 
no. CFBs 1 ^ 100 lines 1902 929 
no. CFBs 100 ^ 200 lines 18 119 
no. CFBs 200 ^ 300 lines 39 9 
no. CFBs over 300 lines 2 2 
Figure 4:12 
Table showing the average number of lines of code in the CFBs 
4.1 NESTED STATEMENTS 
The code is mainly conditional statements many of which are nested. The maximum 
level of nested conditional statements is four in the F&G code and three in the ESD 
code (see Figure 4:13). A high proportion of the code has only one level of nesting 
although in the F&G code a third of the CFBs have up to four levels of nesting (see 
Figure 4:14). 
Nest Level ESD F&G 
0 43 51 
1 1367 856 
2 554 192 
3 26 -
4 - 692 
Figure 4:13 
Table showing the level of nesting of conditional statements in the code 
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E S D nest level of each unit F&G nest level of each unit 
30 0 
4 M 
U i • / I m ^ 
3 
Figure 4:14 
Chart showing the maximum level of nested conditional statements in each CFB 
4.2 CODE MISUSE 
It was noted that in some instances Booleans were assigned to by using the command 
defined for assigning to flags. This was identified as the translator had to be changed to 
succeed in parsing the code. In the user manual it is declared that a Digital flag can be 
used anywhere that a Digital output could be used. It would have to be assumed 
therefore that a Boolean can be used where a flag can be used. 
4.3 VARIABLE USAGE 
Most variables were declared as global variables in both samples of code. It was 
expected that all variables declared would be written to and read except inputs vMch 
should be read only and outputs should be write only. This was not the case, many 
types of variables were not read or not written and some were even not used. During 
translation it was not possible to identify variables that had been declared as constants 
so this accounts for some of the identified read only variables. 
The graphs Figure 4:15 to 4:17 below demonstrate how the declared variables were 
used. They are divided by type and then the percentage that were not used, not read, not 
written, and all variables were represented graphically. 
70 
4.3.1 ESD Variables 
Usage of E S D declared variables 
100% 
80% 4-
60% i 
40% 4-
20% i 
• Not used 
B Not read 
• Not Written 
• Other 
Al B BA DF Dl DO DX F I lA ST T TA Wl WO 
Figure 4:15 
Graph showing variable usage for ESD global variables 
In Figure 4:15 the inputs were all read only or they were not used. Many of the outputs 
were read and written to. None of the declared text and text array variables were used 
although text was indicated in the C&E charts. 
A high proportion of the integers were not read, while over half of the BA(Boolean 
arrays) were not used. Some of the rest of the variables were read only, write only or 
not used. 
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Variable usage of E S D variables global to a unit 
•^4ot 
DNotread 
•NolWittlan 
•Other 
m g >g u. 
Figure 4:16 
ESD usage of variables declared global to units 
Figure demonstrates that most of the recipes were read only, this could either mean that 
they were used as constants or incorrectly. The word inputs were read only or not used. 
The word outputs were all write only. Again the text and text array variables were not 
used. The reals, slow timers and DX (DO 10 Arrays) seemed to have been used as 
expected, while the rest were read only, write only or not used. 
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4.3.2 F&G Variables 
Variable usage F&G global variables 
gNotUSWl 
B Not iwd 
gNot Written 
• Other 
Figure 4:17 
Graph showing variable usage for F&G global variables 
Error! Reference source not found.4:12 demonstrates that the recipes were read only 
or not used which again suggests that they might have been used as constants. Al l of 
the inputs were read only, A^iiile a high proportion of the output variables were read and 
written. The rest of the variables were read only, write only, not used, and used as 
expected. There were 35 Booleans declared global to one imit, of these 3 were read 
only, 
4.4 TIME 
The time facility was used in both samples of code to obtain the hour of the day. Twice 
a day at a specific time the SFC was executed. The SFC contained the code for 
checking the hardware and software were still operational. 
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4.5 SFC 
The SFC was used to perform hardware and software checking on the oil platform. The 
translation was complicated due to the options at the end of each step, which transition 
to follow or for the step to remain active. When the safe SFC became active the fact 
that the active step in the main SFC remained active could not be mapped in WSL. 
This was not an analysis problem as activation of the safe SFC was determined by a 
CFB and not an input or during SFC execution. 
The translation of the SFC was into an action system which contained GOTO jumps 
within conditionals, which in turn were transformed into a nested do loop, (see Figure 
4:18) The other option would have been for each step to be converted to an until loop 
with a break out to the safe SFC. This would however have then risked loosing the 
functionality of the APT SFC because control could not be returned to the main SFC in 
a different step. Results highlighted it was easier to understand the graphical layout of 
the SFC (Figure 3:3 and Figure 3:4) than the WSL code in either form of 
transformation. 
do do 
i f (%action = mi l ) 
if Action block 
set %action to block to call next 
f i exit(l) 
elsif (%action = mi2) 
f i 
od od 
Figure 4:18 
Action system translated into a nested do loop 
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The F&G SFC was checked to determine if an infinite loop could occur in one of the 
steps. This was not possible as the transition condition was set at the end of each step, 
either a Boolean to true, or a timer which after a set time would become true. 
4.6 CONTROL FLOW OF THE CODE 
The control flow of the code is relatively simple. The control flow diagrams of the 
F&G code are located in Figure 4:20 (the CFCs and CFBs) and Figure 4:21 (the SFC). 
Figure 4:19 is the key to Figure 4:20. The ESD had a slightly more complicated control 
flow diagram because it had to be divided into 3 parts, 'high interlocks', 'low 
interlocks' and 'active mathblocks'. The F&G code mainly consisted of 'high 
interlocks' and two CFBs that were of type 'active mathblocks'. 
Unit name 
(with contents 
of unit below) 
Continuous 
Function block 
SFC should be 
connected to 
here 
Continuous 
"Function Chart 
Figure 4:19 
Key to (Figure 4:20) and the connection to Figure 4:21 
(enlargement at the top at the centre of the picture) 
Figure 4:20 gives the overview of the program and is too small to be able to read the 
detail. The main part is at the top and calls the high priority interlocks, then the SFC 
and then the two active mathblocks. The diagram is divided into groups of units, the 
unit name at the top and the columns underneath represent a CFC. Each of the blocks 
in the CFC represent a CFB. The unit that is considerably larger than the rest is the one 
that contains the two active mathblocks. 
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Figure 4:20 
Control flow diagram of the F&G program 
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Figure 4:21 
Control flow diagram of the F&G SFC 
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In Figure 4:21 each box is either the initial or the main part of a step, while the lines are 
all the possible transitions between the steps. Including the jumps to the safe SFC 
which is found in the bottom left hand comer. Notice how the return from the safe SFC 
is to a specific step in the main SFC. 
4.7 SUMMARY 
The ESD and F&G code consisted of units which were programmed mainly using CFCs 
with a main SFC and a safe SFC in the self testing unit. The code is predominately ' 
conditional statements' many of which are nested, assignments and procedure/ function 
calls. There is one while loop in the ESD code and none in the F&G code. The code 
consists of many variables of 17 different types (valves were not used in the ESD code). 
Most of the variables that are used are global, most of the ESD units contain variables 
that are global to only one unit. While only one F&G unit declares variables that are 
global to it. 
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5. ANALYSIS 
The main reason for translating the PLC code as described in chapter 3 and identifying 
the characteristics of the code as described in chapter 4 was to analyse the code. lEC 
1508 is a draft standard that will be used when building safety critical programmable 
electrical systems(PES). lEC 1508 identifies highly recommended (HR) techniques 
that could be used when developing software to each of the four SI levels. Techniques 
that will aid in the development of a specific type of PES for a specific task may not 
necessarily aid in the development of a different type of system. The analysis was 
performed on a subset of the HR techniques defined for SIL 1,2 or 3 to determine if 
they would be beneficial when developing code for ESD or F&G Offshore Oil Platform 
applications using PLC languages. Techniques that were highly recommended only for 
producing SIL 4 software were not analysed, as it is felt by the HSE that software 
systems should not be built to that reliability and that too much dependence would be 
put on them. A subset of the HR techniques was studied as it was not possible to 
analyse all of the techniques using only the data available. The criteria for choosing a 
technique was whether it was possible to analyse it using the data available. Al l the 
analysis was static as it was not feasible to perform dynamic analysis on the code. 
Each technique was analysed individually in a similar manner. So the remainder of this 
chapter deals with each technique individually. A summary of the final results is given 
at the end of the chapter. The aim was (subjectively) to describe for each technique:-
• i f it had been used 
• i f it could have been usefully used 
• i f it could not have been usefully used due to the programming environment 
• i f it could not have been usefully used due to the application 
This information could then theoretically be used when deciding development 
techniques for the development of other ESD and F&G PLC systems on Offshore Oil 
Platforms. The analysis was performed using a GQM (Goal, Question, Metric) 
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approach, identified by Basil and Rombach [49]. The theory was to identify a goal; the 
goal in each case was to use the technique for building the code sometimes with a 
reason i f supplied by lEC 1508. Basil and Rombach then state that i f the relevant 
questions are asked the metrics can be defined based on how to obtain the answers to 
the questions. The questions that were asked in each case were:-
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
In some cases it was not feasible to identify quantitative metrics so qualitative metrics 
were set. Each technique is discussed under the following headings:-
• Goal 
• Definition of technique 
• Questions 
• Metrics (and the analysis of each metric) 
• Conclusions 
They were discussed in the following order:-
Those addressing coding standards 
5.1 Coding Standards 
5.2 Limit the use of pointers 
5.3 Limit the Use of Recursion 
5.4 No dynamic objects or variables 
5.5 No unconditional jumps 
5.6 Limit the use of interrupts 
5.7 Limit the size of modules 
5.8 Use information hiding / encapsulation 
5.9 Use verified modules 
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Those addressing programming languages 
5.10 Use a strongly typed programming language 
5.11 Use a safe subset of the programming language 
5.12 Different programming languages used 
5.13 CFCs 
5.14 SFCs 
5.15 Math Language 
5.16 APT tool 
5.17 Design easily analysable programs 
Those addressing analysis techniques 
5.18 Use data flow analysis 5.21 Use FMECA 
5.19 Use control flow analysis 5.22 Use software fault tree analysis 
5.20 Use structured based testing 
Definitions of the technique are from lEC 1508 unless otherwise stated. [8] 
5.1 CODING STANDARDS 
5.1.1 Goal 
Use coding standards to ensure a uniform design of documents and code, to enforce 
egoless programming. 
5.1.2 Definition of Technique 
The minimum rules that should be adhered to should be defined. A definition of the 
coding standards should be applied which include modularisation and encapsulation (if 
using 0 0 (object oriented) programming). 
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5.1.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.1.4 Metrics 
5.1.4.1 What layout standards can be identified in the ESD and F&G code 
before translation? 
Both programs have comments at the top of each block of code; the ESD comments 
tend to be longer. They both have conmients on each line with assignments and other 
statements. Indentation was used in both programs, the F&G indentation was stricter 
and all indents are 5 spaces, the ESD indentation is less structured so the F&G code 
layout looks neater. 
There is a variable naming convention that is followed by both programs that include 
the following and much more:-
• Recipes end with a _R 
• Valves or digital inputs end with a _D 
• Variables that are connected have the same beginning with a different last 2 letters. 
5.1.4.2 What standards could be identified after translation of the code? 
Much of the translated code looks very similar; there are pieces of code where the 
layout of many of the procedures is almost identical and only the names of the variables 
are different. This would suggest that the layout pattern, style, and coding had been 
reused, with variables that performed a similar function. 
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5.1.4.3 Were nested conditional statements allowed and if so to what 
level? 
Nested conditional statements were used in both pieces of code. The level of nesting 
that was used in the BSD code was less than that of the F&G code. Figure 4:14 is a 
chart showing the level of i f nesting. When transformations were performed on the 
nested conditional statements, they were difficult to remove, and it did not aid the 
understanding of the code. The nested conditional statements tended to be dependent 
on only one or two conditions. Lengthy conditions tended to be located in non nested 
statements. 
5.1.4.4 What is the size of procedures? 
The size of the various procedures is discussed in 5.7, but they tended to be of 
manageable length. 
5.1.4.5 Is the timer usage consistent? 
Timers are used consistently through out the code. In both the BSD and the F&G 
program timers are set by using the 'delay' command in the SFCs and set by changing 
their values in the CFCs. 
5.1.5 Conclusions 
It is obvious that coding standards have been used. The F&G level of nesting was 
immediately identifiable. The convention of having related variables with a similar 
name was beneficial during the understanding of the code. Being able to immediately 
identify the type of a variable and what it is connected to is also beneficial. 
Standards can be used when developing BSD and F&G code on Offshore Platforms. 
The safety should be increased because it improves understandability and readability, 
especially during analysis or modification. 
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5.2 LIMIT THE USE OF POINTERS 
5.2.1 Goal 
Limit the use of pointers to allow ease of development, verification, assessment and 
maintenance. 
5.2.2 Definition of Technique 
"A pointer is a data item that specifies the location of another data item." [43] They can 
be used for example in linked lists. 
5.2.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.2.4 Metrics 
5.2.4.1 Where have pointers been used? 
Using pointers is not allowed in the programming language. Hardware addresses can 
be read or written directly as desired. 
5.2.4.2 Where has the hardware been directly referenced by address? 
It is possible using the APT to address specific parts of the hardware; this is identified 
by a percentage sign followed by the type and then hardware address. In the F&G 
code this has been used in two CFBs, in one CFC they contained where identical 
individual lines of code have been used to write directly to 'status words'. The status 
word locations have not been given a variable name. Al l references to status words 
occur in just one unit. When this was commented upon, writers of the program 
declared they were reading from the hardware address. 
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The BSD has the same two blocks of code in the same named unit, CFC and CFB. The 
BSD code though also has other references to 'status words' in a CFB in a different 
unit. One CFB also has approximately 280 assignments to hardware values that are of 
type Boolean and they are being assigned the value of a 'flag'. The hardware locations 
could not be correlated to the hardware values of any of the variables. There were also 
instances identified where variables with different names, scope and in some cases type 
were assigned the same hardware address. This technique is known as aliasing and is 
considered an unsafe practice. 
5.2.5 Conclusions 
Pointers cannot be used with the APT system which should have improved the ease of 
development, verification, assessment and maintenance. Direct addressing of hardware 
is still allowed although it should be possible to remove it and declare the variables with 
their hardware address. By declaring variables instead of writing directly to the 
hardware valuable information may be lost i.e. the maintainer need not necessarily 
realise the address of the variable. 
The absence of pointers is a well-accepted safety feature as it removes instances of 
multi referencing, dynamic memory allocation. Pointers also tend to lead to confusion 
as to what is assigned what value. Variables though have been allowed to alias the 
same hardware address which will introduce a similar confusion. 
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5.3 LIMIT THE USE OF RECURSION 
5.3.1 Goal 
Limit the use of recursion to allow ease of development, verification, assessment and 
maintenance. 
5.3.2 Definition of Technique 
Recursion is defined as either "1) A process in a software module calls itself or 2) the 
process of defining or generating a process or data structure in terms of itself."[43] 
e.g.:-
proc A 
{ 
call proc A 
} 
Mutual recursion is defined as A calls B and B calls A. 
5.3.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.3.4 Metrics 
5.3.4.1 Where has recursion been used and how could it have been 
better used? 
Recursion is not supported by the APT system. 
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5.3.5 Conclusions 
The APT system did not use recursion which implies that the BSD and F&G system can 
be developed without it. It has been suggested that lack of recursion improves safety as 
it removes an area of memory management, and space allocation that tends to be error 
prone. It can cause timing difficulties as during analysis the length of a cycle cannot be 
calculated. 
5.4 NO DYNAMIC OBJECTS OR VARIABLES 
5.4.1 Goal 
Use coding standards to prevent the use of certain language constructs. Do not use 
Dynamic objects or Dynamic Variables. 
5.4.2 Definition of Technique 
Dynamic is "pertaining to an event or process that occurs during computer program 
execution; for example dynamic analysis, dynamic binding." [43] 
A dynamic object allows the type of the parameters to be passed to a functions to be 
declared at run time. A dynamic variable are variables whose type can be declared at 
run time. 
5.4.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
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5.4.4 Metrics 
5.4.4.1 Are dynamic objects used? 
Dynamic objects were not supported by the APT system. 
5.4.4.2 Are dynamic variables used? 
Dynamic variables were not supported by the APT system. 
5.4.4.3 How does not using them improve safety features? 
By not having dynamic variables and objects the memory management is easier for the 
compiler and programmer and so less likely to introduce faults. Implicit type casting at 
run time can also lead to programmer confusion, but this is only used when flag 
commands were used to assign to Booleans. 
5.4.5 Conclusions 
Dynamic variables and objects are not supported by the APT and this implies that ESD 
and F&G code can be written without the use of dynamic objects and variables. 
Dynamic objects are a well known source of subtle and difficult to find errors which 
may occur long after initial commissioning. The fact that they are not used should 
increase safety by improving memory management resulting in a reduction in the 
number of errors in the executing code. 
5.5 NO UNCONDITIONAL JUMPS 
5.5.1 Goal 
Use no unconditional Jumps to allow an ease of development, verification, assessment 
and maintenance. 
5.5.2 Definition of Technique 
An unconditional jump is a "jump that takes place regardless of execution conditions" 
[43] e.g. GOTO jumps. 
5.5.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.5.4 Metrics 
5.5.4.1 How and where are GOTO jumps used? 
GOTOs were not part of the math language definition. 
The SFC graphical language allows transitions from one step to another, which would 
be a 'GOTO' but not an unconditional jump because the jump was dependent on the 
transition condition being true. 
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There is no defined movement between the CFBs in the CFCs. At compile time they 
are put into a sequential order by the compiler so although there is no ordering defined 
by the user there is no jumping either since it is a compiler defined order. 
5.5.5 Conclusion 
GOTOs are not a necessary part of ESD and F&G programming and the APT does not 
support them. Although the SFC allows GOTOs they are not unstructured jumps. By 
preventing GOTOs omissions and commissions should be prevented. The code should 
have a clearer defined structure, which appears to have occurred in the analysed code. 
5.6 LIMIT THE USE OF INTERRUPTS 
5.6.1 Goal 
Limit the use of interrupts to allow ease of development, verification, assessment and 
maintenance. 
5.6.2 Definition of Technique 
An interrupt is - "1) the suspension of a process to handle an event external to the 
process 2) to cause the suspension of a process 3) Loosely an interrupt request." [43] 
The aim is to consider the interrupts that are explicitly introduced by the software being 
programmed and not i f there are any interrupts in the operating system, since the 
operating system is not part of the analysis of this study. 
5.6.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
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5.6.4 Metrics 
5.6.4.1 How are interrupts used? 
Hardware interrupts are not used in the code. Software interrupts can be used in the 
code and are within a defined structure. Bxecution can move from the main SFC to the 
safe SFC if the safe transition condition is true. Both the BSD and F&G code were 
written so the transition condition was set in a CFB and not in the SFC. If the transition 
condition is false at the beginning of the SFC it is false for the whole SFC. During the 
end steps of the SFC the safe transition condition is set to false so in future iterations 
the safe SFC would only be called if the variable was reset to true. This removed all 
forms of interrupts. 
5.6.4.2 Do values change during an execution? 
The value of all the inputs is read into the buffer at the beginning of each loop. Even if 
the input values change this is not made known until the next loop through the code. 
This is a hardware design implemented by the controller that prevents inconsistent input 
readings throughout the code. Note that all the internal variables change when written 
to including the values of the timers. Timers are background processes and can time 
out during one iteration of the code. By reading inputs into a buffer they need not 
interrupt the code when they change. At set points during execution there are checks 
that a variable value has changed before execution continues; especially in the SFCs. 
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r 
Copy input v a l u e s 
i n t o the b u f f e r 
Perform ladder l o g i c , 
c a l c u l a t i n g outputs 
and timer v a l u e s , 
u s i n g input values 
s t o r e d i n b u f f e r 
Figure 5:22 
Diagram demonstrating how the inputs are used by the PLC 
5.6.4.3 How does not using interrupts improve verification, assessment 
and maintenance? 
The absence of interrupts means that the code executes sequentially. There is 
consistency through the code and all the code will be executed at least once before any 
part is executed a second time. The code when it is compiled does not remain in the 
same order. This means that the order cannot be tested but by removing interrupts it is 
known that every block of code will be executed and not starved. 
5.6.5 Conclusions 
ESD and F&G code do not need interrupts as demonstrated by the sample code 
although the facility is available in the SFC. By keeping the ordering consistent the 
tasks should run on time as no task is going to be starved. Consistent input readings 
will mean all the code reacts to the same values. It also forces the designers to a 
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conservative style of real time design. This illustrates a benefit of PLC code; 
scheduling real time constraints can be programmed without the use of interrupts. 
5.7 LIMIT THE SIZE OF MODULES 
5.7.1 Goal 
Use limited size modules in order to minimise the complexity of a system by:-
• limiting the parameter number 
• only having one exit and entry point 
• having a fully defined interface 
5.7.2 Definition of Technique 
A module is "2) A logically separate part of a program" [43]. A module should have a 
well defined task or function to ful f i l . This provides coherence within the module 
(coherence in a module should be strong). The connections between the modules 
should be limited and strictly defined. 
Modules should communicate via interfaces; the global variables that are used should 
be well structured and their access controlled and their use justified. Al l interfaces 
should be well documented. An interface should contain the minimum number of 
parameters for the necessary functions; this is typically five. 
Sub programs should be built providing several levels of modules, of which the sizes 
should be restricted to two to four screens. Bach module should have a single entry and 
exit point and the modules should hide information from the enviroment. 
5.7.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
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5.7.4 Metrics 
5.7.4.1 Is the function of the modules well defined? 
I f a module is taken to be a unit then it is defined to be a page of a C&E chart; each of 
which relates either to a function (e.g. Red Shut down) in the ESD code or a platform 
area (e.g. fire gas zone 11 A) in the F&G code. The CFB in the CFCs generally relate to 
the manipulation of one or more variables. The CFB will then be the name of the 
variable that is to be set. To this effect the function of the modules in the CFCs is well 
defined. The function of the SFC is to perform the self checking routines and to 
sequentially check that they have been carried out. 
5.7.4.2 What is the communication between modules? 
The communication between units is via globally declared variables which are known 
as intertrips. The majority of the variables that are declared are global. There is also no 
communication within units as the CFBs and SFCs are not directly called. None of the 
tested variables were used in all of the units. (See 5.8 for the analysis of when, and 
where and how the variables were used.) The SFC calls one step to be executed then 
the next; they are always declared in the specified order and do not return to the calling 
step but move down the diagram. 
There is no interface between user defined functions and procedures, so no parameters 
passed. There are APT defined functions and procedures which were used. 
5.7.4.3 What is the size of the modules (equated to math blocks)? 
The size of the units vary, see Figure 4:6 to Figure 4:11 for the number of CFB and 
CFCs located in each of the units. The number of lines in each of the CFBs was 
calculated including comments. There are 50 lines of code within four screens. 
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In the BSD program only 53 CFBs were shorter than 50 lines. In the F&G program 
there were 732 CFBs that were shorter than 50 lines of code. The BSD code had 2020 
CFBs while in the F&G code there were 1791 CFBs. An interesting fact though was 
that the average length (lines of code including comments) was:-
ESD F&G 
49 41 
Figure 5:1 
Table showing the average number of lines of code 
This demonstrates that the average length of a CFB was less than the recommended 
four screen lengths. Although most of the CFBs, as demonstrated in Figure 4:12 were 
greater in length than the IBC 1508 recommended four screens. This indicates that a 
large number of the CFBs must have neen very short hence less than the recommended 
two screens length. 
The SFC diagram in the F&G code covers 3 pages while the BSD diagram is on two 
pages. This is within the recommended length and since it was pictorial it was easier to 
understand than four screens of code. (See Figure 3:3 and Figure 3:4) Bach step 
contained textural code, so all the information was not provided by the picture. 
5.7.4.4 Does every module have only one entrance and exit point? 
The CFCs do not have a single entry and exit point because the CFBs are compiled into 
an arbitrary order; it is not even necessary that the CFBs within the chart will remain 
together. After compile time there will be one exit and entry point for the entire piece 
of code written within a loop. 
The CFBs have two entry and two exit points; on the first iteration of the code the entry 
point is the declaration section, the 'INIT' part of the code is then executed and the exit 
point is then before the 'BODY' part of the code. On future iterations the entry point 
is at the 'BODY' and the exit point is at the end of the block. 
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The SFC has only one entry point into the main SFC and the safe SFC. There can be 
many exit points from the main SFC; in the F&G program there are two while in the 
BSD program there are four. The safe SFC is called from any of the steps in the SFC 
and it returns to a specific step in the main SFC which is not necessarily the calling 
step. This means that after execution of a safe SFC the re-entry point to the main SFC is 
known, and as such allows SFC steps to be skipped. 
5.7.5 Conclusions 
The APT supports the code being divided into modules, of a relatively small size that 
map to the environmental conditions. This technique has been successfully used and as 
such should aid safety as the code is not a large single document but one of manageable 
sized chunks for analysis. 
5.8 USE INFORMATION HIDING / ENCAPSULATION 
5.8.1 Goal 
Use information hiding / encapsulation to increase the readability and maintainability of 
the software. 
5.8.2 Definition of Technique 
Information hiding is "a software development technique in which each module's 
interfaces reveal as little as possible about the module's inter workings and other 
modules are prevented from using information about the module that is not in the 
module's interface specification." [43] 
Encapsulation is "a software development technique that consists of isolating a system 
function or a set of data and operations on those data within a module and providing 
precise specifications for the module." [43] 
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Data that can be globally accessed can be incorrectly changed, and all the code would 
then have to be revalidated. Information hiding reduces these difficulties i f one module 
has to be changed then only one module has to be re validated. 
5.8.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.8.4 Metrics 
5.8.4.1 Is information hiding supported by APT? 
Information hiding is not supported in the conventional sense by the APT. It allows the 
code to be divided into CFCs and CFBs but there is no formal interface between them. 
Al l information passed around the program is via global variables. 
5.8.4.2 IHow many units are global variables normally used in? 
One in ten variables were analysed to provide the following data. The results listed 
below show the number of units that each variable was used, read and written in. The 
BSD sample variables demonstrated more clearly that the variables were read in one 
unit and written in another. 
It should be noted that the F&G system does not have unit defined global variables. 
The variables sampled in the F&G code were used in a maximum of 3 units (see Figure 
5:5), while in the BSD code the variables sampled were used in up to 7 units (see Figure 
5:2). 
It was interesting to note that some units contained local variables of the same name. 
Some of the local variables also had the same name as global variables. 
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5.8.4.3 Are global variables read and written in multiple units? 
Of the variables sampled there were instances of variables being both read and written 
to in more than one unit. The summary of the number of units that global variables 
were read and written in is provided in Figure 5:2 to Figure 5:7. The data is slightly 
inaccurate as it was taken from the translated code and flags in the translated code were 
assigned to in every block that they were used in, as that was seen as the best method of 
mapping the On itoction. 
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The BSD code demonstrated a number of instances where variables were read in one 
unit and written to in a different unit. This is demonstrated in Figure 5:2 to Figure 5:4. 
The data also demonstrated that variables tended to be written to in one or two units, 
often read in more and in many cases different units. This information has not been 
supported by software fault tree analysis which often indicates internal variables (not 
outputs) only being written to in one block. 
The F&G code demonstrated a large number of variables that were read in one unit and 
written to in two units. The unit in which the variable was read was normally one of 
the ones it was written to. There are also a number of instances where the variables are 
read in one unit and written to in a different unit. It was not analysed how many of the 
CFBs within a unit the variables were used in. The F&G variables sampled were used 
in a maximum of 3 units. See Figure 5:5 to Figure 5:7. 
5.8.5 Conclusions 
Information hiding and encapsulation was not an option available with the APT. A 
greater level of programming discipline was therefore required to not use variables in 
all of the units. Of the 392 F&G variables tested 283 were used in only one unit and the 
rest in a maximum of 3. In BSD, 377 global variables were sampled and 225 of them 
were used in only 1 unit but the rest were used in up to 7 units. 
Encapsulation aids safety as it reduces the chances of read write conflicts between units 
but it was not available in the APT system. 
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5.9 USE VERIFIED MODULES 
5.9.1 Goal 
Use a library of trusted or verified modules to avoid continually having to revalidate 
code 
5.9.2 Definition of Technique 
Well defined PBS (Programmable Electrical Systems) consist of hardware and software 
components and modules that are distinct and interact in a clearly defined way. In 
many PBS there are parts of the code that can be reused, which requires less 
revalidation. 
5.9.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.9.4 Metrics 
5.9.4.1 Was code reused? 
It is believed that all the code was written from scratch, as it is the first time that the 
PLC software was used. The SFC layout, structure and design were similar in the BSD 
and F&G code. They both had the same sort of language constructs and they both 
mainly used interlocks and similar sorts of functions. They both used SFCs in the self 
test units. 
5.9.4.2 Was code written so it could be reused? 
The code was written in a style that could potentially be reused. There was a self test 
unit in both pieces of code developed in a similar style. The units were divided partly 
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in terms of plant layout and partly in terms of function. Other platforms may have 
similar designs but each of them is unique. Also within the CFBs much of the code 
looked identical with just 1 or 2 variables replaced. This suggests the existence of 
informal or formal coding standards. 
5.9.5 Conclusion 
It is not easy to develop for reuse, because there is no method of encapsulating code to 
perform just one function. Theoretically reuse is possible. It is hindered by the 
dependence on global variables but there were definite similarities between the two 
samples of code. Reuse of previously verified code reduces the need of re-verification 
but increases the problem of identifying if 2 functions have the same functionality.. 
5.10 USE A STRONGLY TYPED PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE 
5.10.1 Goal 
Use a strongly typed programming language which will permit a high level of checking 
by the compiler to reduce the probability of faults. 
5.10.2 Definition of Technique 
User defined types can be formed from basic programming types, and strict checks are 
enforced at compile time to ensure that the correct type is used. 
5.10.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
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5.10.4 Metrics 
5.10.4.1 Is it a strongly typed language that was used? 
The manual [50] identifies the language as being a strongly typed language but it 
allowed Booleans and flags to be interchanged. It also did not insist on the 
recommendations that were made within the user manual. (See 5.11.4.2) 
5.10.4.2 Were there any instances of code that would not have compiled 
using a strongly typed language? 
Variables that were declared to be of type Booleans were assigned using the command 
to assign a flag throughout the F&G code. This should not have caused a problem 
because flags have values of true and false, but they are assigned differently from 
Booleans. 
Unit Boolean 
FZ_11B WSL_XS_20201 
FZ l i e WSL_XS_20215 
FZ_11J WSL_XS_20217 
FZ_1 IJ WSL_XS_20218 
FZ_1 IJ WSL_XS_20263 
FZ_1 I M WSL_XS_20202 
FZ 12G WSL_XS_20213 
FZ_12H WSL_XS_20260 
FZ_13F WSL_XS_20214 
FZ_13L WSL_XS_20206 
FZ 13L WSL_XS_20259 
FZ 51A WSL_XS_20212 
LOG PAGD WSL_XS_20261 
LOG_PISO WSL_XS_20209 
LOG_UAGD WSL_XS_20262 
LOG_Y_SD WSL_XS_20203 
Figure 5:8 
Table showing the Booleans that are assigned as flags 
Had the language been a strongly typed language the above Booleans would not have 
been able to be assigned the value of a flag. 
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5.10.4.3 Would a strongly typed language have aided maintenance by 
preventing erroneous code being included? 
In the math language timers can be started using the DELAY command or by setting 
the values of the timer. Both options could be used on the same timer but this is not 
recommended by the manual [51] - only one should be used. Two methods would make 
it more difficult during maintenance to identify the method used with individual timers. 
With the code supplied the SFCs used the DBLAY command and the CFBs did not use 
the DELAY command. Turning an individual timer on by two different methods was 
not used. 
5.10.4.4 Were variables declared and not used? 
Some global variables were declared and not used. A language that identified these 
may have proved useful as it may have identified code that had not been written. In the 
case of the BSD code all the text variables that were declared were not used but the 
C&E charts still identify textural output. The text variables had the same hardware 
address as an integer array; it is believed that the array was used to copy the text values 
into another integer array. Even digital inputs and outputs had been declared and not 
used; so were pieces of hardware made redundant or was the code omitted? The F&G 
system had 2 out of the 3 Word inputs that were declared but not used. 
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ESD F&G 
Type Quantity Type Quantity 
B 14 A I 2 
BA 44 B 12 
D I 148 BA 32 
DO 25 DUAL_LIM 1 
F 7 I 11 
I 12 lA 7 
T 59 SING_LIM 1 
TA 1 VSS 1 
WI 2 
Figure 5:9 
Table showing types and quantities of variables not used 
The F&G system had less variables declared globally to units, this might have been the 
reason that all of the variables declared at unit level were used. The ESD system 
though did have variables declared at the unit level that were not used. All the text 
variables declared at the unit level were also not used see Figure 5:10. 
Type Quantity 
B 57 
F 34 
I 243 
T 1000 
lA 1 
TRIP_HH 4 
TRIP_LL 1 
W I 4 
Figure 5:10 
Table showing types and quantities of ESD unit variables that were not used 
104 
5.10.5 Conclusions 
Strongly typed languages may not have allowed any of the above to occur; the Booleans 
would have to have been declared as flags. Allowing variables of different types to 
have the same hardware address seems to mean that the language was not as strongly 
typed as it could have been. 
Not allowing the above would remove the possibility of ambiguity and omissions but 
decreases flexibility. Code could potentially be written using a stronger typed language 
which could help to prevent omissions, detectable and undetectable errors. Enforcing 
the correct use of timers aids maintenance. A strongly typed programming language 
which the APT seemed to supply reduced the chances of careless mistakes with similar 
variable names being allowed unchecked. 
5.11 USE A S A F E SUBSET OF THE PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE 
5.11.1 Goal 
Use a subset of the language to reduce the probability of introducing programming 
faults and increase the probability of detecting faults. 
5.11.2 Definition of Technique 
Examine the language to determine the constructs that are error prone or difficult to 
analyse, especially using static analysis methods. A subset of the language should be 
defined to exclude these techniques. 
5.11.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
105 
5.11.4 Metrics 
5.11.4.1 What is the subset of the language and how do the removed 
techniques improve safety? 
Overview 
The top level of the program did not have any SFCs or CFCs; all of the code was in 
units. The main and safe SFC that was included in both programs was put in the 
'SELFTEST' ('S_TEST') unit. It was CFCs that were predominately used in both the 
ESD and the F&G code. 
CFCs 
Within each of the CFCs only the interlocks and math blocks were used. All of the 
math blocks were active so they could not be turned off, and interlocks cannot be turned 
off. The math blocks were not given any inputs (although this is allowed) and 
interlocks cannot be given any inputs. Hence none of the connection possibilities 
between the CFBs were used nor were any of the other CFB types which include:-
• Pieces of hardware types 
• Maths functions e.g. divider, summer, subtractor 
Al l of the coding that required interaction of variables was written in the math 
language. 
SFCs 
Most of the SFC functionality was used. Parallel execution was not used which is 
beneficial since it is easy to write invalid programs. Only the local safe SFCs were 
used and not either of the other two types. Using any safe SFCs would have made the 
exit conditions more confusing. The F&G SFC did not use any loops although the ESD 
SFC had one loop, (see Figure 3:3 and Figure 3:4) Also the condition to call the safe 
SFC was set outside the SFC, within a CFB. 
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SSABORT command was not used. This stops the execution of all the relevant SFCs. 
It would mean that it may not have been known where in the cycle the program had 
reached. 
Math language 
Al l of the math language was used apart from the printing. There was only one while 
loop used. Some of the APT defined procedures and functions were used. No piece of 
code that could only be compiled to SFPGM was used. 
5.11.4.2 Which error prone parts would the author have removed if 
possible? 
In 5.18 the example is cited of a function that according to the manual can only be 
compiled to RLL and a function that can only be compiled to SFPGM used in the same 
CFB. Since most of the code was compiled to RLL then the author would probably 
have excluded all functions and procedures that were compile only to SFPGM to 
prevent this sort of fault from occurring. This was reported to Siemens and the APT 
development team issued the following statement: 
"The APT Engineering organization has reviewed the manuals and has confirmed that 
the definition of BITS_TO_INT function is described incorrectly. Page 11-16 of the 
APT Programming Reference manual states in the first sentence that this function is 
"available only in SFPGM for Series 505 controllers." This limitation is incorrect. The 
function is available in both SFPGM and RLL. We have entered DT7265A into our 
APT Configuration Management and Problem Tracking system to document the 
incorrect statement in the manual. This Development Task (DT) will be incorporated 
during the next manual update cycle." 
107 
5.11.4.3 Was it possible to tell which were error prone parts? 
In some parts of the user manual it was difficult to comprehend what was the meaning 
of the definitions. These included:-
• When the on command on a flag turned off. 
• What parallel execution was - SFC predominately. 
• How often the input values were read by the program 
• What control errors are 
• Whether the parameter types were checked 
• Whether there is boundary checking on arrays 
5.11.5 Conclusions 
It is possible to use a subset of the APT language. The ESD and F&G code did not 
require all of the available features. Defining a subset should simplify static analysis 
performed on the code, which in turn should lead to safer code. 
Using only a subset of the code improves the understandability of the constructs. The 
safety that it should provide is the removal of omission and commission, and the 
analysis should be more likely to identify detectable and undetectable errors. 
5.12 DIFFERENT PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES USED 
5.12.1 Goal 
Use a programming language with a defined subset of language to produce easily 
verifiable code with the minimum of effort. 
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5.12.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.12.4 Metrics 
This goal is used against the three programming languages used by the APT, CFCs, 
SFCs and the math language, then the APT system as a whole is studied. The results 
are in 5.13 to 5.16 respectively. 
5.13 C F C S 
5.13.1.1 Is the language fully and unambiguously defined? 
There is confusion about the order the CFBs are compiled into and whether they remain 
within the CFCs at compile time. The semantics are also never formally defined. 
5.13.1.2 Is the language problem oriented? 
The language is problem oriented in as much as it allows a different chart to be built for 
each piece of hardware, or each function that is required to be performed on the 
platform. 
5.13.1.3 Does the language provide:-
• Block structure 
The entire programming language is made up of blocks. The CFC is divided into 
interconnecting CFB (Continuous Function Blocks); the sub-language used only had 
distinct CFBs. 
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• Run time checking and array boundary checking 
Arrays are not stored or used directly by the CFCs. 
• Parameter checking 
No parameters are passed so there is no requirement for parameter checking. 
5.13.1.4 Does the language encourage:-
• Use of small and manageable modules 
It is possible to have many CFCs in a program, each of which can be divided into 
CFBs. It is easier to maintain control of the CFC if it is all displayed on one screen. 
The F&G and ESD code's largest CFC corresponded to 2 screens, which was 50 
CFBs. 
• Restriction of access to data in defined modules 
Restriction of data is not possible since variables cannot be declared as local to an 
entire chart. Variables can be declared as local to the block which means that 
information cannot be accessed elsewhere otherwise they are global to a unit or all 
the code. 
• Definition of variable sub ranges 
Variables are not declared within the CFC. They are declared as part of one of the 
other programs. 
• Any other type of error limiting construction 
The subset of blocks used did not take inputs and outputs and the math blocks were 
set so that they could be turned off. 
5.13.1.5 Features which make verification difficult should be avoided 
including:-
• Unconditional jumps (excluding sub routine calls) 
Each of the blocks are distinct entities and there is no connection between them, 
apart from the ordering which is decided at compile time. 
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• Recursion 
This is not possible. Each block is executed once before any block is repeated. 
• Pointers, heaps or any type of dynamic variable or object 
These are not possible. 
• Interrupt handling at source code level 
This is not supported. 
• Multiple entries or exits of loops, blocks or sub programs 
The blocks in the chart are distinct and can only be entered at one point, but the 
blocks of the charts are ordered at compile time and the ordering can be changed 
each time, so the entry point to the chart effectively changes. 
• Variant records or equivalence 
There are no records stored in the CFCs 
• Procedural parameters 
There are no procedures, so procedures cannot be passed as parameters. 
5.13.2 Conclusions 
Many of the characteristics required for an IBC 1508 language were found in the subset 
of CFC language that was used with the ESD and F&G code. The possibility of only 
using a much smaller subset was available, which enabled less confusion and greater 
rigidity over the characteristics of the code. 
5.14 S F C S 
5.14.1.1 Is the language fully and unambiguously defined? 
It was unclear how parallel execution within the steps worked; also none of the 
language was formally defined. 
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5.14.1.2 Is the language problem oriented? 
A different chart could be created for different functions or pieces of hardware. 
5.14.1.3 Does the language provlde:-
• Block structure 
The entire programming language is made up of blocks (steps). The chart is made 
up of steps that are joined together by transactions. This means that the code in each 
of the blocks can be quite small. In each of the steps there is math language text. 
• Run time checking and array boundary checking 
Arrays are not stored or used directly by the SFCs. 
• Parameter checking 
No parameters are passed so there is no requirement for parameter checking. 
5.14.1.4 Does the language encourage:-
• Use of small and manageable modules 
There can be any number of steps to an upper limit of 500 combined together and 
even any number of SFCs i f necessary. The SFC in the BSD code fitted onto two 
screens while the F&G SFC fitted onto three screens. Since all the steps are joined 
by transactions which can be the 'true' transaction the steps can be as small as 
desired. 
• Restriction of access to data in defined modules 
Variables cannot be declared as local to an entire chart, variables can be declared as 
local to the step which means that information cannot be accessed elsewhere. 
• Deflnition of variable sub ranges 
Variables are not declared within the SFC they are declared as part of the math 
language in the step or as part of the programming environment of the APT. So 
variable sub ranges are not relevant to SFCs. 
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• Any other type of error limiting construction 
Although the language supports parallel processing of steps the sub language did not 
use parallel processing. The ESD SFC had one loop back to previous steps, but the 
F&G did not. The sub language did not use SSABORT of the safe step which meant 
the whole SFC could not be stopped in an unknown state. 
The language encourages code that is divided into sequential blocks and it allows 
implicit delays where the code loops until the exit transition becomes true. Care has 
to be taken that the exit transition does become true, as this could potentially be a 
danger of the language. 
5.14.1.5 Features which make verification difficult should be avoided 
including:-
• Unconditional jumps (excluding sub routine calls) 
Jumps are made from one step to the next but they are dependent on the transition 
condition being true so they are not unconditional jumps. 
• Recursion 
This is not possible. 
• Pointers, heaps or any type of dynamic variable or object 
This is not possible. 
• Interrupt handling at source code level 
This is not supported 
• Multiple entries or exits of loops, blocks or sub programs 
There is only one entry step in an SFC. There are no multiple entrances to the steps 
in the SFC. The exit depends on which step is to become active next and hence 
which transaction is to be followed. The transition to the safe SFC can become true 
at any time so the active step is postponed. This was programmed so if the safe SFC 
was going to become active in a pass it occurred as soon as the safe SFC was turned 
on or not at all. When the safe SFC has finished the active step is stopped and the 
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return step becomes active. There is more than one final step in the SFC. The BSD 
SFC has four while the F&G SFC only has two. 
• Variant records or equivalence 
There are no records stored in the SFCs 
• Procedural parameters 
There are no procedures, so procedures cannot be passed as parameters. 
5.14.2 Conclusions 
Many of the characteristics required for an lEC 1508 language were found in the subset 
of the SFC language that was used with the BSD and F&G code. The program proved 
that a subset of the language could be used. It was possible to create loops in steps, and 
loops in the SFC that did not exit. 
5.15 MATH LANGUAGE 
5.15.1.1 Is the language fully and unambiguously defined? 
There is ambiguity defining turning an 'on' flag automatically off. The language is not 
formally defined but defined in natural language with examples in the manual. 
5.15.1.2 Is the language problem oriented? 
It is similar to Pascal so it is oriented round assignments and conditions. 
5.15.1.3 Does the language provide:-
• Block structure 
The language does not support a block structure, but the language is expected to be 
within a block of another language. 
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• Run time checking and array boundary checking 
There is run time checking. 
• Parameter checking 
Parameters are passed to the math language defined procedures. 
5.15.1.4 Does the language encourage:-
• Use of small and manageable modules 
The size of a block of math language is dependent on the amount of information that 
is to be processed in that block and that is dependent on the design of the CFC and 
the SFC so the actual block size is progranuner and designer dependent. 
• Restriction of access to data in deHned modules 
Variables can be declared within the block which means that these variables can only 
be accessed in the blocks. Most of the variables are declared globally outside the 
math block in which case the data is accessible to any of the blocks. Only Booleans, 
integers, reals, timers or arrays can be declared within the block. 
• Deflnition of variable sub ranges 
Variables declared within the block cannot be given a sub range although they can be 
given an initial value. 
• Any other type of error limiting construction 
The manual does not encourage the use of while loops, and there is only one while 
loop in the ESD code and none in the F&G code. 
The compiler has allowed Booleans to be used as flags in more than one instance in 
different blocks of code (see 5.10). 
116 
5.15.1.5 Features which make verification difficult should be avoided 
including:-
• Unconditional jumps (excluding sub routine calls) 
No unconditional jumps are allowed in the math language code. 
• Recursion 
This is not possible. 
• Pointers, heaps or any type of dynamic variable or object 
These are not possible. 
• Interrupt handling at source code level 
This is not supported 
• Multiple entries or exits of loops, blocks or sub programs 
Each block is entered at the start and either the initial code or the main body of the 
code is executed depending on whether it is the first loop of the execution or later 
ones. The exit is when the last statement of code in either the initial part or the main 
part is executed. 
• Variant records or equivalence 
There are no records stored in the CFCs 
• Procedural parameters 
There are no procedures, so procedures cannot be passed as parameters. 
5.15.2 Conclusions 
Many of the characteristics required for an IBC 1508 language were found in the subset 
of Math language that was used with the BSD and F&G code. It was possible to use a 
subset of the language and avoid all the problem areas identified in IBC 1508. 
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5.16 APT TOOL 
5.16.1.1 Is the language fully and unambiguously defined? 
Al l the languages and their interactions are defined apart from the parts cited 5.13 to 
5.15. The ordering of the of the entire system is not clearly defined. 
5.16.1.2 Is the language problem oriented? 
It allows the code to be divided into units with respect to the functional units of the 
platform. 
5.16.1.3 Does the language provide:-
• Block structure 
Code can be divided into units which then allows the use of one or more 
programming language, which themselves are divided into blocks. 
• Parameter checking 
Parameters are not passed between the various parts of the programs. 
5.16.1.4 Does the language encourage:-
• Use of small and manageable modules 
The facility is provided to divide the code into units and then to divide each of the 
units into one or more programs written as either CFCs or SFCs. 
• Restriction of access to data in deflned modules 
Most of the variables declared within the APT are global; in the F&G code the 
majority are global to the entire program, while with the ESD about half are global 
to the entire program while the other half are declared as global to the entire contents 
of one unit. 
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• Definition of variable sub ranges 
Variables cannot be declared to have sub ranges. 
• Any other type of error limiting construction 
5.16.1.5 Features which make verification difficult should be avoided 
including:-
• Unconditional jumps (excluding sub routine calls) 
These are not allowed in any of the languages supported by the APT. 
• Recursion 
This is not allowed in any of the languages supported by the APT. 
• Interrupt handling at source code level 
This is not supported 
• Multiple entries or exits of loops, blocks or sub programs 
The SFC starts at the beginning and finishes at one of the end steps,(see 5.14) The 
CFCs are reordered at compile time and each CFB is executed in an order in a loop. 
• Variant records or equivalence 
Recipes are records in which every part has to have a declared type. 
• Procedural parameters 
User defined procedures (CFCs, CFBs, SFCs) could not be called. 
5.16.2 Conclusions 
Many of the characteristics required for an IBC 1508 language were found in the subset 
of languages that were used with the BSD and F&G code. The system allowed safer 
subsets to be used. There is the potential problem of not knowing the ordering of the 
system. It is possible to build SFCs that do not terminate. On the whole most of the 
accepted problem areas are avoided either by the APT or the subset of the language. 
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5.17 DESIGN EASILY ANALYSABLE PROGRAMS 
5.17.1 Goal 
Design programs so analysis is easy and feasible and the program is fully testable. 
5.17.2 Definition of Technique 
Programs should be designed so that they are easy to analyse using static analysis 
techniques. To do this structured programming methods should be followed - these 
include:-
• Module control flow should be composed of small structured components 
• Modules should be small 
• Number of possible paths through a program should be small 
• Program parts should be decoupled 
• Complex calculations should not be the basis of branching / looping decisions. 
• Branch and loop decisions should be related to the module input parameters 
• Boundaries between different types of meanings should be simple 
5.17.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.17.4 Metrics 
5.17.4.1 What is the size of modules and are they small? 
I f a module is taken to be a unit then size can be calculated by looking at the number of 
lines of code in the unit, the number of CFCs or the number of CFBs in each unit. The 
number of lines of code can vary depending on the length of statements, most of which 
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were no longer than a screen width or were moved onto the next line. See graphs 
Figure 4:6 to Figure 4:11. 
The BSD code is divided into 38 units, each containing between 1 and 14 CFCs. Most 
of them have between 4 and 7 CFCs which could be considered small. The lines of 
code per unit and the number of CFBs relates directly to the number of CFCs per unit. 
Only two of the units have over 5000 lines of code and one of them has 17000 lines 
which is much higher than the others. This same unit has a high number of CFBs and 
the highest number of CFCs. So this unit could not be called comparatively small. 
The F&G code is divided into more units and there are fewer lines of code compared 
with the BSD code. This mostly suggests that the units are smaller than those in the 
BSD system. There are 55 units each having at least 1 CFC and at most 11; many of 
them have 7 CFCs. The number of lines of code in each unit relates directly to the 
number of CFBs per unit and not strongly correlated the number of CFCs per unit. The 
maximum lines of code in a unit is 8000 although many of them have under the 2000. 
The F&G program has smaller units than the BSD program; both programs have one 
unit that is considerably larger than the others. Most of the units though are relatively 
small, without being so small that there would be hundreds of units; which is thought to 
increase complexity. 
5.17.4.2 The number of paths through a program is dependent on 
branching and loops 
The BSD code contains only one while loop which either does not execute, or 
terminates in 450 cycles or less see Figure 5:28 for the code. The number of paths 
through a conditional statement is dependent on the level of nesting which is a 
maximum of 4. The number of ' i f , 'else' and 'else i f branches is analysed in 5.20. 
The actual number of paths through the entire piece of code is a factorial of the number 
of mathblocks in the code, since the ordering of the CFBs is unknown. This is because 
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it is determined at compile time and so could be different each time it is compiled; 
although it probably isn't as there is a system for determining execution order at 
compile time. 
5.17.4.3 Are parts of the program decoupled? 
The CFBs and CFCs are not decoupled because they are all dependent on global 
variables that are dependent on other parts of the program. 
5.17.4.4 Where are complex calculations used as the basis of branching 
and could this be changed? 
There are no complex calculations although in some instances the branching is 
dependent on long combinations of and's and or's. Conditional statements that are 
multi lines long could be regarded as complex logical expressions. There was limited 
functionality within a branch i f the conditional had been complex. This indicates a 
value that was dependent on many others, often tracing back to inputs. 
5.17.4.5 Branching based on input parameters? 
There are no input parameters in the code studied. Therefore the branching conditions 
cannot be based on input parameters. Some of the math blocks can take inputs but in 
the code studied they have not been used. Code is easier to analyse if parameter passing 
is not allowed because the origination of variables does not need to be tracked, or where 
variables were passed from. Global variables though, which were used within the 
system, can be just as hard to analyse. 
5.17.4.6 Do math blocks use predominately global or local variables? 
In the F&G system only one unit has its own set of global variables declared. All the 
rest use global variables and the variables declared within the CFBs. The F&G code 
has 3989 global variables while the ESD code has 4413 global variables and 5899 
variables that are declared global to only one unit. The ESD math blocks use a mixture 
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of global and unit global variables in the code. Many of the CFBs declare their own 
local variables. 
5.17.5 Conclusions 
The code is written in relatively small modules which allow a modest number of paths 
through each block. There are a large number of paths through the program since the 
CFB order is determined by the compiler. Variables that are used are declared globally 
either to a unit or the whole program. The declaration of variables is external to the 
code within the APT tool. 
Input parameters have not been used. The major difficulty of the static analysis would 
therefore be to prove that the ordering of the CFBs is immaterial. The code that was 
written had CFC names that were often similar or contained the unit name so most of 
the CFC could be joined to a unit by their name. This was a great help during static 
analysis. 
5.18 USE DATA FLOW ANALYSIS 
5.18.1 Goal 
Use data flow analysis to detect poor and potentially incorrect data structures 
5.18.2 Definition of Technique 
Data flow: " the sequence in which data transfer, use, and transformations are 
performed during the execution of a computer program". [43] 
Combines information from control flow analysis with information about which 
variables are read or written in different parts of the code. Variables that are important 
to identify are those that are:-
• written more than once without being read - omitted code 
• written but never read - redundant code 
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5.18.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.18.4 Metrics 
5.18.4.1 Were all variables written to and read from? 
The code could not be checked for variables read and then written and vice versa since 
the ordering of the CFBs is not predefined. Variables that were written to but never 
read could be an indication of redundant code. Variables that were read and never 
written to could be an indication of omitted code, or, alternatively,variables that have 
been used as constants. The variables listed below do not include variables that were 
not used only the variables that have not been written to but have been read and vice 
versa. It would be expected for inputs to be read and not written to and outputs to be 
written to but not read, but this was not always demonstrated. 
Not Written Not Read 
Type Quantity Type Quantity 
Dl 1189 DF 6 
A! 229 DO 474 
Wl 1 BA 5 
BA 1 B 33 
DF 1 1 232 
B 89 lA 2 
1 4 
Figure 5:11 
ESD code variables not written and read 
Of the variables declared globally to the ESD system all the inputs that had been used 
were read only. The digital flag (DF) is treated as an output so it is interesting that it 
was read but not written. Most of the digital flags that were used were written to and 
read - 378 while only 6 of them were just written to. 183 of the digital outputs were 
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both read and written to. While only 11 of the 259 declared integers were read and 
written to. 
Not Written Not Read 
Type Quantity Type Quantity 
Wl 2 WO 4 
B 625 B 851 
BA 9 BA 8 
1 3 DX 2 
lA 1 1 58 
TRIP ALL 5 lA 2 
TRIP HH 51 
TRIP_LIM 71 
TRIP LL 92 
TRIP LLL 10 
Figure 5:12 
ESD variables declared in units that were not read or written 
Of the variables declared as global to one unit in the ESD system, the inputs and 
outputs were either used as expected or not used at all. 17 of the 19 BA (Boolean 
arrays) that were used were not read and written to, this can be seen in Figure 5:12 
which demonstrates that 9 were not written to and 8 were not read from. The BSD 
recipes that were not written to could have been used as constants, since they did not 
contain any inputs only integers and reals. 
Not Written Not Read 
Type Quantity Type Quantity 
Dl 325 DF 56 
Al 199 WO 4 
Wl 1 DO 12 
C O D E L L 3 1 128 
B 11 lA 4 
DUAL LIM 57 B 337 
DX 2 
1 267 
lA 1 
SING LIM 130 
ST 1 
Figure 5:13 
F&G code not written and read 
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Of the global variables in the F&G system, all the inputs used were read and not written 
to. The recipes consist only of integers and reals (not inputs) so it could be that they 
were used as constants. Of the integer arrays only 1 was read and written to. The 
number of outputs used was not equal to the number write only so some of them must 
have been read. 
There were 35 Booleans declared local to a unit and three of them were not written to. 
The three not written to were declared as false. 
This analysis has identified the possibility of large amounts of redundant or omitted 
code. 
5.18.4.2 Some internal procedures should not be used in the same CFB 
The analysis identified procedures that should not be used in the same CFB. This has 
been resolved and they can in fact be used together since the manual was out of date, 
(see 5.11.4.2) 
5.18.5 Conclusions 
Data flow analysis proved to be useful. It demonstrated an overview of the whole 
program which would aid understanding i f the workings of the entire program are not 
understood. It demonstrated where the functions / procedures may have been used 
incorrectly but in fact were not. 
The information about variables was very interesting; the study revealed that of the 
4413 global variables declared in the ESD system many were not used as expected by 
analysis or not at all. There were 3958 global variables declared in the F&G system 
many of which were not used as expected. This analysis of the code indicated that there 
could be redundant and omitted code in both of the programs. On further investigation 
it was demonstrated that many of the variables not written to were used as constants, or 
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a connection to a data link. It did identify three variables that had been used incorrectly 
which in itself proved the benefit of the technique. 
Since the data analysis has proved useful on the BSD and F&G code it would be 
assumed that it could be used beneficially on other BSD and F&G systems. 
5.19 USE CONTROL FLOW ANALYSIS 
5.19.1 Goal 
Use Control flow analysis to detect poor and potentially incorrect program structures. 
5.19.2 Definition of Technique 
Control flow :- "The sequence in which operations are performed during the execution 
of a computer program" [43]. Control flow should identify code which does not follow 
good programming techniques. A directed graph can then be created and analysed. It 
should identify :-
• inaccessible code e.g. due to unconditional loops 
• knotted code - poorly structured programs can only be reduced to a knot composed 
of several nodes. 
5.19.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
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5.19.4 Metrics 
5.19.4.1 What does the procedural control flow look like? 
Figure 4:20 and Figure 4:21are control flow diagrams of the F&G code. 
The procedural control flow is as expected from the APT top level layout. Figure 4:20 
• the main program calls the init parts of all the CFBs 
• then the main parts for the high interlocks, 
• then the SFC (which is shown on a separate diagram Figure 4:21) 
• then the two mathblocks. 
This is quite a straight forward control flow graph that does not show complicated flow 
of control in the code. The graphs were drawn from the translated code. 
5.19.4.2 What is the control flow within the code? 
A graph was not drawn of the internal structures of the code, although this is possible. 
The code consisted of GOTO type jumps in the SFC and from a hand performed 
analysis of the F&G SFC there was no code that was inaccessible. Within the main 
body of the code there were conditional statements that were nested up to four levels. 
(See Figure 4:13) The only while loop in the ESD code can be located in one of the 
CFBs. It was studied to ensure that it would terminate. 
5.19.4.3 Does the SFC control flow program look like the SFC diagram? 
The SFC chart demonstrates identical control flow to the control flow diagram of the 
SFC part of the translated code. They both show the same information; this would 
suggest that the SFC programming language shows a higher level of abstraction than 
WSL and so should prevent incorrect programming structures. 
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5.19.5 Conclusions 
Control flow diagrams can be drawn of both the top level and the lower levels of the 
code. The top level diagram did not increase the information about the program 
structure. It gave information about the size and numbers of units, and number of CFBs 
at a glance for maintenance etc. 
The control flow diagrams of the individual pieces of code may have indicated more 
information about where complicated and inaccessible code could be located. Since the 
code consisted mainly of conditional statements a study of the values of the conditionals 
has greater likelihood of locating the omitted and complicated code than a control flow 
diagram. 
Control flow analysis of the overall layout of procedures and units is not necessary with 
graphical languages. 
5.20 USE STRUCTURED BASED TESTING 
5.20.1 Goal 
Use structured based testing to apply tests which exercise certain subsets of the program 
structure. 
5.20.2 Definition of Technique 
Testing is based on the analysis of the program, where a large fraction of selected 
program elements are executed. Below is the main selection of subsets that are of 
differing vigour:-
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• Statement testing 
Each statement is tested once. In the case of a conditional statement then only one of 
the paths will be tested. Loops have to be entered at least once. 
• Branch testing 
All branches of every condition should be tested, i.e. the then, else if, and the else 
branches should all be executed at least once. 
• Compound condition testing 
Every condition in the conditional i.e. those parts linked by 'and' and 'or' should be 
tested as true and false. 
• LCSAJ - (linear code sequence and jump testing) 
Testing all sequences of code between jumps, or between the start of the program 
and the start of a jump, or the end of a jump and the end of the program. 
• Data flow testing 
The test paths are selected by their data usage, i.e. a path where a variable is both 
written to and read. 
• Call graph testing 
The test path is so that every function that is used is executed 
• Entire path testing 
Test all possible paths through the code. 
• FAT's (factory acceptance testing) 
The tests are performed by checking that each line of the C&E chart is executed 
correctly. 
5.20.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
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5.20.4 Metrics 
5.20.4.1 Statement testing 
Most of the code is in 'conditional statements'. The level of nesting of the code can be 
up to four levels i f there is an outermost 'else' or 'else i f then none of the inner levels 
of the ' i f branch are necessarily tested. 
F&G code ESD code 
if 8102 6742 
else 4190 2353 
else if 12 1128 
Figure 5:14 
Table showing the approximate number of times each of the key words were used in the programs 
I f the number of conditional statements are taken as a maximum approximation of the 
number of statement tests and the number of conditional statements minus the 
maximum number of nest levels in each math block is taken as a minimum number of 
statement test cases then Figure 5:15 gives an approximate number. 
minimum maximum 
F&G 4057 8102 
ESD 6742 3753 
Figure 5:15 
Table showing the approximate number of statement tests 
5.20.4.2 Branch testing 
This increases the number of test cases in the code in comparison to statement testing. 
It is believed that all the test cases should be accessible. 
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Branch Testing 
F&G 12,304 
ESD 10,245 
Figure 5:16 
Table showing the approximate number of branch tests 
5.20.4.3 Compound condition testing 
Compound testing represents a large increase in the number of test cases but could 
prove very useful since many of the conditions are based on more than one conditional. 
Some of the condition statements are based on a long string of combined conditional. 
Testing that they work correctly would be beneficial since they are the parts of the code 
that are most likely to lead to confusion because of there length. 
Compound Testing 
F&G 15,694 
ESD 21,586 
Figure 5:17 
Table showing the approximate number of compound tests 
5.20.4.4 LCSAJ - (linear code sequence and jump testing) 
The ESD code only has one while loop and the F&G code has no while loops, so unless 
the SFCs and CFBs are included as jumps there would be very little benefit to this form 
of testing. 
Each of the SFC steps should be considered to start and end with a jump, but some of 
them wil l need to be tested twice as the first loop may contain different code to the 
future loops. So executing each step the once would mean that some of the code is not 
executed. 
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Using this method each of the CFBs could be treated as individual identities and so the 
ordering of them would not have to be fixed. Since the ordering is fixed at compile 
time the start and the end of each of the CFBs could be considered as a jump. 
LCSAJ Testing 
F&G 12,304 
ESD 10,245 
Figure 5:18 
Table showing the approximate number of LCSAJ tests 
Note all the block of code between the conditional statements would have to be added to the value 
in Figure 5:18 and the number of CFBs and Steps in the program.. 
This testing would seem to fi t in with this sort of program although there is only one 
explicit loop in the code. 
5.20.4.5 Data flow testing 
Data flow testing would be similar to taking a slice through the code and follow a 
variable being written to and read from. The study in 5.8 indicated that each of the 
variables were used in a small number of units. This would mean that a high number of 
the variables would have to be traced through the code to gain a reasonable coverage. It 
has also been identified that there is a high degree of interaction between variables. It 
would also be relatively difficult to identify variables that do not overlap and to obtain 
distinct blocks of code e.g. for the F&G code most slices seem to go into the SFC. 
5.20.4.6 Call graph testing 
Enforcing that all of the function and procedure calls are carried out would require a 
level of testing between that of branch testing and compound condition testing. This is 
due to the fact that in many of the condition statements contain function calls. This is 
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probably easier to obtain than the compound condition testing and it provides more test 
cases than the branch testing. 
5.20.4.7 Entire path testing 
Entire path testing would be impossible for these systems. It is even more difficult than 
with a normal large program because the ordering of the CFBs is undefined. This 
implies that every possible combination of ordering of the CFBs would have to be 
tested along with every combination of every path through each of the CFBs and the 
SFC. 
5.20.5 FAT (Factory Acceptance Tests) 
Many PLC systems are tested presently by using FATs. These are performed by 
relating directly to the C&E chart. For each input the outputs are all checked for 
correctness. This sort of testing covers all the cases for which the program is specified, 
but it does not necessarily check any of the redundant parts of the code, or self checking 
parts. 
ESD F&G 
Number of inputs 327 426 
Test cases for inputs 868 489 
Test cases for intertrips 162 320 
Number of outputs 486 376 
Number of intertrips 161 265 
Figure 5:19 
Table demonstrating number of FAT tests 
The F&G C&E charts specified quite a high amount of voting whereas the ESD C&E 
charts did not specify any voting. In some cases in the ESD C&E charts the on and the 
off value of an input were considered rather than just the on value. 
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5.20.6 Conclusions 
There seem to be considerably less test cases for the FAT than other forms of testing. 
But the FAT test should perform at least the statement testing in each test since every 
CFB is executed in every block. The FAT may not test the SFC as that can be turned 
off. 
The more testing that is performed the greater the level of safety. Testing does not 
identify all of the software faults especially as it is not possible to perform entire path 
testing. The compound condition testing will force the greatest number of test cases. 
Branch testing should probably be the minimum test coverage considered and not 
statement testing. 
LCSAJ testing seems to be ideal for this sort of code since it allows each step in a SFC 
and each CFB in a CFC to be tested individually. Although interface testing between 
the CFBs and the SFC would also have to be performed. 
5.21 U S E F M E C A 
5.21.1 Goal 
Use FMECA (Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis) to rank the criticality of 
component failure which could result in injury, damage or system degradation through 
single point failures. 
5.21.2 Definition of Technique 
FMECA's are similar to FMEA's (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) with more 
information requiring identification. 
FMEA is performed on the hardware normally after the detailed design stage once the 
hardware and interactions between them have been defined. The method is to identify 
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for each piece of hardware, in the system, the reasons why it might fail, and then 
identify their failure modes, i.e. the frequency of this specific type of failure. This is 
normally calculated by the manufacturer. (Care should be taken though since this could 
be the average and the actual value may be much lower. Also the value obtained by the 
manufacturer will be under a specific set of test conditions.) The seriousness of a failure 
should then be assessed e.g. critical. 
The FMECA part then identifies what can be done to prevent the seriousness of the 
failure, i.e. the redundancy and the fail safe design requirements that are needed. It also 
requires making a note of what has been done to prevent the seriousness of the failings. 
[13] 
5.21.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.21.4 Metrics 
5.21.4.1 Use FMECA with the PLC code? 
FMECA can be used with these programs, except the ESD and F&G code both have a 
high proportion of inputs and outputs which would make the analysis long and tedious. 
It is not known from the code and the C&E charts whether they use the same type of 
hardware which would reduce the amount of work to be performed. The information 
about the number of inputs, outputs, valves (and hence hardware devices) is from the 
code which means that the redundancy identified in this sort of analysis has already 
been added. 
It would be assumed that all hardware parts used would have their failure rate frequency 
calculated. The F&G system has a total of 728 known hardware devices while the ESD 
has a total of 2260. Each of these would require a table to be created for them 
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identifying how they can fail, the frequency of the failure, the seriousness of the failure, 
what can be done to prevent the failure. I f it were to say take an hour to perform the 
analysis on each piece of hardware it would take 3,000 hours. Working a 35 hours 
week would give 85 weeks worth of work. The original estimation could be inaccurate 
and it may take more or less time and it will take less time with experience. 
5.21.4.2 What information can be obtained? 
The information that can be obtained is the location and type of failures that are likely 
to occur and how to guard against them. If the mean time of failure is very low then 
either the piece of hardware can be changed, or less dependency put on it, i.e. redundant 
hardware and spare parts should be easily available during maintenance of the system. 
FMECA will identify, on average, how frequently an individual piece of hardware will 
fail, and not evaluate it in conjunction with any other items of hardware. It will identify 
where the safety problems are likely to arise and how they can be fixed, but not how 
hardware failures are likely to interact. 
5.21.5 Conclusions 
Although the amount of hardware that is required for this system is large the analysis 
identifies important information. It gives information about where the failures are 
likely to be found and how to improve the safety. I f this information is then studied in 
conjunction with the layout of the hardware and where and how it is used rather than 
just the single point of failures it would provide very useful information about how to 
obtain the safest hardware configuration. This is because "it can be used to identify the 
redundancy and fail safe design requirements, single point failure modes, and inspection 
points and spare part requirements." [13] Analysis can be used with hardware in the 
system and should provide hardware system safety. 
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5.22 USE SOFTWARE FAULT T R E E ANALYSIS 
5.22.1 Goal 
Use software fault tree analysis (SFTA) to perform an analysis of events that will lead 
to a hazard or a serious consequence. 
5.22.2 Definition of Technique 
A starting event is the immediate cause of a hazard; the analysis is performed from 
branch to root along a tree path, using logical 'and' and 'or' operators between nodes if 
more than one follow a node. Fault tree analysis was originally developed for 
identifying problems with hardware but is now being developed for software. 
Fault trees can be applied to software but "the analysis is used for verification, as the 
code must have already been written to generate the trees"[13]. The other benefit of 
software fault trees is that theoretically much of the process can be automated. 
Software fault trees can be used with the pre written software for two methods. The 
first is to check the internal values of the code, i.e. an array is never out of range, or a 
variable cannot reach a dangerous value. The other method is to relate the code to a 
hazard to prove that the hazard cannot occur i.e. an output is not assigned false when it 
should be true (normally dependent on input). Building a software fault tree is labour 
intensive but it looks at high level faults and not at specification. 
The technique is similar to that used in hardware fault trees; a hazardous event is 
identified and is made the top (root) event. For example a hazard could be variable x 
being equal to 10, and then the code is followed down the tree until it is proved that x 
can not be made equal to 10. The tree is built directiy from the code and as such is a 
representation of it. As branches on the tree are developed that can not possibly occur 
they are no longer considered. With SFTA it is the loops that cause problems; each 
iteration of the loop can be studied, which may lead to very large or infinite trees. The 
other option is to prove the tree by induction in which case the following have to be 
proved:-
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• hazard cannot occur if there is no iteration 
• hazard cannot occur if there is 1 iteration 
• hazard cannot occur if there is n +1 iterations 
I f the second two statements can be drawn as identical trees apart from n then the tree 
can be shown to not cause the desired hazard by induction. [52] The software fault tree 
analysis condition of a hazard is believed to be the weakest pre condition of that 
hazard. A software fault tree is preferable though because it gives more detailed 
information. Nancy Leveson defined the templates of trees found below. 
Assignment cause; 
event 
Change in value 
c a u s e s event 
Exception 
c a u s e s 
event 
1 
Operand 
evaluation 
c a u s e s event 
Figure 5:20 
Template of an assignment software fault tree 
F(p1,p2,p3..) 
causes event 
Evaluation of 
parameters 
causes event 
Execution of F 
with p1, p2, p3... 
causes event 
Failure of F 
causes event 
Figure 5:21 
Template of a function software fault tree 
Event in 
IF_THEN_ELSE 
Condition T R U E , Condition Condition F A L S E , 
THEN part evaluation E L S E part 
causes event causes event causes event 
Condition T R U E 
before 
I F _ T H E N _ E L S E 
statement 
THEN part 
causes 
event 
Condition F A L S E 
before 
IF_THEN_ELSE 
statement 
E L S E part 
causes 
event 
Wnile statement 
causes event 
Statement 
executed n times 
Statement not 
executed 
Condition false 
before wttile 
statement 
Condition tme 
before while 
statement 
nt" Iteration 
causes event 
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Figure 5:22 
Template of an 'if-then-else' software fault tree 
Figure 5:23 
Template of a while loop software fault tree 
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5.22.3 Questions 
1. Is this technique possible to use with the provided PLC code? 
2. Does it give information about any safety features? 
5.22.4 Metrics 
5.22.4.1 Can a software fault tree be built for a math block? 
A software fault tree can only be built for any math block if it is possible to build a sub 
fault tree for all of the statement types found within the code. A template has been built 
for all the statement types apart from:-
• Edge function (defined in the math language)-due to it requiring previous knowledge 
• Timers - as the trees do not hold time information 
• While loop - too much iteration to template. 
The edge function has to become an end node within a tree. The timers can sometimes 
be analysed and the while loop can be analysed. Two examples of analysed math code 
have been included in the code the first one is to determine if the digital output value 
PAHH_14320IS = true (Figure 5:27) and the second is to see if an array in the while 
loop can go out of range (Figure 5:29). Before the trees could be built a template for 
each type of statement has to be built a selection are included give in Figure 5:24 to 
Figure 5:26. 
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Value = ? 
X and y = ? 
T3 
C 
< 
x = ? y = ? 
Figure 5:24 
An assignment statement 
IntageM = ? 
pack_blts( 
Boolean_Array1) = ? 
Boolean_Array1(1) = Boolean_Array1[21 next bit of ? 
Ttils part may be 
optional 
Boolean_Array1(nl ' 
ntti bit of ? 
Figure 5:25 
Pack bits function 
Must be present 
it condition = tme 
H condition = false elsit(1)condition = true 
What is ttying to be 
proved 
Must be present 
JTTL 
if condition = false alsif(1)condition = false elsil(2)condition = true 
if condition = false elsit(1)condition = false elsif(2)conditlon - false 
Figure 5:26 
An if statement 
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Building the tree for the CFB that contained the while loop was more difficult than for 
the one containing the digital output. Building trees with functions, conditional 
statements and assignments is a case of filling information into a template. 
The math block corresponding to the fault tree below (without comments) 
Integer: x; 
Integer: y; 
Begin 
Init 
I : = l ; { new_array index } 
counter := 1; { Counts the number of alarms detected } 
Body 
x : = l ; { Number of tags in FIRST_UP_LST } 
y : = i ; { Increment to array_text location } 
WHILE ((x <= 450) AND (counter < 50)) LOOP { Check all ID_TAG locations } 
{ until 50 alarms detected } 
IF (ID_TAG[x]) THEN { I f tag is in alarm } 
MARK_TAG[x] := true; { This tag already accounted for} 
counter := counter + 1 ; \ Increment alarm counter } 
time_fup[I] := : array_time[l]; { Pick up the current time } 
time_fup[I+l] = array_time[2] { Pick up the current time } 
time_fup[I+2] = array_time[3] { Pick up the current time } 
time_fup[I+3] = array_time[4] { Pick up the current time } 
time_fup[I+4] = array_time[5] { Pick up the current time } 
time_fup[I+5] = array_time[6] { Pick up the current time } 
time_fup[I+6] = array_time[7] { Pick up the current time } 
time_fup[I+7] = array_time[8] { Pick up the current time } 
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new_array[I] := array_text[y]; { Copy the text by copying the } 
new_array[I+l] 
new_array[I+2] 
new_array[I+3] 
new_array[I+4] 
new_array[I+5] 
new_array[I+6] 
new_array[I+7] 
new_array[I+8] 
new_array[I+9] 
new_array[I+10] 
new_array[I+ll] 
new_array[I+12] 
new_array[I+13] 
new_array[I+14] 
= array_text[y+l] 
= array_text[y+2] 
= array_text[y+3] 
= array_text[y+4] 
= array_text[y+5] 
= array_text[y+6] 
= array_text[y+7] 
= array _text[y+8] 
= array_text[y+9] 
:= array_text[y+10] 
:= array_text[y+ll] 
:= array_text[y+12] 
:= array_text[y+13] 
:= array_text[y+14] 
{ integer value } 
IF (counter < 50) THEN 
I := I + 15; { Increment the new_array index } 
{ ready to write the next tag } 
ELSE 
I := 1; { Reset new_array index } 
ENDIF; 
ENDIF; 
X : = X + 1; { Increment the ID_TAG index } 
y := (((x - 1) * 15 ) + 1 ); { Increment the array_text index} 
END LOOP; 
Figure 5:28 
Code of the ESD While loop 
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Mark_Tag[>450] 
hazard before 
while loop 
X = = 1 
y = = 1 
hazard not in 
this CFB 
look In next 
not go Into 
while loop 
counter >= 50 
or x>450 
true before while 
statements in 
loopexecuted n 
times 
c 
< 
loop statements 
cause hazard 
X ^, <= 450 and 
counter^, < 50 
values tnie 
before while 
ID_TAG[x„.,] = false ID_TAG[x^,] = false 
Mark_tag[X^,] = true 
Hazard 
cannot occur 
here 
Y = (X„-1)*15+1 counter„ = counter. + n 
counter„ < 50 = true counter„ < 50 = false 
1=1+15 
Y = ((X-1)*15)+1 
1 = 1+15 
+ n -1 
Y=((X-1)*15)+1 
Hazard has not occured in the while loop 
Figure 5:29 
Hazard in while loop 
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It can be seen from the above examples that although it is possible to perform the SFTA 
on an individual CFB the variables in blocks are dependent on variables defined 
elsewhere. Building trees over more than one block is considered in section 5.22.4.3. 
Each case of a conditional statement has to be considered so if a tree goes through a 
'multi' branched 'conditional statement' with a high number of conditions then the tree 
will be large. 
5.22.4.2 Can a software fault tree be built for a math block? 
The code in each step of the SFC is math language and so is treated as above. The only 
problem with the SFC is that after each step has been analysed the transitions can cause 
looping problems. This is because each transition into the step and each transition out 
of the step has to be analysed to determine if the step could be on its n"^  re-execution. 
This leads to relatively large and complex trees but it was possible to build the software 
fault tree for both the BSD and F&G SFC. There are 10 templates that are associated 
with building the tree for the SFC, and the actual trees covered three pages of A3. 
In the F&G code most of the slices through the code demonstrate some sort of 
dependency on the SFC. For the trees to be used they would ideally be automated and 
it is not possible to automate the transitions of the SFC, the advantage though is that the 
tree for the transitions only need be built once as it can be reused. 
5.22.4.3 Can the whole program be combined? 
The examples above have demonstrated that SFTA on a single CFB or SFC is not 
sufficient, the remainder of the code has to be considered. The method of joining 
blocks would be to treat them as sequential pieces of code since only the piece of code 
relevant to the node are used the tree can just continue. I f a variable in a node at the 
end of a block is assigned to in more than one block then a tree has to be built for each 
of the blocks that the variable has a value assigned to it. Analysis so far has not 
demonstrated any instances of this occurring. 
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5.22.5 Conclusions 
SFTA can be performed on the code supplied. Loops are generated in the tree through 
numerous executions of the code. Since the BSD code has only one specific while loop 
and the F&G none, the SFTA should be easy to perform; it is not that simple though 
due to the SFC, timers and edge function. Another issue is also the fact that the whole 
system is developed in a loop. This sort of code would be ideal for SFTA had all the 
code been written using CFCs. Although it is not too difficult to build a tree for the 
SFC it just has to be performed manually. 
The trees provided much information about the code when they were drawn, such as 
hardware addresses that were assigned to more than one variable and potential looping 
of code. 
The advantage of this technique is that it does not compare the code to the specification 
which could be erroneous but to the hazardous events and whether they can be 
performed. Although this technique in many parts can be automated more information 
about the code can be obtained by doing it manually using the templates. A template 
has to be designed for each type of statement supported by the language. 
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5.23 A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
5.23.1 Insisted On By The Compiler 
• No pointers 
• No recursion 
• No dynamic variables 
• No dynamic objects 
• No unconditional jumps 
• No programmed interrupts 
5.23.2 Not Insisted On By The Compiler But Were Used 
• Coding standards 
• limiting module size (although some CFBs were still relatively long) 
5.23.3 Techniques Supported By The Language And Used 
• Strongly typed programming languages 
• A defined subset of CFCs 
• A defined subset of Math language (Structured text) 
• A defined subset of SFCs (none of the languages used had all the recommended properties.) 
• Designing easily analysable code. 
5.23.4 Techniques Supported By The Translated Code 
• Control flow analysis 
• Data flow analysis 
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5.23.5 Techniques Supported By The APT Code And Extra 
Information 
• Software fault tree analysis 
5.23.6 Techniques Not Supported By The APT Tool 
• Reuse of verified modules 
• Information hiding and encapsulation 
5.23.7 Techniques That Could Be Used With Difficulty 
• FMECA - due to the high number of hardware devices 
• Structure based testing - entire path testing is not possible, although statement path 
and branch testing may have proved possible. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The BSD and F&G code were successfully translated into WSL. Analysis was then 
performed on the code against a selection of IBC 1508 HR development techniques. 
The code that was translated was the FAT code for an Offshore Oil Platform. This 
code has been operational for at least 2 years. It was written using Siemens TI high 
level languages; CFCs, SFCs and math language. The languages were automatically 
translated into WSL using a number of programs. Perl scripts were used to determine 
variable types, names of CFBs and the ordering of the translation and building of the 
code. A C program was used to build the SFC equivalent in WSL and a YACC parser 
was built to translate each block of math language. Prior to building the parser every 
construct in the SFC, CFC and math language languages had to be identified, defined as 
precisely as possible and then defined in WSL (see mapping document Appendix HI). 
The languages were translated into the following constructs:-
• SFC An action system 
• CFC A procedure containing only procedure calls to each CFB, which in turn 
were procedures. 
• Math language The equivalent text based structure in WSL. 
During development of the mapping document and parser every construct had to be 
defined in WSL. This was performed by identifying the representation that closely 
mapped the PLC languages in WSL. The judgement was based on the knowledge of 
the languages that was available, since no formal semantics of the PLC languages were 
available. During the analysis phase of the thesis, some minor problems with the WSL 
representation were identified, although the syntax and semantics were technically 
correct. Analysis would have been easier i f a different representation had been used for 
a number of the constructs. These included:-
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• There was an 'init' procedure in the WSL representation of the SFC but none of the 
analysed code actually made use of this facility. Also the fact that the active step in 
the main SFC remains active during execution of the safe SFC until control returns 
to the main SFC was not represented in WSL. This fact though was recognised 
implicitly for use during the analysis. 
• There was an extra procedure at the end of each block in which flags had been used 
to check if the flags had been turned 'on'. Only the 'clear' and 'latch' commands 
were used, not the 'on' command. Therefore the data collected regarding which 
unit's variables were read and written to was slightly inaccurate. 
• The time representation within the timers was difficult to analyse both from the PLC 
and WSL code as only static and not dynamic analysis was performed. 
The key characteristics of the BSD and F&G code were identified and are summarised 
below:-
• The number of lines of code (including blank lines but not comments) was 199,431 
for the BSD system and 88,607 for the F&G system. 
• The BSD system had 38 units while the F&G code had 55 units. 
• Most of the variables declared in the systems are global variables. Since there was 
no parameter passing, all data transfer was via global variables. The analysis of a 
subset of the global variables identified that they were predominately used in one or 
two units to a maximum of seven in the BSD code and three in the F&G code. 
• Variables were not used exactly as expected but most when analysed by the company 
supplying the code had been used correctly. 
• The CFCs consisted of two types of distinct CFBs, the active math blocks and 
interlocks. 
• The SFC consisted of steps and transitions. The transitions demonstrated 
convergence and divergence but no parallel execution. 
• The math language constructs that were used were: assignment, conditional 
statements, while loop, APT defined procedures and functions, comments. 
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• The conditional statements were nested to a maximum of four levels. A high 
proportion of the blocks had four levels of nesting in the F&G code. The majority of 
the blocks in the BSD code had a maximum of one or two levels of nesting. 
• There was only one while loop in the analysed code and that was in a CFB in the 
BSD code. 
The analysis of the code was performed against 22 of the HR development techniques 
for producing SIL 1,2 or 3 software. The techniques were analysed to determine 
whether:-
• They had been used 
• They could have been used 
• They could not have been used due to the applications 
• They could not have been used due to the programming environment 
Many of the analysed techniques could have been used or had been used. There were 
some techniques that could not have been used due to either the applications or the 
programming environment used. 
6.1 CRITERIA FOR S U C C E S S 
The BSD and F&G code were automatically translated and analysed; but was the 
project successful? This can only be determined by analysing the criteria for success 
(section 1.2). 
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The top priorities of the thesis were:-
1. To identify key highly recommended techniques from SIL 1,2 or 3 that can be 
analysed using the data available. 
The techniques that were chosen were dependent on the data available for analysis. The 
data available was the BSD and F&G code, the C&B charts and the APT programming 
environment. The analysed techniques addressed the following:-
• Coding techniques (e.g. limit the use of pointers, use information hiding) 
• Programming languages (e.g. use a strongly typed language, use a safe subset 
of the PLC language) 
• Analysis techniques (e.g. use structured based testing, use software fault tree 
analysis) 
2. To analyse the code to asses the feasibility of using the technique with the specific 
safety critical PLC code. 
Each of the designated techniques of IBC 1508 were analysed with respect to the code. 
Bach technique was analysed individually although some of the data could be used for 
multiple techniques. The techniques were divided into the following categories after 
analysis:-
• techniques insisted on by the compiler 
• techniques not insisted on by the compiler but used 
• techniques supported by the translated code 
• techniques supported by the APT tool and extra information 
• techniques supported by the APT tool 
• techniques that could be used but only with difficulty 
The techniques that were insisted on by the compiler were development techniques that 
analysis easily identified could be used. Those that could only be used with difficulty 
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were harder to perform the analysis on, to determine if they could be used. All the 
techniques that were analysed were performed or calculations performed to determine 
how they could be used, as with the different number of test cases. 
The GQM approach was a useful basis for analysis as it meant that each technique was 
analysed using a similar structure. The method also allowed data transferral between 
the techniques being analysed. 
3. To identify the general characteristics of the BSD and F&G PLC code on an offshore 
platform. 
These were discussed in detail in chapter 4 and a summary is given above. 
The secondary priorities of the thesis were to determine :-
1. I f a single language could be used to replace the three PLC languages. 
The three languages were translated into the one text based language -WSL. Two of 
the original languages were graphical languages, while the third was a textural 
language. The source and target languages were all high level languages. The 
randomness of the compilation order of the CFBs was lost during translation. 
2. I f any language deficiencies were identified in the PLC languages. 
None of the PLC languages were formally defined hence they had to be formalised 
before translation could commence. There were sections of the PLC language definition 
that were confusing. These included:-
• Execution order 
• Parallel execution within steps of an SFC 
• When an on flag was automatically set to false 
• How frequently input variables were read 
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The languages allowed the same hardware address to be assigned to more than one 
variable - a form of aliasing. The languages also enabled Boolean arrays to be 
converted to integers and back within blocks of code. Both these can cause 
maintainability and understandability problems in safety critical code. 
3. I f it is helpful to perform analysis in this way and what the benefits and problems 
were. 
The analysis identified much data about the code and the techniques that were analysed. 
This data could then be used in association with other similar applications. Many of the 
problems that occurred during analysis of the code were due to the sheer size and 
quantity of data that was generated and manipulated. The size of the BSD and F&G 
programs were very memory intensive both during translation and analysis. Also WSL 
was not ideally suited to being the target language. WSL does not have any concept of 
time or of variable type. Some of the primitive programming constructs of the math 
language were not available in WSL; this probably would have been true for any target 
language. An example would be:-
A := B or C was converted to A := if (B or C) then true else false 
The analysis was beneficial to the company that wrote the code as it identified variables 
that had been used but not read, and variables that had been read but not written. This 
according to IBC 1508[8] implied omitted or redundant code. When the variables were 
analysed by the company three of the variables had been used incorrectly. The analysis 
was also beneficial to Siemens as it identified an error in the documentation of the math 
language specification, which is in the process of being remedied. 
It therefore can be concluded that all the criteria for success have been met. 
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6.2 FURTHER WORK 
I f further work in the field was to be performed, it would be interesting to analyse some 
of the techniques in more detail, especially software fault tree analysis. It would also be 
interesting to be able to analyse more of the techniques identified in lEC 1508 for 
developing safety critical code. 
Another avenue of further work would be to analyse another similar safety critical 
application. This would identify the characteristics specific to the analysed system and 
those general to similar applications. 
6.3 SUMMARY 
In summary all the criteria for success have been met. The BSD and F&G PLC code 
were successfully translated and analysed against lEC 1508. The key characteristics of 
the code were identified, and tools were developed to aid the analysis. 
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ACRONYMS 
A I Analogue Input 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Possible 
APT Application Productivity Tool 
B Boolean 
BA Boolean Array 
BCD Binary Coded Decimal 
BNF Backus Naur Form 
C&B Cause and Bffect Charts 
CFB Continuous Function Block 
CFC Continuous Function Chart 
CODBLL Recipe 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
DF Digital Flag 
D I Digital Input 
DO Digital Output 
DUAL_LIM Recipe 
DX DO 10 Array 
EBPROM Blectrical Erasable Programmable 
BSD Emergency Shut Down 
F&G Fire and Gas 
FAT Factory Acceptance Test 
FBD Function Block Diagrams 
FT Fast Timer 
GQM Goal Question Metric 
HAZOP Hazards and Operability Analysis 
HR Highly Recommended 
HSB Health and Safety Executive 
I Integer 
I/O Input / Output 
l A Integer Array 
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IBC 1131-3 Programmable controllers Part 3: Programming languages 
IBC 1508 Functional safety of electrical/ electronic/ programmable electronic 
safety related systems 
I L Instruction Lists 
LD Ladder Diagrams 
M A Maintainers Assistant 
0 0 Object Oriented 
PC Personal Computer 
PBS Programmable Electrical System 
PID Proportional Integral Derivative 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
R Real 
RAM Random Access Memory 
RLL Relay Ladder Logic 
ROM Read Only Memory 
SCS Safety Critical System 
SFC Sequential Function Chart 
SFPGM Special Function Program 
SFT Software Fault Tree 
SFTA Software Fault Tree Analysis 
SI Safety Integrity 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SING_LIM Recipe 
ST Structured Text 
ST Slow Timer 
VDD Dual Valve 
V D M Vienna Development Method - a formal method 
VSS Single Valve 
W I Word Input 
WO Word Output 
WSL Wide Spectrum Language 
YACC Yet Another Compiler Compiler 
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NON-TERMINALS 
program 
statement_sequence 
statement 
a_or_x_proc_call 
proc_call_type 
a_proc_call 
x_proc_call 
actuaLparameters 
actual_parameters_with. 
var 
actual_parameters_with_ 
optional_var 
assert_statement 
assignment 
assignment_sequence 
Assignment_option 
Action_system 
action_sequence 
Action_option 
Call_statement 
conmient_statement 
if_statement 
( statement sequence )? <EOF> 
statement (";" ( statement)? )* 
( a or X proc call I assert statement I assignment I 
comment statement I action system I call statement 
I i f statement I loop statement I skip statement I 
var statement I where statement I while statement I 
procedure call) 
proc call type 
("!" I "!p")a proc call 
"!xp" X proc call 
name actual parameters with var 
name actual parameters with var 
"(" ( expression ("," expression )* ")" I " ) " ) 
"(" ( expression ("," expression )* )? "var" (ival ( 
" ," lval)* )?")" 
"(" ( expression ("," expression )+)? ("var" Wa] ( ( 
"," Ival)+)? )? ")" 
" I " condition " I " 
"<" assign ( ( " , " assign )+ )? ">" 
assign ("," assign )* 
assignment option ( ( " , " assignment option )+ )? 
( assignment)? 
"actions" ":" name ":" action sequence 
"end_actions" 
action option ( ( " . " action option )+ )? 
( action)? 
"call" name 
("comment" I "#")":" <STRING> 
"if" condition ("then" I "->") statement sequence ( 
"elsf' condition ("then" I "->") statement sequence 
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loop_statement 
procedure_call 
skip_statement 
var_statement 
where_statement 
while_statement 
proc_formal_parameters 
formaLparameters 
formal_parameters_with_ 
optional_var 
expression 
expression_or_condition 
logical_or_condition 
logical_and_condition 
relational_condition 
relational_op 
)* ("else" statement sequence )? "fi" 
"do" statement sequence "od" 
name actual parameters with var 
"skip" 
"var" assignment":" statement sequence "end" 
"begin" statement sequence "where" ( definition )* 
"end" 
"while" condition loop statement 
"(" (Ival ("," Ival )* )? "var" (iya] ("," ival )* )? 
")" 
"("(Ival ("," Ival )* )?")" 
"(" (lyal ("," Ival )* )? "var" (Ival ("," M l )* )? 
")" 
expression or condition 
logical or condition 
logical and condition ("or" logical and condition 
)* 
relational condition ("and" relational condition )* 
set in condition ( relational op set in condition )* 
set_in_condition 
Set_union 
setjntersection 
concat_expression 
"xor_bit" 
"or_bit" 
"and_bit" 
set union ("in" set union )? 
set intersection (("\\" I "W") set intersection )* 
concat expression ("AV concat expression )* 
adding expression ("++" adding expression )* 
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adding_expression 
add_op 
multiplying expression ( add op 
multiplying expression )* 
: = " - I - " 
multiplying_expression 
mult_op 
:= power expression ( mult op power expression )* 
. _ «*<< 
power_expression 
Funct_call_slice_expressi 
on 
Slice_values 
slice_range 
segment_specifier 
primary 
"/" 
"mod" 
"div" 
funct call slice expression ("**" 
funct call slice expression)? 
primary ( actual parameters I slice values )? 
"[" slice range " ] " 
expression 
(".." I " , " ) expression 
( name I (" [" expression "]")+ I"(" expression ")" I 
mw or X function call"(" expression ("," 
expression )* ")" I "if" condition "then" expression 
"else" expression " f i " I "abs" "(" expression ")" I 
"frac""(" expression ")" I "int""(" expression ")" I 
"sgn""(" expression ")" I "max""(" expression ("," 
expression )* ")" I "min" "(" expression ("," 
expression )* ")" I "powerset" "(" expression ")" I 
" { " expression "1" condition " } " I "array" "(" 
expression "," expression ")" I "head" "(" expression 
")" I "tail""(" expression ")" I "last" "(" expression 
")" I "butlast""(" expression ")" I "length" "(" 
expression ")" I "reverse" "(" expression ")" I 
number I "-" primary I <STRING> I "not" primary I 
"true" I "false" I "integer""?""(" expression ")" I 
"even" "?""(" expression ")" I "odd" "?" "(" 
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mw_or_x_function_call 
mw_function_call 
x_function_call 
number 
condition 
Ival 
Name 
definition 
proc_definition 
funct_definition 
assign 
action 
expression ")" I "MyVect" "?" "(" expression ")" 
"set" "?" "(" expression ")" I "name" "?" "(" 
expression ")" I "empty" "?" "(" expression ")" I 
"subset" "?""(" expression "," expression ")" I 
"member" "?""(" expression "," expression ")" I 
"sequence""?" "(" expression ")") 
( mw function call I x function call) 
"@" name ("?")? 
("!xf"l"!f"l"!xc")nanie 
<integer> 
expression or condition 
name ( slice values )? 
("%")? <IDENTIFIER> 
proc definition 
funct definition 
"proc" name proc formal parameters "==" 
statement sequence "." 
"funct" name formal parameters "==" ( 
statement sequence ":")? expression "." 
Ival ":=" expression 
name "==" statement sequence 
167 
APPENDIX II 
GRAMMAR FOR THE MATH LANGUAGE 
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The grammar rules that were used in the BISON parser for the math language 
translator follows. The word sin capitals are tokens, the other words can be expanded 
further. /* ? */ is a comment. 
mathblock: /* empty */ I declarations BEGIN main I declarations BEGIN main 
I MATH PRAGMA ' ( ' " " RLL '"' y';' declarations BEGIN main 
IMATH declarations BEGIN main ; 
main:INIT initialisation body Istatements ; 
declarations: /* empty */ I declarations declaration ';'; declaration: /* empety */ 
I BOOLEAN ':'b_variables constant I INTEGER ':'i_variables constant 
I REAL ':'r_variables constant 
I BOOLEAN RETENTIVE ':' b_variables constant 
I TIMER FAST ':'f_variables t_constant 
I TIMER SLOW ':' s_variables t_constant 
I ARRAY '(' INT '.".'INT y OF a_type ; 
a_type: BOOLEAN ':'ba_variables constant I INTEGER ':'ia_variables constant 
I REAL ':' ra_variables constant 
I BOOLEAN RETENTIVE ':' ba_variables constant; 
var : 11 R I D I I DO I B I W I I WO I BA I lA I T I DX I RA I TA I F I A I I FTI ST I DF ; 
b_variables: var lb_variables ','var ; 
i_variables: var li_variables ','var ; 
r_variables: var lr_variables ','var ; 
ba_variables: var lba_variables ','var ; 
ia_variables: var lia_variables ','var ; 
ra_variables: var lra_variables ','var ; 
f_variables: var lf_variables ','var ; 
s_variables: var ls_variables ','var ; 
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constant: /*empty */ I ':' '=' val; 
t_constant:/* empty * / l ' : "= 'NUM ' , 'NUM ','bool ', 'bool; val: NUM I bool; 
initialisations: /*empty */ IINIT initialisation ; 
initialisation: statement V i n i t ; 
init: /* empty */ I init statement';'; 
body: /* empty */ I BODY statements ; 
statements: /* empty */ lfirst_statement';' statementjist; first_statement: assignment 
I if_statement I while_loop ; 
statementjist: /* empty */ I statementjist statement';'; statement: assignment 
I if_statement I whilejoop ; 
assignment: value ':"='p_exp I f_value I t_value I t_value ':"='p_exp 
I recipe ':"='recipe I r_value ':"='p_exp I r_value I A I ':"='p_exp 
I A I '.'ai_value ':"='p_exp I v_value I v_value ':"='p_exp I sfc_value 
I sfc_value ':"='p_exp I procedure ; 
sfc_value: unit '.'ABORT I unit ' . 'ENABL ; 
unit: S_TEST I SELFTEST ; 
time: PROGRAM '.'IHOUR ; 
r_value: recipe '. 'RTU Irecipe '.'INUSE Irecipe '.'DSTBL Irecipe '. 'DRDY 
Irecipe '.'STATUS Irecipe ' . 'L_LIMIT Irecipe ' . 'H_LIMIT Irecipe ' . 'LL_LIMIT 
Irecipe ' . 'HH_LIMIT Irecipe ' . 'BAD_XMT_LIM Irecipe ' . 'HI_LIM 
Irecipe ' . 'XMT_LOW Irecipe '. 'XMT_HIGH Irecipe '.' OPTIC_LO 
Irecipe '.'OPTIC_HI Irecipe ' . 'HIHI_LIM I UNLOCK '('recipe y 
I CLEAR '(' recipe y I SELECT '(' recipe y; 
recipe: TRIP_ALL I TRIP_LLL I TRIP_HH I TRIP_LL I TRIP_LIM I CODELL 
I SING_LIM I D U A L . L I M ; 
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f_value : LATCH '(' flag y I CLEAR '(' flag y I ON '(' flag y; 
flag :F I DF ; 
e_flag :DF I F ; 
value : 11 R I DI I DO I B I W I I WO I BA I BA '['exp T l lA I lA '['exp T I T text 
I T '[ ' exp TI DX I DX '[ ' exp TI RA I RA '[ ' exp TI TA I TA '[ ' exp TI e_flag ; 
text: /* empty */ I ' . 'TEXTl I '.'TEXT2 I '.'TEXT3 ; 
ai_value: FTAU /* which can be assigned*/1 RAW I SRV ; 
t_value: DELAY timer Itimer '.' TCC Itimer '.' TCP Itimer '.' ENABL Itimer '.' RESET 
Itimer'. 'TOUT; 
timer: FT I ST ; v_value: valve ' . 'CMMD I valve '.'OPENC I valve '.'CLSC 
I valve '.' OPND I valve '.' CLSD I valve '.' TRVL I valve '.' OSL I valve '.' CLS 
I valve '.'FTO I valve '.'FTC I valve ' . 'FAILD I valve '.'CLSTO 
I valve '.'OPNTO I valve '.'DSBLD I valve '.'LOCKD I valve '.'NRDY 
I valve '.'MOPEN I valve '.'OURDO I valve '.'OURDC I valve '.'STATUS 
I valve '.' VFLAG I valve '.' OTCP I valve '.' OTCC I valve '.' CTCP 
I valve '.' CTCC I LOCK '(' valve TI UNLOCK '(' valve y I OPEN '(' valve y 
I CLOSE '(' valve y I RESET '(' valve y; 
valve: VSS I VDD ; exp:value I t_value I time I sfc_value I A I I A I ' . ' ai_value I v_value 
I r_value I NUM I bool!'(' exp y I exp '-I-' exp I exp '-' exp I exp '*' exp I exp '/' exp 
I INCREMENT 11 DECREMENT 11 exp MOD exp I exp AND exp 
I exp OR exp I exp XOR exp I NOT exp I exp '*"*' exp I exp '<' exp 
I exp '<"=' exp I exp ^ ' exp I exp ">"=' exp I exp '=' exp I exp '<">' exp I function ; 
p_exp:value I t_value I time I sfc_value I A I I A I ' . ' ai_value I v_value I r_value I NUM 
I bool I'C p_exp y I p_exp '-I-' p_exp I p_exp '-' p_exp I p_exp '*' p_exp 
I p_exp '/'p_exp I INCREMENT 11 DECREMENT 11 p_exp MOD p_exp 
I p_exp AND p_exp I p_exp OR p_exp I p_exp XOR p_exp I NOT p_exp 
I p_exp '*"*'p_exp /* I p_exp '<'p_exp I p_exp '<"='p_exp I p_exp '>'p_exp 
I p_exp *>"=' p_exp I p_exp '=' p_exp I p_exp '<">' p_exp */ I function ; 
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procedure: UNPACK_BITS '('exp ','exp y I PACK_BITS '('exp ','exp y 
I BCDBIN '(' exp ',' exp T I BIT_ASSIGN '(' exp ',' exp ',' expT 
I BITCLEAR '(' exp ',' exp y I BITSET '(' exp ',' exp y 
I LOAD_ARRAY '(' exp ',' exp T ; 
function: BITS_TOJNT '(' exp y I BITTEST '(' exp ',' exp y I EDGE '(' exp y ; 
c_function: BITS_TO_INT '(' exp y I BITTEST '(' exp ',' exp y I EDGE '(' exp y ; 
bool: TRUE I FALSE ; 
whilejoop: WHILE condition LOOP statements END LOOP ; 
if_statement: IF condition THEN statements endif; 
endif: ENDIF I ELSIF condition THEN statements endif I ELSE statements ENDIF 
condition: c_exp ; 
bracket: c_exp ; 
c_exp: c_value I c_t_value I time I sfc_value I A I I A I ' . ' ai_value I c_v_value 
I c_r_value I NUM I bool I'C c_exp')' I c_exp'+' c_exp I c_exp'-' c_exp 
I c_exp'*'c_exp I c_exp'/'c_exp I INCREMENT 11 DECREMENT I 
I c_exp MOD c_exp I c_exp AND c_exp lc_exp OR c_exp 
I bracket XOR bracket I NOT c_exp I c_exp'*"*' c_exp I c_exp'<' c_exp 
I c_exp'<"='c_exp I c_exp'>'c_exp I c_exp^"='c_exp I c_exp'='c_exp 
I c_exp'<">' c_exp I cjunction ; 
c_v_value: valve '.' CMMD I valve '.' OPENC I valve '.' CLSC I valve '.' OPND 
I valve '.' CLSD I valve '.' TRVL I valve '.' OSL I valve '.' CLS I valve '.' FTO 
I valve '.' FTC I valve '.' FAILD I valve '.' CLSTO I valve '.' OPNTO 
I valve '.' DSBLD I valve '.' LOCKD I valve '.' NRDY I valve '.' MOPEN 
I valve '.' OURDO I valve '.' OURDC I valve '.' STATUS I valve '.' VFLAG 
I valve '.' OTCP I valve '.' OTCC I valve '.' CTCP I valve '.' CTCC 
I LOCK '(' valve ')' I UNLOCK '(' valve ')' I OPEN '(' valve ')' 
I CLOSE '(' valve ')' I RESET '(' valve ' ) ' ; 
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c_t_value:/* DELAY timer I * / timer '.'TCC Itimer '.'TCP Itimer '. 'ENABL 
Itimer '.'RESET Itimer '.'TOUT ; 
c_r_value: recipe '. 'RTU Irecipe '.'INUSE Irecipe '.'DSTBL Irecipe '.'DRDY 
Irecipe '.'STATUS Irecipe ' . 'L_LIMIT Irecipe ' . 'H_LIMIT Irecipe ' . 'LL_LIMIT 
Irecipe ' . 'HH_LIMIT Irecipe ' . 'BAD_XMT_LIM Irecipe ' . 'HI_LIM 
Irecipe ' . 'XMT_LOW Irecipe ' . 'XMT_HIGH Irecipe '.'OPTIC_LO 
Irecipe '.' OPTIC_HI Irecipe '.' HIHI_LIM I UNLOCK '('recipe ')' 
I CLEAR '(' recipe y I SELECT '(' recipe y; 
c.value : 11 R I D I I DO I B I W I I WO I BA I BA '['exp TI lA I lA '['exp TI T text 
I T '[ ' exp TI DX I DX '[ ' exp TI RA I RA '[ ' exp TI TA I TA '[ ' exp TI e_flag ; 
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1. PLC APT OVERVIEW 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
"A program in the APT is that portion of the process that can run on a single controller. 
The actual size of the program depends on controller memory size, safety 
considerations and other characteristics of the process line." [1] 
The code that will be translated is written using three different languages using the APT 
system. Only the code that was used in the two programs (ESD and F&G) will be 
discussed in this mapping document. The code was written using three programming 
languages which combine together at compile time to produce RLL. 
The continuous function blocks can be of type interlock, which has high or low priority 
or math blocks - only the active type was used; which means that they cannot be turned 
off. 
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1.2 BUILD ROUTE 
When the software is compiled it is ordered depending on the block type and is in the 
following order: 
1. System Logic (APT usage) 
2. Interlocks (high priority) 
3. SFC controllers 
4. SFC transitions 
5. SFC Steps 
6. Flags 
7. Device logic / CFB activation logic 
8. CFB math logic / interlocks 
end of each scan 
9. APT generated RLL subroutines 
It is not known if the units are kept together, but for the purpose of this translation it 
will be assumed that they are. This should aid in the understanding of the translated 
code. 
1.3 HARDWARE 
The hardware of the controller has many features - these include:-
• the RLL program is stored in memory. 
• interrupt I/O allows for fast reactions to external events * 
• it supports a redundant remote base controller * 
• immediate I/O updates allows the application program to access an I/O point 
multiple times during a scan. 
• cyclic RLL allows the creation of an additional RLL program that runs 
independently to the main program. 
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• it allows external subroutines that can be written in a high level language (although 
ESD and F&G code does not seem to have used this function.) 
• has PID (proportional integral derivative) loops for batch control 
• the CPU contains a real time clock that contains a 2 digit year, month, day of month 
and day of week. The hour, minutes, second, tenth and hundredth of a second. This 
information can all be read by the program, only the hour though is actually 
accessed. 
• The translated code does not use these faciHties. The inputs are read into a buffer at the start of 
each cycle and that value is then used for the cycle. 
2. STATIC DOS STRUCTURE OF FILE STORAGE 
The programs that are written using the APT are stored as a directory tree structure in 
DOS. The programs are all stored in a directory called "program"; the leaves of this 
directory are the programs that are within the APT in this configuration. On moving 
into the directory of one of the programs there is a sub directory called "units". Within 
"units" there is a leaf directory for each of the units that have been declared within the 
program, (a unit is basically dividing a program into modules). Within a unit there can 
either be CFCs (continuous function charts) or SFCs (sequential function charts) or 
both. There are many sub directories but the important ones are "cfc" and "sfc" which 
contain the charts that are used to write the program. 
In the "cfc" directory there is a directory for each of the CFCs implemented in the unit. 
Within the directory there is a file called "graphic" which gives the positioning and 
number of CFB (continuous function blocks) that are found within that CFC. The math 
language that is contained in the blocks is stored in individual text files with an 
extension ".mth" for the commented version and ".mt_" for the non-commented 
version. These are called by the same name as the CFB in the program. 
It should be noted that the programs stored within the APT at a given time can be 
totally unrelated. 
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Directory structure in BNF form 
<pathname> ::= 
program\<progname>\units\<unitname>\<chart> 
<chart> ::= cfc\<cfcname>\textfile 
I sfc\<sfcname> 
<progname> ::= <identifier> 
<unitname> ::= <identifier> 
<cfcname> ::= <identifier> 
<sfcname> ::= <identifier>.sfc 
<cfcname> ::= graphic I <identifier>.mth I <identifier>.mt_ 
Figure 2:1 
BNF form of the directory structure 
Program 
ProgA Units — I - Uniti 
Unit2 
ProgB Units 
Units 
Uniti 
Unit2 
Units 
C F C 
S F C 
C F C 
L - S F C 
C F C 
L- S F C 
CFC1 
C F C 2 
- C F C 3 
I— C F C 4 
CFC1 
C F C 2 
Figure 2:2 
DOS file structure demonstrating key words 
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Directory PATH listing 
Volume Serial Number is 0837-18EF 
C:. 
+—UNITS 
+—TESTl 
+—SFC 
+—CFC 
I +—CHARTA 
+—PRR 
+—DEBUG 
+—TEST 
+—SFC 
+—CFC 
+—CHART 1 
+—CHART2 
+—CHART3 
+—PRR 
+—DEBUG 
+—PGMSUB 
+—PGMSFC 
+—PGMCFC 
+—PRR 
+—MAKE 
+—DEBUG 
+—SYMTABLE 
+—MAITT 
Figure 2:3 
The directory tree of an APT program 
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2.1 C F C FILE STRUCTURE 
ESD and F&G code only used Interlocks and Math Blocks. This implies that each 
block can be individually translated into a WSL procedure since each block contains a 
math language piece of code, (many of the CFBs that were not used have predefined 
meaning.) The CFB names can be determined from the file names in DOS. The file 
"graphic" in the CFC directory identifies the number of CFB, its type, its name and its 
position on the screen. I f connecting CFBs had been used then the positions of the 
interconnections would also be included in this file. The math language files are stored 
as ".mth" files with comments and .mt_ without any comments. I f the block of code 
contains no comments then it is not stored in mth format. When the APT creates the 
mt_ file it also includes abbreviations about the code. 
File "graphic" 
5 5 indicates that there are 5 CFB. 
51 0 720 PI35051 51 indicates it is of type interlock 
51 120 720 PI35053 27 (where the 51 is would indicate a math function) 
51 240 720LI35039 two numbers after the 51 are the screen position of 
51 360 720LI35042 the CFB. 
51 480 720 LI35033 Last item on the line is the CFBs name in ASCII 
Figure 2:4 
A sample graphic file 
Each CFB stored in a separate file will be translated individually into a WSL, then the 
files will be combined as procedures into one piece of code. The type of CFB is either 
a high interlock, low interlock or an active mathblock. Al l the math blocks that have 
been used are active, which means that they cannot be disabled. 
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The initial part of each of the CFBs will be called first and then the main part of the 
CFC will be called on the second and future loops around the program. 
2.2 S F C FILE STRUCTURE 
Al l the code is stored in one file "sfc_name.sfc" this file needs to be divided into 
individual steps so that it can be translated, and then translated code recombined in 
WSL format. The SFC information is stored within the SFC directory in its' unit 
directory. The splitting of the code into steps and the translation was managed by Perl 
scripts. The recombination of the SFC after translation was more complex and required 
human intervention so a C program was developed to perform this task. 
3. PROGRAM LAYOUT 
High priority interlocks are executed before SFCs, other CFBs and devices: low priority 
interlocks and math blocks are executed after the SFC. (High level interlocks are 
commonly used for internal validation checks.) The ordering of the high priority 
interlocks is arbitrary and can not be defined. The random ordering will be maintained 
by using procedure calls to units and procedure calls to SFCs, CFCs and CFBs. This 
will allow the procedures to be moved if desired. I f the code had been inserted into the 
main body then the block like structure would have been lost. The method of 
determining high and low priority is defined in 6.1 
There is a main procedure of the program in WSL that calls each type of block, this 
then calls all the units and they in turn call all the relevant blocks. The original function 
templates were generated by a program that walks around the directory tree structure in 
DOS. The initial procedures called each of the units in the order that they are stored in 
DOS. Each of the units will call the relevant CFBs identified within the sub 
directories. 
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The main procedure calls a set of functions, which in term calls the CFBs that are stored 
within the units so that the procedures do not become to long. The main procedures 
are: 
• init_high_interIock(var) 
• init_low_interIock(var) 
• init_active_mathblock(var) 
• body_high_interlock(var) 
• sfc(var) 
• body_low_interlock(var) 
• body_active_mathbIock(var) 
initial part of the high priority interlocks 
initial part of the low priority interlocks 
initial part of the active math blocks 
body of the high priority interlocks 
the SFC in each program 
body of the low priority interlocks 
body of the active math blocks 
The last four functions calls are in a loop since they will be expected to execute 
continually. At the end of the code there is a procedure that is called after every time a 
timer is used. This is to simulate the changing of the value due to an external device. 
Following is the initial block of code for the translated WSL program. Note italics are 
comments to aid the reader and do not appear in the code. 
Var 
FALSE := 0, 
TRUE := 1, 
the constants that are used as array elements for some of the translated variable 
types. 
Flags 
LATCH := 1, 
ON := 0, 
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Timers 
RESET := 1, 
ENABLE := 2, 
TCC := 3, 
TCP := 4, 
TOUT := 5, 
Inputs 
RAW := 1, 
SRV := 2, 
FTAU := 3, 
valves 
CMMD := 1, 
OPENC := 2, 
CLSC := 3, 
OPND := 4, 
TRVL := 6, 
OLS := 7, 
CLS := 8, 
FTO := 9, 
FTC := 10, 
FAILD := 11, 
CLSTO := 12, 
OPNTO := 13, 
DSBLD := 14, 
LOCKD := 15, 
NRDY := 16, 
MOPEN := 17, 
ORRD := 18, 
CLSD := 19, 
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VFLAGS := 20, 
OTCP.-21 , 
OTCC := 22, 
CTCP := 23, 
CTCC := 24, 
Recipes 
RTU:= 1, 
INUSE := 2, 
DSTBL := 3, 
DRDY := 4, 
STATUS := 5, 
UNLOCK := 6, 
CLEAR := 7, 
SELECT := 8, 
L_LIMIT := 9, 
H_LIMIT := 10, 
L L _ L I M I T : = 11, 
HH.LIMIT := 12, 
BAD_XMT_LIM := 13, 
HI_LIM := 14, 
XMT_LOW := 15, 
XMT_HIGH := 16, 
OPTIC_LOW := 17, 
OPTIC_HI := 18, 
HIHI_LIM := 19: 
begin 
comment: "Flags"; 
comment: "TIMER"; 
comment: "ANALOGUE INPUT"; 
comment: "VSS AND VDD2"; 
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comment: "RECIPIES"; 
comment: "start of code"; 
Initialising the CFBs 
init_high_interlock(var); 
init_low_interlock(var); 
init_active_mathblock(var); 
do 
comment: "do loop that will run continually for the whole program. "; 
body_high_interlock(var); 
sfc(var); 
body_low_interlock(var); 
body_active_mathblock(var) 
od; 
comment: "end of the continual loop and the program" 
An example of the rest of the code 
where 
proc init_high_interlock(var) == 
begin 
unit 1 (var); 
unit2(var) 
where 
proc unit 1 (var) == 
begin 
cfc_cfb(var) 
where 
proc cfb_cfc(var) == 
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end 
end 
proc init_low_interlock (var) 
The procedure to represent the counting down of time by the timer. 
proc timer_set(var timer) == 
comment:" this procedure simulates the behaviour of a timer"; 
i f ((timer[RESET] = TRUE) and (timer[ENABL] = TRUE)) then 
timer[TCC] := timer[TCC] - 1 ; 
comment:"the timer is counting down" 
elsf ((timer[RESET] = TRUE) and (timer[ENABL] = FALSE)) then 
timer[TOUT] := TRUE; 
comment:" timer remains inactive but TCC value remains 
where it was " 
else 
timer[TCC] := timer[TCP]; 
timer[TOUT] := FALSE; 
comment:" timer remains inactive and tout remains false. " 
f i ; 
i f (timer[TCC] = TRUE) then 
timer[TOUT] := TRUE 
f i . 
end; 
comment: "now the end of the constants being declared" 
end 
Figure 3:1 
Sample layout of the entire program 
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3.1 PROCEDURE CALLS IN WSL 
The units and CFBs are internal procedure calls where no value is passed. The 
procedures/ functions that are supplied by the APT were mapped as external procedure 
or function calls. Internal procedures and functions are also used. With a procedure 
there must be the keyword var present. Before var is the list of variables that do not 
change value during the procedure and after var are those variables that do change 
value. 
The external procedure and function call is a WSL feature that allows the assumption 
that the procedure / function is declared in another part of the code. This feature is so 
that subsets of the code can be read into Maintainers Assistant the transformation tool. 
This was used for all procedures and functions that are pre defined by the APT. Below 
are all the possible procedures / function calls that were used in the translated code. 
Internal Procedure /function Call 
procedure_name(nochangel, nochange2 var change 1) 
function_name(var_list) 
External Procedure / function Call 
!p procedure_name(var) 
!f function_name() 
Internal Procedure Declaration 
proc procedure_name(var) == 
proc procedure2(var) == 
Figure 3:2 
An example WSL procedure calls 
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4. MATH LANGUAGE ^ WSL 
The statement types and ordering are similar in the math language and WSL: both 
languages have comments, assignment and conditionals. The differences arise with the 
fact that WSL does not have types, and has no concept of Booleans, timers, flags and 
variables that can contain more than one variable. 
Keywords and variables in the math language are not case sensitive, i.e. 'LATCH' or 
'latch' are identical. Variables in the APT languages are allowed to start with a number 
but in WSL they are not so all WSL variables will be converted to capitals with WSL_ 
placed in front of them. The keywords in WSL are lower case letters. 
5. LAYOUT 
All of the math blocks (steps in SFCs) follow a strict layout of the program including 
keywords to define structures. The math block was translated into a WSL procedure, 
split up into body and init. The mathblock is set up so that if there is only a body 
portion and no initial part then the BODY word omitted. I f there is no body but an 
initial part then the INIT keyword is used and not the BODY keyword. If both parts are 
included then both words are used. 
At the top of an SFC step there is the keyword MATH before any of the math language, 
all the statements before this keyword are executed in parallel. The keywords 
PRAGMA "RLL" indicate that the program is to compile to ladder logic but they do not 
force compilation. The compile type is forced by the types of functions that are used 
and i f functions that cannot be compiled to RLL are used then the code will not be 
compiled to RLL. Al l math language statements start with the keyword BEGIN. 
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Math block layout WSL procedure layout 
<mathblock> ::= [PRAGMA {"RLL"};] 
[<Declarations>] 
BEGIN 
[INIT 
<initialisations>] 
[BODY 
<body portion>] 
e.g. e.g. 
{A low priority interlock called A} proc low_int_A() == 
PRAGMA ("RLL"); comment: "Comment at top of CFB"; 
Begin comment: "PRAGMA { " R L L " } ; " ; 
I_200 := (hs_20405); comment: "Begin "; 
I_201 := (hs_20405); 
I_200 := (hs_20405); 
IF NOT (Red_test_ovr) THEN I_201 := (hs_20405); 
A := B; 
C :=B; if not (Red_test_ovr = 1) then 
ENDIF; A :=B; 
C :=B 
f i 
Note that this is the format for the body part f 
the code if there is an initialisation then it will 
go in a different procedure. 
Figure 5:3 
Assignment format in Math language and WSL 
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BEGIN BEGIN BEGIN BEGIN 
body portion INIT BODY INIT 
initialisations body portion initialisations 
BODY 
body portion 
Figure 5:1 
Different orderings of keywords in a math block 
In a CFB the INIT part of the code is executed once and only once. In a SEC the INIT 
part of the code is executed once each time through the SFC, but only once per time the 
step is active. The CFB INIT and MAIN parts are translated into different procedures 
and so are called separately. 
5.1 DECLARATIONS 
Declarations occur at the top of a function block and the variables are local to that 
function block. Only variables of type Boolean, retentive Boolean, integer, real, array 
or a timer (fast or slow) can be declared in the declaration section; they may be 
initialised. Arrays can be of any of the above types except timers. Retentive Booleans 
are not used within the analysed code. The other method of declaring variables is in 
tables and are global to either the entire program or an entire unit. The format of tables 
is discussed in chapter 6. 
WSL does not support typed declarations and variable types so this part will be 
converted into comments. Variables in the math language can be of no more than 12 
characters and must be at least one character long. They can contain an underscore and 
must contain a letter, unusually though they can start with a number. Al l variable 
names and types were added to a symbol table, for type checking and manipulation of 
the code. 
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Math block Declarations 
<declarations> ::= <declaration> ; 
{<declaration>;} 
<declaration> ::= <type> : <variable> 
{,<variable>} [ := constant ] 
I TIMER <ttype>: <variable> {,<variable>} 
[:= <int> <int> <bool> <bool>] 
I ARRAY ( <num> .. <num> ) of <type> : 
<variable> {<variable>} [:= <constant> ] 
<type> ::= integer I Boolean retentive I 
Boolean I real 
<ttype> ::= fast I slow 
The timer information, the first integer is the 
current value of the timer, the second integer 
is the preset value of the timer, the first 
Boolean enables the timer while the fourth 
resets the timer. 
e-g 
Boolean: button; 
Integer: count; 
Integer: count 1; 
WSL Declaration 
WSL does not support typed 
declarations so the declaration in PLC 
format will be inserted as a comment. 
e.g. 
comment: " Variable declaration 
information as in the math language." 
comment:" Boolean: button"; 
comment:" Integer: count"; 
comment:" Integer: countl "; 
Figure 5:2 
Declarations in Math language and WSL 
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5.2 INIT 
The math language code in the initial part of the block is only executed on the first 
iteration. It can contain any statements that the body of the code can contain. 
Math block INIT WSL procedure 
<initialisations>::= <initialisation> 
{<initialisation>} 
<initialisation> ::= <variable> := <constant> 
<constant> ::= <Boolean> 1 <integer> 1 
<real> 
e.g. e.g. 
INIT proc cfc_cfb 0 == 
A : = 3 ; A : = 3 ; 
B:=2; B:=2 
Figure 5:3 
INIT in Math language and WSL 
5.3 BODY 
The body of the code is executed on all executions of the loop after the initial one. The 
body is either empty or a list of statements; these statements are comments, 
assignments, procedures or conditionals. 
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Math block Body WSL procedure 
<body portion> ::= <statements> 
<statements> ::= <statement> {<statement>} 
<statement>::=< comment> 1 <assignment 
statement> 
1 < procedure statement> 1 <conditional> 
1 <function statement> 
1 <command statement> l<while> 
e.g. e.g. 
proc cfc_cfb 0 == 
this procedure is called from within 
BODY the procedure representing the units 
IF (A = 1) THEN if (A = 1) then 
A : = 3 ; A :=3; 
B:=2; B:=2 
ENDIF f i 
Figure 5:4 
Body in Math language and WSL 
5.4 COMMENTS 
PLC comments become WSL comments but since the WSL delimiters are "" all " were 
converted into a double ' which will look like " . This should avoid confusion between 
" and ' already in the conmient. 
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Keywords that are no longer required are maintained by putting them into comments. 
This will be performed on the following words: 
• PRAGMAC'RLL"); 
• BEGIN 
• INIT 
• MATH (only used in SFC) 
The comments about variables, CFB, units and the program can only be determined 
from the database file see chapter 6 
Math block comment WSL comment 
<comment> ::= " { " <characters> " } " <comment> ::= comment: "<characters>" 
1 (* <characters> *) 
e.g. e.g. 
{ This is a comment} comment: "This is the comment" 
or 
(* This is a comment *) 
Figure 5:5 
A math block comment and the WSL comment 
5.5 T Y P E S 
There are five types that can be declared in the CFB; integers, reals, Booleans, arrays, 
flags and timers. The rest of the variables are declared in tables outside the main 
programming environment and are stored in binary files see chapter 6. 
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5.5.1 Integers 
Integers are one of the basic types in the math language; they use 16 bit words and 16 
bit intermediate arithmetic. This means that the values of the integers are between -
32768 and 32767. There are various operations allowed with integers all of which are 
also allowed in the WSL language. 
Math language for integers 
<integer>::= <sign> <unsigned integer> I <unsigned integer> I 
#2# <base 2 integer> I #16# <base 16 integer> I 
<sign> #2# <base 2 integer> I 
<sign> #16# <base 16 integer> 
<sign> ::= + !-
<unsigned integer> ::= <digit> {<digit>} 
<digit>::=OI 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 
<base 2 integer> ::= <2digit> {<2digit>} 
<2digit> ::=0 1 
<base 16 integer> ::= <16digit> { <16digit>} 
<16digit> ::= <digit> l A I B I C I D I E I F 
Figure 5:6 
Integers defined 
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Math language integer operators WSL operators 
Increment INCREMENT a Increment a = a+ 1 
Decrement DECREMENT a Decrement a = a - 1 
Multiply * Multiply * 
Division / Division / 
Modulus MOD Modulus mod 
Addition + Addition + 
Subtraction - Subtraction -
Logical AND AND Logical AND and_bit 
Exclusive OR XOR Exclusive OR xor_bit 
Logical OR OR Logical OR or_bit 
Figure 5:7 
Integer operators 
5.5.2 Reals 
The value of a real is between -9.223372E'" to 9.223372E'", although a value between 
-2.710501E"* to 5.42101 IE '" except 0.0 gives a control error. Although there is no 
declaration in WSL the assignment of real values is possible in WSL. When arithmetic 
is performed using real numbers the answer is always a real number. 
Math language for reals 
<real> ::= [<sign>] <unsigned integer>.unsigned integer> [E <sign>] 
<unsigned integer>] 
Figure 5:8 
Reals defined 
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Math language real operators WSL operators 
Power ** Power ** 
Multiply * Multiply * 
Division / Division / 
Addition + Addition + 
Subtraction - Subtraction -
Figure 5:9 
Real operators 
5.5.3 Booleans 
There is no such thing as a Boolean in WSL; this means that they are assigned integer 
values 0 or 1. The convention is to assign true the value 1 and false the value 0. In 
conditional statements in PLC a Boolean can be just a variable. For a conditional 
comparison in WSL this will have to be converted to the following:-
• variable = false 
• variable = true. 
Since true and false are assigned values at the top of the WSL code. Booleans in the 
math language have the operators XOR, OR, NOT, AND although there is no such 
thing as Booleans in WSL, in conditionals, AND, OR and NOT are allowed. There is 
no equivalent of an XOR in WSL but it maps to the equation ( a XOR b ) to ((a or b) 
and (not(a = b))). 
Math language for and Boolean 
<Boolean> ::= <true> I <false> 
<true> ::= 1 I on I true 
<false>::=Oloff Ifalse 
Figure 5:10 
Booleans defined 
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Math language Boolean operators WSL operators 
Logical NOT NOT Logical NOT TRUE xor_bit 
Logical AND AND Logical AND and_bit 
Logical OR OR Logical OR or_bit 
Logical XOR XOR Logical XOR xor_bit 
Figure 5:11 
Boolean operators 
Relational operators are allowed with integers, reals and Booleans the result is a 
Boolean. 
Math language integer operators WSL operators 
less than < less than < 
less than or equal <= less than or equal <= 
greater than > greater than > 
greater than or equal >= greater than or equal >= 
equal = equal = 
not equal <> not equal <> 
Figure 5:12 
Integer operators 
5.5.4 Flags 
Flags have the value of either on (true) or off (false). Al l the references to a flag are 
logically connected and the value of the flag can only be set in one place in the 
compiled program. The commands used to assign the flags are:-
• Clear - false - sets the value to false and remains false. 
• Latch - true - sets the flag to on until there is a clear command 
• On - true - sets the flag to on while the SFC/ CFB is active 
When a flag is set to 'On' it remains true while the block is still active. At the end of a 
CFB or Step it is turned off and does not automatically come 'On' again when the block 
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becomes active. In the case of an SFC the flag is 'On' while the step is active and false 
once the step becomes inactive. In the case of a safe SFC being called while the flag is 
'On' the flag remains true until control returns to the main SFC and the previous step is 
then set inactive. (See 7 for information about SFCs) 
Math language flag assignment WSL assignment 
<f_assign> ::= LATCH ( <flag_variable> ) <f_assign> ::= <flag_variable>[LATCH] 
1 CLEAR ( <flag_variable> ) := TRUE ; 
1 ON ( <flag_variable> ) <flag_varibale>[ON] := TRUE 
1 <flag_variable>[LATCH] := 
FALSE ; 
<flag_varibale>[ON] := FALSE 
1 <flag_varibale>[ON] := FALSE 
e.g. e.g. 
LATCH (var3) var3[LATCH] := TRUE; 
var3[LATCH] := TRUE 
Figure 5:13 
BNF form of flag assignment 
At the end of each mathblock the flags that have been used have to be tested to see if 
they have been turned on. I f this is the case they have to be turned back off using the 
following WSL code. This is forced by the APT compiler so it was inserted with each 
procedure. A list of all flags used in the block was stored by the translator so as to be 
able to insert the code at the end of the WSL block. 
i f ((WSL_DFI_11 A02_HR[LATCH] = FALSE) and 
(WSL_DFI_11 A02_HR[ON] = TRUE)) then 
WSL_DFI_11 A02_HR[ON] := FALSE; 
f i 
Figure 5:14 
A sample end piece of code of a math block containing flags 
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5.5.5 Timers (type ST or FT) 
A timer allows a delay to be set up within a SFC step or a CFB. They are either fast or 
slow and count down at that specific rate from the preset value. Timer values change 
during the execution of the program. When used in the SFC they have to run faster 
than the execution cycle of the program. 
There are various values and keywords associated with timers; they are:-
• DELAY :- starts the timer counting as soon as the step is active and sets current 
value = preset value and .tout to false 
• .TCC :- is the current timer count (i.e. current value) (read only integer) 
• .TCP :- preset value count (for slow timer 0.1 * value) (read / write integer) 
• .ENABLE :- indicates the timer has been activated ( read / write Boolean) 
• .RESET :- becomes false to indicate the current counter is reset to the preset 
value, true indicates that the timer can be activated if .enable is set to true, (read 
/write Boolean) 
• .TOUT :- true when current counter = 0 false when current counter ^ 0 (read 
only Boolean) 
DELAY is used to set the timer counting which is done as soon as the step is active. 
For the timer to start counting the .reset and .enable values must both be true. 
When .reset is false the current timer count .tec equals the preset false, .tout remains 
false and the timer remains inactive. 
When .reset is true and .enable is false the timer becomes inactive, but .tec is not reset 
and .tout remains true. To manipulate the timers either the delay command can be used 
or the extension can be manipulated directly. The method of setting a timer should be 
consistent through the life of a timer. 
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Math language timer assignment/ WSL assignment 
conditional 
<timer_assignment> ::= DELAY <timer_assignment> ::= !P DELAY 
(<timer>) (<timer>) 
1 <timer>.tcc 1 !P TCC ( <timer>) 
1 <timer>.tcp 1 !P TCP ( <timer>) 
1 <timer>.enabl 1 !P ENABLE ( <timer>) 
1 <timer>.reset 1 !P RESET ( <timer>) 
1 <timer>.tout 1 !P TOUT ( <timer>) 
if last 5 are being assigned a value then of the if last 5 are being assigned a value then of the 
format:- format:-
<timer>.enabl := bool <timer> " [ " enabl " ] " := bool 
e.g. e.g 
DELAY (timer_3) !P DELAY( timer_3,null,R) 
i f (timer 3.tec) if (!PTCC(timer 3,null,R) 
timer_5.reset := true !P RESET(timer_5,true,W) 
Figure 5:15 
BNF form of a timer assignment 
After each time a timer is read or written to during the code in the WSL there is a 
procedure call to timer_set which will emulate the behaviour of the timer counting 
down. This procedure is declared at the end of the code. 
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proc timer_set(var timer) == 
comment:" this procedure simulates the behaviour of a timer"; 
if ((timer[RESET] = TRUE) and (timer[ENABL] = TRUE)) then 
timer[TCC] := timer[TCC] - 1 ; 
comment: "the timer is counting down" 
elsf ((timer[RESET] = TRUE) and (timer[ENABL] = FALSE)) then 
timer[TOUT] := TRUE; 
comment:" timer remains inactive but TCC value remains 
where it was " 
else 
timer[TCC] := timer[TCP]; 
timer[TOUT] := FALSE; 
comment:" timer remains inactive and tout remains false. " 
f i ; 
i f (timer[TCC] = TRUE) then 
timer[TOUT] := TRUE 
f i . 
Figure 5:16 
The timer set function 
5.5.6 Arrays 
An array is an indexed collection of values that can be referenced as a whole or 
individual value. Boolean, integer and real arrays can be assigned in the declaration 
section, the rest must be declared in tables see chapter 6. Arrays can be assigned as a 
whole e.g. arrayl := array2 in this instance the whole array will be copied so the array's 
must be the same size and of a compatible type. 
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Math language array assignment WSL assignment 
An array can be assigned to equal another 
array ;-
<array> ::= <name> [ ' [ ' number']' ] <array> ::= <name> [ ' [ ' number']' ] 
array := array 
Note the arrays are of the same size 
array := array 
array [n] 
the nth bit of the array will be accessed for 
array [n] 
assignment or reading 
e.g. 
e.g 
array 1 := array 2 
array2 [2] := true 
array3[10] := array4[4] 
array 1 := array 2 
array2 [2] := true 
array3[10] := array4[4] 
Figure 5:17 
Array assignment 
5.5.6.1 Integer Array (type lA) 
An integer array is an indexed collection of integers, they are indexed 1 —> 7 if there are 
7 items in the array. 
5.5.6.2 Boolean Array (type BA) 
A Booleans array is an indexed collection of Boolean values, i.e. assigned true or false. 
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5.5.6.3 DO10 Array (type DX) 
A DO 10 array is a Boolean array with length 10 that is translated to PCS as a DO 10 tag 
type. 
5.5.6.4 Text Array (typeTA) 
This is an array of text variables, each element is 30 characters longs and is primarily 
used for PCS tags. Assignment to the text is not allowed in the coding and must be pre 
assigned. The array can only be assigned by literal values. Although variables of this 
type were declared they were not used. 
5.5.6.5 Text (type T) 
Text is similar to an array but it is a string variable that will contain text and is 1,2 or 3 
fields long. Each field contains 30 characters of text. Text can not be written and 
assigned during the program although text can be copied from one text string to the 
other. Although variables of this type were declared they were not used. 
Math language text assignment WSL assignment 
<text_assign> ::= <text_variable> . textl <text_assign> ::= <text_variable>[l] 
1 <text_variable> . text2 1 <text_variable>[2] 
1 <text _variable> . text3 1 <text_variable>[3] 
1 <text_variable> [ <int(ll2l3)>] 
e.g. e.g 
array2.textl := array3.text2 array2[l] := array3[2] 
array_4[2] :=array_5[l] array_4 [2] : = array_5 [ 1 ] 
Figure 5:18 
Text assignment 
208 
5.5.7 Input/Output 
There are six types of inputs and outputs that are used in the code. 
5.5.7.1 Analogue Input (type Al) 
These inputs are used for measuring flow meters, pressure transmitters, etc. The 
analogue input contains 4 different values that can be read, one of which can also be 
written to:-
• name 
• name.RAW 
• name.SRV 
• name.FTAU 
- filtered real value (read only) 
- integer input in module form (read only) 
- raw scaled value real pre filter (read only) 
- time constant rate for filter (read/ write ) real or integer 
The filter was not used in the translated code. 
Math language Analogue input WSL assignment 
expression 
<ai_assign> ::= < ai> <ai_assign> ::= <ai> " [ " 0 " ] " 
1 <ai> . RAW 1 <ai> " [ " RAW " ] " 
1 <ai>. SRV l<ai> " [ " SRV " ] " 
1 <ai>. FTAU 1 <ai> " [ " FTAU " ] " 
e-g- e.g 
i f (analouge_in.RAW < another_variable) if((analogue_in[RAW])< another_variable) 
Bitassign(analouge_in,6,var) !p Bitassign(analogue_in[0], 6, var) 
(Bitassign functions are discussed in 5.6) 
Figure 5:19 
Analogue Input assignment 
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5.5.7.2 Digital Input (type Dl) 
A digital input is a signal from a field input; it reflects the status of field equipment. A 
digital input is a read only Boolean and so can be on or off. It is treated as a Boolean 
except it cannot be assigned, (see 5.5.3) 
5.5.7.3 Digital Output (type DO) 
The digital output changes the on / off state of field equipment. It is treated as a read / 
write Boolean (see 5.5.3) 
5.5.7.4 Digital Flag (type DF) 
The digital flag is a read/ write Boolean that can be used any where that a digital output 
would be used. Al l the references to a digital flag are logically connected, and the flag 
state is set in one place in the compiled program. The variables are manipulated as 
flags in both PLC and WSL code, (see 5.5.4) 
5.5.7.5 Word Input (type Wl) 
The word input is a read only integer, that can be treated as an integer (see 5.5.1); it 
does not contain any scaling or special processing. 
5.5.7.6 Word Output (type WO) 
This is an integer signal from the controller to the process control device. It is treated 
as a read / write integer (see 5.5.1). 
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5.5.8 Devices 
There are two types of devices that were used in the fire and gas system, both of which 
were assigned to. 
5.5.8.1 Single drive/ single feedback valve (type VSS) 
The VSS device is either open or closed, and is controlled by a single discrete signal 
with one discrete feed back signal. The two types of VSS devices are energise-open 
and energise-close. 
There are various values and keywords associated with the VSS:-
• .CMMD open / close command Read only Boolean 
• .OPND opened Read only Boolean 
• .CLSD closed Read only Boolean 
• .TRVL traveling Read only Boolean 
• .OLS open feedback Read only Boolean 
• .CLS closed feedback Read only Boolean 
• .FTO fail to open Read only Boolean 
• .FTC fail to close Read only Boolean 
• .DSBLD forced to manual mode Read / Write Boolean 
» .LOCKD locked (auto mode) Read / Write Boolean 
» .NRDY not ready Read / Write Boolean 
» .MOPEN manual open Read / Write Boolean 
• .OVRD override feedback Read / Write Boolean 
• .STATUS device status Read / Write Boolean 
• .VFLAGS device status Read only integer 
* .OTCP open timer/counter preset Read / Write integer 
• .OTCC open timer/ counter current Read / Write integer 
• .CTCP close timer/ counter preset Read / Write integer 
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• .CTCC close timer/ counter current Read / Write integer 
The commands that are used with this valve are:-
• LOCK place in auto mode 
• UNLOCK place in manual mode 
• OPEN open valve 
• CLOSE close valve 
• RESET clear feedback override and/or issues open/close command after .FTO or 
.FTC is true. 
I f the energize-open valve is open (.MOPEN = true), the control signal (.CMM) is set to 
true. I f the desired state is closed (.MOPEN = false) the .CMMD bit is set to false. 
The feed back signal (.OLS) should be true when the valve is open and false when the 
valve is closed. 
I f the desired state of the energize-close valve is open (.MOPEN = true), the control 
signal (.CMMD) is set to false. I f the desired state is closed (.MOPEN = false) the 
.CMMD bit is set to true. The feedback signal for the energize-close valve (.CLS) 
should be set to false when the valve is open and true when the valve is closed. 
I f the CLEAR CMMD on FTO or FTC option is selected, the .CMMD bit changes to 
false when the .FTR becomes true. The .CMMD bit remains false until the RESET 
command is issued. The RESET command issues an OPEN/ CLOSE command that 
turns on the .TRVL bit. The OPEN/ CLOSE alarm timer starts counting down when 
the RESET bit goes false. The clear command was not used and the .FTR ending was 
not listed in the endings that can be used with the valve in the manual. 
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Math language VSS expression WSL assignment 
<vss_assign> ::= <vss> . CMMD <vss_assign>::=<vss> " [ " CMMD " ] " 
1 <vss>.OPND 1 <vss>"["OPND " ] " 
1 <vss>.CLSD 1 <vss>"["CLSD " ] " 
1 <vss>.TRVL 1 <vss>"["TRVL " ] " 
1 <vss>.OLS 1 <vss>"["OLS " ] " 
1 <vss>.CLS 1 <vss>"["CLS " ] " 
1 <vss>.FTO 1 <vss>"["FrO " ] " 
1 <vss>.FTC 1 <vss>"["FTC " ] " 
1 <vss>.DSBLD 1 <vss>"["DSBLD"]" 
1 <vss>.LOCKD 1 <vss>"["LOCKD " ] " 
1 <vss>.NRDY 1 <vss>"["NRDY"]" 
1 <vss>.MOPEN 1 <vss>"["MOPEN " ] " 
1 <vss>.OVRD 1 <vss>"["OVRD " ] " 
1 <vss>.STATUS 1 <vss>"["STATUS " ] " 
1 <vss>.VFLAGS 1 <vss>"["VFLAGS"]" 
1 <vss>.OTCP 1 <vss>"["OTCP " ] " 
1 <vss>.OTCC 1 <vss>"["OTCC " ] " 
1 <vss>.CTCP 1 <vss>"["CTCP " ] " 
1 <vss>.CTCC 1 <vss>"["CTCC " ] " 
1 LOCK (<vss>) 1 !p LOCK (<vss> var) 
1 UNLOCK (<vss>) 1 !p UNLOCK (<vss> var) 
1 OPEN (<vss>) 1 !p OPEN (<vss> var) 
1 CLOSE (<vss>) 1 !p CLOSE (<vss> var) 
1 RESET (<vss>) 1 !p RESET (<vss> var) 
e.g. e.g 
UNLOCK (XS_20001_D) !p UNLOCK (XS_20001_D var) 
XS_20001_D.MOPEN := XS_2 XS_20001_D[MOPEN] := XS_2 
Figure 5:20 
VSS assignment 
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5.5.8.2 Dual drive/ dual feedback valve (type VDD) 
The VDD device is either open or closed and is controlled by two discrete signals with 
two discrete feedback signals. The two control signals consist of an open signal 
(.OPENC) and a close signal (.CLSC), which are both normally false. 
There are various values and keywords associated 
.OPENC open command 
.CLSC close command 
.OPND opened 
.CLSD closed 
.TRVL traveling 
.OLS open feedback 
.CLS closed feedback 
.FTO fail to open 
.FTC fail to close 
.FAILD failed (both feedback bits are true) 
.CLSTO close timeout 
.OPNTO open timeout 
.DSBLD forced to manual mode 
.LOCKD locked (auto mode) 
.NRDY not ready 
.MOPEN manual open 
.OVRDO override open feedback 
.OVRDC override closed feedback 
.STATUS device status 
.VFLAGS device status 
.OTCP open timer/counter preset 
.OTCC open timer/ counter current 
.CTCP close timer/ counter preset 
.CTCC close timer/ counter current 
with the VSS:-
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read only Boolean 
Read / Write Boolean 
Read / Write Boolean 
Read / Write Boolean 
Read / Write Boolean 
Read / Write Boolean 
Read / Write Boolean 
Read / Write Boolean 
Read only integer 
Read / Write integer 
Read / Write integer 
Read /Write integer 
Read / Write integer 
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The commands that are used with this valve are :-
• LOCK place in auto mode 
• UNLOCK place in manual mode 
• OPEN open valve 
• CLOSE close valve 
• RESET clear feedback override and/or issues open/close command after .FTO or 
.FTC is true. 
I f the desired state is open (.MOPEN = true), the .OPENC bit is set to true. The 
.OPENC bit remains true until either the open feed back signal is true or the open alarm 
time expires; then .OPENC is set to false. 
I f the desired state is closed, the .CLSC bit is set to close the valve. The .CLSC bit 
remains true until either the close feedback signal is true or the close alarm expires; 
then .CLSC is set to false. 
The only command that is used is the reset command. That is used in the INIT part of 
the CFBs that deal with the valves so they are all unlocked at the start of the code. 
The RESET command issues an OPEN/CLOSE command that turns on the .TRVL bit. 
The OPEN/CLOSE alarm timer starts counting down when the RESET bit goes false. 
The two feedback signals consist of an open feedback signal (.OLS) and a closed 
feedback signal (.CLS). The .OLS bit should be true when the valve is open; otherwise, 
it should be false. The .CLS bit should be true when the valve is closed; otherwise it 
should be false. 
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Math language VDD expression WSL assignment 
<vdd_assign> ::= <vdd_assign> ::= 
<vdd> .OPENC <vdd> "["OPENC " ] " 
l<vdd>.CLSC l<vdd>"["CLSC " ] " 
1 <vdd>.OPND 1 <vdd>"["OPND " ] " 
1 <vdd>.CLSD 1 <vdd>"["CLSD " ] " 
1 <vdd>.TRVL 1 <vdd>"["TRVL " ] " 
1 <vdd>.OLS 1 <vdd>"["OLS " ] " 
1 <vdd>.CLS 1 <vdd>"["CLS " ] " 
1 <vdd>.FTO 1 <vdd>"["FTO " ] " 
1 <vdd>.FTC 1 <vdd>"["FTC " ] " 
1 <vdd>.FAILD 1 <vdd>"["FAILD " ] " 
1 <vdd>.CLSTO 1 <vdd>"["CLSTO"]" 
1 <vdd>.OPNTO 1 <vdd>"["OPNTO " ] " 
1 <vdd>.DSBLD 1 <vdd>"["DSBLD"]" 
1 <vdd>.LOCKD 1 <vdd>"["LOCKD " ] " 
1 <vdd>.NRDY 1 <vdd>"["NRDY"]" 
1 <vdd>.MOPEN 1 <vdd>"["MOPEN " ] " 
1 <vdd>.OVRD 1 <vdd>"["OVRD " ] " 
1 <vdd>.STATUS 1 <vdd>"["STATUS " ] " 
1 <vdd>. VFLAGS 1 <vdd>"["VFLAGS"]" 
1 <vdd>.OTCP 1 <vdd>"["OTCP " ] " 
1 <vdd>.OTCC 1 <vdd>"["OTCC " ] " 
1 <vdd>.CTCP 1 <vdd>"["CTCP " ] " 
1 <vdd>.CTCC 1 <vdd>"["CTCC " ] " 
1 LOCK (<vdd>) 1 !p LOCK (<vdd> var) 
1 UNLOCK (<vdd>) 1 !p UNLOCK (<vdd> var) 
lOPEN (<vdd>) 1 !p OPEN (<vdd> var) 
1 CLOSE (<vdd>) 1 !p CLOSE (<vdd> var) 
1 RESET (<vdd>) 1 !p RESET (<vdd> var) 
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e.g. e-g 
UNLOCK (XV_16061_D) !p UNLOCK (XV_16061_D var) 
XV_16061_D.MOPEN := TRUE XV_16061_D[MOPEN] :=TRUE 
XV_16061_DD := XV_16061_D.FTO XV_16061_DD := XV_16061_D[FTO] 
Figure 5:21 
VDD assignment 
When declaring valves the time that is takes for them to change state is also declared. 
This should prevent valves that are opening from being closed and vice versa. 
5.5.9 Recipes 
A recipe serves as a user defined storage place for a set of related values that have 
different data types. The recipe (similar to a struct in C) allows the variables to be 
accessed in the following way:-
recipe_name. recipe_element := variable 
or 
recipie_name := recipe_ name 
Figure 5:22 
Accessing a recipe element 
The extensions associated with the recipes are:-
• .RTU Request to unlock 
• .INUSE Data is in use 
• .DSTBL Data is stable 
• .DRDY Data is ready for use 
• .STATUS Recipe status 
Read/ 
Read/ 
Read/ 
Read/ 
Read / write 
write 
write 
write 
write 
Boolean 
Boolean 
Boolean 
Boolean 
Boolean 
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The commands associated with the recipes are:-
• UNLOCK / CLEAR Makes the recipe available for data 
• SELECT Makes data from one recipe available to the other. 
Recipes have been used in both the ESD and F&G system. To make the translation 
possible the user defined recipes are being used as though they are part of the language 
definition. Each recipe has its own collection of recipe elements and they are as 
follows:-
5.5.9.1 Elements associated to Trip_all recipe (ESD) 
• L_Limit Real 
• H_Limit Real 
• LL_Limit Real 
• HH_Limit Real 
• Bad_xmt_lim Integer 
5.5.9.2 Elements associated to TripJII recipe (ESD) 
• L_Limit Real 
• LL_Limit Real 
• Bad_xmt_lim Integer 
5.5.9.3 Elements associated to Trip_hh recipe (ESD) 
• HH_Limit Real 
• Bad_xmt_lim Integer 
5.5.9.4 Elements associated to TripJI recipe (ESD) 
• LL_Limit Real 
• Bad_xmt_lim Integer 
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5.5.9.5 Elements associated to Tripjim recipe (ESD) 
• LL_Limit Real 
• HH_Limit Real 
• Bad_xmt_lim Integer 
5.5.9.6 Elements associated to CODELL recipe (F&G) 
• hi_lim Real 
• xmt_low Integer 
• xmt_high Integer 
• optic_lo Real 
• optic_high Real 
5.5.9.7 Elements associated to SING_LIM recipe (F&G) 
• hi_lim Real 
• xmt_low Integer 
• xmt_high Integer 
5.5.9.8 Elements associated to Dualjim recipe (F&G) 
• hi_lim Real 
• h i h i j i m Real 
• xmt_low Integer 
• xmt_high Integer 
Each of the recipe elements will be turned into an item in an array. The following 
language definition will only show the PLC functions used in the ESD or F&G code 
and the Trip_all extensions because they are all translated using the same theory. 
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Math language recipes WSL 
<recipe> ::= < recipe_name> <recipe> ::= < recipe_name> 
1 <recipe_name> .RTU i <recipe_name> "["RTU " ] " 
1 <recipe_name>.INUSE 1 <recipe_name>"["INUSE"]" 
1 <recipe_name>.DSTBL 1 <recipe_name>"["DSTBL"]" 
1 <recipe_name>.DRDY 1 <recipe_name>"["DRDY"]" 
1 <recipe_name>.STATUS 1 <recipe_name>"["STATUS"]" 
1 UNLOCK( <recipe_name>) 1 !p UNLOCK(<recipe_name> <var>) 
1 CLEAR ( <recipe_name> ) 1 !p CLEAR(<recipe_name> <var>) 
1 SELECT ( <recipe_name> ) 1 !p SELECT(<recipe_name> <var>) 
1 <recipe_name>.L_LIMIT 1 <recipe_name>"["L_LIMIT " ] " 
1 <recipe_name>.H_LIMIT 1 <recipe_name>"["H_LIMIT"]" 
1 <recipe_name>.LL_LIMIT 1 <recipe_name>"["LL_LIMIT"]" 
1 <recipe_name>.HH_LIMIT 1 <recipe_name>"["HH_LIMIT"]" 
1 <recipe_name>. 1 <recipe_name>"[" 
BAD_XMT_LIM BAD_XMT_LIM"]" 
e.g. e.g 
IF(PT_13180 >= IF((PT_13180) >= 
PT_1380_R.HH_LIMIT) ( PT_1380_R [HH_LIMIT])) 
IF(PT_13180<= IF((PT_13180) <= 
PT_13180_R.LL_LIMIT) (PT_13180_R[LL_LIMIT] ))) 
Figure 5:23 
Recipe usage 
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5.5.10 Hardware 
Hardware addresses can be read and written to directly; these are treated in the same 
way as variable names are. Hardware addresses in WSL and the APT languages are a 
variable name except they start with a percentage sign. 
5.6 PROCEDURE CALLS 
Procedure calls are predefined operations that are available from within the math 
language and count as a statement. These operations will be represented as external 
procedure calls. 
Only those procedures used in the ESD and F&G code are discussed. 
Note 
most significant bit least significant bit 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
second row demonstrates the number 153 
Figure 5:24 
Binary storage of integers 
5.6.1 UNPACK_BITS (Boolean array , variable) 
This procedure is only used in RLL and shifts a specified number of bits from an 
integer into a Boolean array. The number of bits moved from the integer to the array is 
determined by the size of the declared array. 
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Math Language Procedure call WSL 
UNPACK_BITS (<Boolean_array> , !p UNPACK_BITS (<integer> var 
<integer>) <BoOlean_array>) 
Figure 5:25 
UNPACK_BITS procedure call 
5.6.2 PACK_BITS (Boolean array, variable) 
This procedure is used only in RLL and shifts the values in the Boolean array into an 
integer variable. The size of the array will determine the number of bits that can be 
moved into the integer variable. 
Math Language Procedure call 
PACK_BITS (<Boolean_array> , 
<integer>) 
WSL 
!p PACK_BITS ( <Boolean_array> var 
<integer>) 
Figure 5:26 
PACK_BITS procedure call 
5.6.3 BCDBIN (variable, variable) 
The BCDBIN procedure converts a binary coded decimal (BCD) value into an integer. 
The first variable in the parenthesis contains the four-digit BCD value to be converted, 
the second variable is the integer where the result is to be stored. 
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Math Language Procedure call 
BCDBIN ( <bcd_value> , <integer> ) 
WSL 
!p BCDBIN ( <bcd_value> var <integer>) 
Figure 5:27 
BCDBIN procedure call 
5.6.4 BIT_ASSIGN (variable, integer, expression) 
The BIT_ASSIGN procedure sets the individual position of an integer based on the 
result of a Boolean expression 
The first value in the parenthesis is an integer that contains the bit that is to be set 
depending on the Boolean expression. The integer is treated as a binary value with the 
most significant bit as the number 1 bit and the least significant as the 16* bit. The 
second value in the parenthesis specifies which bit is to be changed (so is a number 
between 1 and 16). The Boolean expression evaluates to true or false and depending on 
the answer will be how the significant bit of the variable will be set. 
Math Language Procedure call WSL 
BIT_ASSIGN ( <variable> , <integer> , !p BIT_ASSIGN ( <integer> , 
<bool_expression>) <bool_expression> var <variable>) 
Figure 5:28 
BIT_ASSIGN procedure call 
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5.6.5 BITCLEAR (variable, integer) 
The BITCLEAR procedure resets a specified bit in an integer variable to false, off (0). 
The first variable in the parenthesis is the integer that contains the bit to be reset. The 
integer value represents which bit is to be reset; the value must be a number between 1 
and 16. 
Math Language Procedure call 
BITCLEAR ( <variable> , <integer> ) 
WSL 
!p BITCLEAR (<integer> var <variable>) 
Figure 5:29 
BITCLEAR procedure call 
5.6.6 BITSET (variable, integer) 
The BITSET procedure resets a specified bit in an integer variable to true, on (1). 
The first variable in the parenthesis is the integer that contains the bit to be set. The 
integer value represents which bit is to be reset; the value must be a number between 1 
and 16. 
Math Language Procedure call 
BITSET ( <variable> , <integer> ) 
WSL 
!p BITSET (<integer> var <variable>) 
Figure 5:30 
BITSET procedure call 
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5.6.7 LOAD_ARRAY( input variable, array) 
The LOAD_ARRAY procedure assigns a value to the elements of an array. 
The input variable and the array elements must be of the same type. The value of the 
input variable is assigned to each of the elements in the array. 
Math Language Procedure call 
LOAD_ARRAY (<variable> , <array>) 
WSL 
!p LOAD_ARRAY (<variable> var <array>) 
Figure 5:31 
LOAD_ARRAY procedure call 
5.7 FUNCTION CALLS 
A function appears on the right hand side of an assignment statement or in a Boolean 
expression i.e. it returns a value. Al l functions are translated to an external function 
call. 
5.7.1 BITS_TO_INTS (array variable) 
The BITS_TO_INTS function moves an array of 16 Boolean variables into an integer 
value. Within the Boolean array true is 1 and false is 0. Element 1 of the array is the 
most significant bit. 
Math Language function call 
BITS_TO_INTS ( <booLarray>) 
WSL 
!f BITS_TO_INT (<bool_array>) 
Figure 5:32 
BITS_TO_INT function 
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5.7.2 BITTEST (variable , integer) 
The BITTEST function checks the status of a specified bit. The variable is the integer 
which contains the bit that is to be checked (the most significant bit is numbered as 
number 1 the least significant bit is the 16* bit). The integer value specifies which bit 
in the binary equivalent of the number is to be tested. I f the tested bit is 1 then true is 
returned otherwise 0 is returned. 
Math Language function call 
BITTEST ( <variable> , <integer> ) 
WSL 
!f BITTEST (<variable>, <integer> ) 
Figure 5:33 
BITTEST function 
5.7.3 EDGE (expression) 
Edge is a Boolean function that detects the change from false to true in the value of a 
Boolean expression. The variables in the parentheses are monitored to detect the first 
time that the expression changes from false to true. When this change has been 
detected the returned value of the function is true and remains true for one scan of the 
controller. 
Edge stores temporary variables each time it is used. It performs an edge on the 
variables since last time an 'edge' was performed on it and not since the last time the 
current 'edge' was performed on the variable. 
Math Language function call WSL 
EDGE (<expression>) !f EDGE (<expression>) 
Figure 5:34 
EDGE function 
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5.7.4 ABS(expression) 
ABS is a function that returns the positive values of an expression. Note that it is also a 
function supplied in WSL. 
Math Language function call WSL 
ABS (<expression>) abs (<expression>) 
Figure 5:35 
ABS function 
5.8 TIME 
The controller contains the date and time which can be accessed by the program. The 
only part of the time that is accessed by the translated code is the hour past midnight 
which is stored as a read only integer. This means that the controller clock can not be 
set from the program. 
Math Language time expression 
X := program_name . IHOUR 
WSL 
x : = I fTIME (var) 
Figure 5:36 
Time expression 
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5.9 ASSIGNMENTS 
Numerical assignments map as would be expected in the following way: 
Math language assignment WSL assignment 
<assignment assignment> ::= <assign> 
<assign> ::= <variable> := <value> ; <assign> ::= <variable> := <value> 
<value> ::= <Boolean> <compound booeanl> 1 
<real> 1 <compound real> 1 <integer> 1 
<compound interger> 
e.g. 
X45 := 1; 
X44 := True; 
e.g. 
X45 := 1; 
X44 := TRUE 
Figure 5:37 
Assignment format in Math language and WSL 
When an assignment is Boolean value of true or false it has to be assigned as an integer 
value of 0 or 1. Rather than changing the Boolean assignment to 1 for true and 0 for 
false two global WSL constants will be declared. 
FALSE := 0; 
TRUE := 1; 
Figure 5:38 
WSL constant declaration 
The assignment of Booleans in WSL can now remain identical to the assignment in 
PLC. True and False were not case sensitive in the APT languages but they are case 
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sensitive in WSL. Variables with special methods of assignment are discussed when 
the variables are defined, below are two such examples. 
Math language flag / timer assignment WSL flag / timer assignment 
clear (firstup_set) firstup_set[LATCH] := FALSE 
firstup_set[ON] := FALSE 
timer_name.ENABL := TRUE timer_name[ENABL] := TRUE; 
timer_set(var timer_name) 
Figure 5:39 
Assignment format in Math language and WSL 
Conditionals on the right hand side of an assignment statement are not allowed in WSL 
so they are translated to an if statement on the right hand side that will return true or 
false. 
Math language conditional assignment 
a:= (b = c) 
WSL conditional assignment 
a:= if (b =c) then TRUE else FALSE f i 
Figure 5:40 
If statement in an assignment 
The equality operators that cause this sort of assignment are '= ' , '< ' , '<=', '> ' , '>=', 
'<>' i.e. anything that would create a Boolean result. 
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5.10 CONDITIONALS 
The conditional in math language is an if statement of the following format:-
Math language conditional WSL conditional 
IF (<Boolean expression>) THEN if (<Boolean expression>) then 
<statements> <statements> 
{ ELSIE (<Boolean expression>) THEN { elsf (<Boolean expression>) then 
<statements>} <statements>} 
[ELSE <statements>] [else <statements>] 
ENDIF; f i 
e.g. e.g. 
IF ( X45) THEN if (X45=l) then 
X45 := True; X45 := True 
ELSIE (X44) THEN elsf (X44= 1) then 
X21 := X34; X21 :=X34 
ENDIF; f i 
Figure 5:41 
Conditional format in Math language and WSL 
Note the missing ';' at the end of the WSL conditional, this is because in WSL a ';' 
joins two statements whereas in most languages it indicates the end of a statement. 
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The Boolean expression will have to be translated from the PLC format:-
X454 OR X3524 OR X234 
to the WSL format:-
(X454 = TRUE) or (X3524 = TRUE ) or (X234 =.TRUE) 
There can be any number of ELSIF statements in both languages. There can also be 
nesting of i f statements and this frequently occurred. 
The xor logical operator is not declared in WSL so it is translated to a function call that 
returns true or false. 
Xor function call 
xor (a,b) 
Xor function deflned 
funct xor(x,y) == 
if ( x = y) then 1 
else 0 
f i 
Figure 5:42 
xor function deHned 
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5.11 WHILE LOOP 
While loops are allowed within the math language and are of the following format:-
Math language conditional WSL conditional 
WHILE (<Boolean expression>) LOOP while (<Boolean expression>) do 
<statements> <statements> 
END LOOP; od 
e-g- e.g. 
WHILE (X45) LOOP while ( X45 =1) do 
X45 := True; X45 := True; 
X21 :=X34; X21 := X34 
END LOOP; od 
Figure 5:43 
While loop format in Math language and WSL 
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6. TABLE INFORMATION FOR DECLARING VARIABLES 
Variables in the APT language can contain numbers, letters and the '_'; they can be up 
to 12 characters long and must contain a letter. Since the APT variables can start with a 
number and WSL variables cannot all of the variables will have WSL_ prefixed to the 
beginning of their name. 
Most of the declarations within the APT are in the tables. The scope of the variables 
declared in the table are dependent on the position of the table. A table in a unit means 
the variables are global to only the SFCs and CFCs in that unit. Variables declared in 
the higher level i.e. the program level are global to CFCs and SFCs in all units. 
Al l of the variable information is stored in two binary files. There is one file called 
App.d2 in the database directory which contains all the variable information about all 
the programs within the APT at a given time. It also includes information about 
previous programs because it does not seem to delete the information properly. The 
format of this variable information is as foUows:-
hex variable name type of declaration e.g. "INT_DEC" key letter initial e.g. " I " 
comments initial value PLC address. 
e.g. 
* M TIGER INT_DECL I This is a tiger 5 Automatic 
I f the value is a constant then the hex number 4 before the letter 'A ' of Automatic is 01. 
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Type of Declaration Key letter 
Boolean B 
Integer I 
Real R 
Flag F 
Text T 
Integer Array lA 
Real Array RA 
Boolean Array BA 
DO 10 Array DX 
Text Array TA 
Slow Timer ST 
Analogue Input A I 
Digital Flag DF 
Digital Input DI 
Digital Output DO 
Word Input W I 
Word Output WO 
Valve single drive / single feed back VSS 
Valve Dual drive /dual feed back VDD 
Templates - user defined 
Figure 6:1 
Types of Variable declarations 
This information is stored in an arbitrary order and the number of spaces between the 
information seems to be arbitrary. The solution will be to search for the variable name 
so that the information about the variable can be obtained. 
A list of the program name, units, CFB and variables is stored in the file called 
object.xrf. There is an object.xrf file for each of the programs that are declared. This 
can be found at path:-
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\APT\PROGRAM\ESD_A\OBJECT.XRF 
This contains a list of the unit name and then the name of the item that it is storing. The 
difference between the math blocks and variables cannot be determined but the math 
blocks can be identified from the graphic file (see 2.1). The units are declared as unit 
name then item name (also obtainable from directory names). So the variables are the 
names that follow a unit name and are not units or CFB. This information can then be 
used to identify the type of variable from app.d2. The unit name has to be maintained 
as this will indicate the globality of the variables and they have to be declared within 
their units. The global variables have the hex value 0007010000 or 1000000028 before 
the variable name. The information about recipes is stored in app.dS. 
6.1 MATH BLOCK TYPE 
The type of an interlock can be determined using a similar method, a high priority 
interlock should be run before a SFC and a low priority interlock should be after the 
SFCs. App.dl in the database directory stores the information about the type of math 
block. This includes the name of the CFC that it belongs to, the comment of the math 
block (this is the only place that this information is stored) and whether it is high or low 
priority. The information stored with the math block gives the type of the math block 
which is active since all of the used math blocks are active. 
Format of storing this information:-
name of CFB Keyword type key number type comment name of CFC hex 
keyword 
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e.g. 
W_DOG_0 STNDMATH 27 comment CFCname *M ACTIVE OUS 
PHASE_1 INTRLOCK 51 comment SELFTEST hex HIGH 
PHASE_2 INTRLOCK 51 comment SELFTEST hex HIGH 
Al l of the files listed above are fixed length files. 
6.2 COMMENTS WITH UNITS AND PROGRAMS 
App.dl stores the program name and comment the programmer supplied with the 
program in following format:-
hex Program_name PRG comment hex 
The first writing after the PRG is comment and then the comment continues until there 
is a specific hex character. App.d2 stores the comments with the units, the comments 
are the letters after the unit name until there is more hex which is not printable text. 
7. S F C ^ WSL 
A SFCs name can have up to 8 alpha numeric characters; the name includes at least one 
letter and may contain an underscore. The name cannot begin with a number. 
The SFC diagram will be converted as a whole into WSL. Each of the steps will be an 
action system. An action system is a facility in WSL that allows pieces of code 
containing GOTOs to be translated Although the SFC does not explicitly have GOTOs 
depending on the transition options the control of the program could move to one or 
more different steps. The best way to map this will be via action blocks as there are 
very powerful transformations to remove the GOTO jumps in action systems. The 
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transitions out of the action system will be an if statement (which will test on the 
transition condition) and jump to the next step/ action system. I f none of the conditions 
of the transitions (if else if statement) are true then control will go to the start of the 
action block. There will be two action blocks for each step, the INIT part which is 
executed at least once and then the main part which is executed zero or more times. 
The action system will retain the same number as the step; these are numbered SI to 
S500 (not in execution order but in coded order). The number is Ix for the initial 
action system and Ax for the main body of the action system. The code that is written 
within the safe SFC in the body of the step is put into a block as a procedure call; the 
name of the procedure is Sx and ISx for the initial part of the step. The name of the 
transition was retained in the first parse of the document to get the layout. When the 
math language was translated and inserted the name of the transition was no longer 
required but for reference purposes it was stored as a comment. 
Where there is a choice of transitions the ordering is maintained from the left to right. 
Once the transition has been made there will be an action call to the step that is in that 
transition. The code does not contain parallel steps although the code does contain 
statements that are executed in parallel. It is understood that code executed in parallel 
is executed sequentially in an indeterminate order. This is located before the MATH 
keyword in each of the steps. 
SFCs can be of two types normal and safe state SFCs. A safe state SFC once it has 
been turned on interrupt's its local SFC and takes over control as soon as a trigger 
condition becomes true. This is mapped by an extra condition in the transaction to 
enable a break out into the safe state SFC which is built into the same action system. 
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BNF form of a S F C 
<SFC> ::= <name> <start step> <transition> {transition} {step} <end step> 
- L t 
<transition> := 
Non BNF rules 
1. Steps must be separated by transitions 
2. O 8 Alpha characters 
3. there are constraints on loops 
4. there must be a step before a transition. 
<sfcl> control enters at start step and exits at 1 or more end steps possibly at a later 
time. 
<transionl> if transition is true goto next step if false re-execute the previous step. 
<transition2> if left hand side branch true more to that step if right hand side step is true 
move to the step on right hand side otherwise repeat the previous step. 
<transition3> i f transition on left hand side and right hand side are both true then move 
to the next transition 
<transition4> not implemented 
<transition5> not implemented 
WSL 
A step will be converted into a WSL action block 
A transition will be converted into an if statement at the end of the action block and a 
goto statement to move to the required action block. 
Figure 7:1 
syntax of an SFC 
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There are two extensions associated with the main SFC in each of the units. These are 
the .enabl and the .abort extension and they allow all of the SFCs within a unit to be 
turned off. When the program is originally downloaded the .enabl extension is set to 
true and the .abort is set to false. 
During the running of an SFC it can be halted and will not run again until reset. In other 
parts of the code the SFC can be reset or stopped so that it will not run again until it is 
turned on. I f unitname.ENABL is set to false then all the currently active steps in the 
SFC become inactive. I f the unitname.ABORT is set to true then the SFC will become 
inactive. The execution does not resume until the enabl command is set to true, if the 
.abort command is set to false only, the SFC does not resume execution. 
S F C unitname extensions WSL unitname extensions 
<extension> := <unitname> '.' ENABL 
1 <unitanme> '.'ABORT 
<extension> := <unitname> ' [ ' ENABL ' ] ' 
1 <unitanme> ' [ ' ABORT ' ] ' 
e.g e-g 
self test, abort := TRUE WSL_SELFTEST[ENABL] := TRUE 
Figure 7:2 
syntax of unitname extensions 
I f a controller looses power then all the units become inactive and remain inactive until 
the power returns. When the power returns each unit / program starts at the initial step 
of the main SFC; except for specifically set safe state SFCs. 
An SFC can be turned off from elsewhere in the code, by giving the variable within the 
unit the value of false. As such at the top of each SFC there will have to be a test to see 
if the code should be run or not and this will be in the form of:-
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i f ((unitname[ENABL] := TRUE ) and (unitname[ABORT] := FALSE)) then 
sfc code 
f i 
Figure 7:3 
Initial if statement before a piece of code 
It should be noted that an entire action system is thought of as one statement. 
Normal S F C 
WSL 
begin 
if ((normal[ENABL] = TRUE) and 
(normal[ABORT] = FALSE)) 
then 
WSL_safe[ARM] := FALSE; 
actions: M i l : 
MIl==IMSl(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((sstrigger = TRUE) and 
(WSL_safe[ARM] = TRUE)) 
then call safe 
elsf ((MTl = TRUE)) 
then call MI2 
elsf ((MT2 = TRUE)) 
then call MI3 
else call M A I 
f i . 
MAl==MMSl(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
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elsf ((sstrigger = TRUE) and 
Safe S F C (WSL_safe[ARM] = TRUE))then 
call safe 
elsf ( (MTl = TRUE)) 
SI then call MI2 
1 
T1 
1 
elsf ((MT2 = TRUE)) then call MI3 
S2 
else call M A I 
f i . 
1 
T2 
1 
S3 MI2==IMS2(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((sstrigger = TRUE) and 
(WSL_safe[ARM] = TRUE))then 
call safe 
elsf ((MT3 = TRUE)) 
then call MI4 
else call MA2 
f i . 
MA2==MMS2(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((sstrigger = TRUE) and 
(WSL_safe[ARM] = TRUE))then 
call safe 
elsf ((MT3 = TRUE)) 
then call MI4 
else call MA2 
f i . 
MI3==IMS3(var); 
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if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((sstrigger = TRUE) and 
(WSL_safe[ARM] = TRUE))then 
call safe 
else call MA3 
f i . 
MA3==MMS3(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((sstrigger = TRUE) and 
(WSL_safe[ARM] = TRUE))then 
call safe 
else call MAS 
f i . 
MI4==IMS4(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((sstrigger = TRUE) and 
(WSL_safe[ARM] = TRUE))then 
call safe 
else call MA4 
f i . 
MA4==MMS4(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((sstrigger = TRUE) and 
(WSL_safe[ARM] = TRUE))then 
call safe 
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else call MA4 
f i . 
safe==ISSl(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((ST 1 = TRUE)) 
then call SI2 
else call Asafe 
f i . 
Asafe==MSSl(var); 
if (normal [ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((ST 1 = TRUE)) 
then call SI2 
else call Asafe 
f i . 
SI2==ISS2(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((ST2 = TRUE)) 
. then call SIB 
else call SA2 
f i . 
SA2==MSS2(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
elsf ((ST2 = TRUE)) 
then call SI3 
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else call SA2 
f i . 
SI3==ISS3(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
else call SA3 
f i . 
SA3==MSS3(var); 
if (normal[ENABL] = FALSE) then 
call z 
else call MI3 
f i . 
end_actions 
f i 
where 
proc IMSl(var) == 
proc MMSl(var) = 
proc IMS2(var) == 
proc MMS2(var) = 
proc IMS3(var) == 
proc MMS3(var) = 
proc IMS4(var) == 
proc ]VIMS4(var) = 
proc ISSl(var)== 
proc MSSl(var) == 
proc ISS2(var) == 
proc MSS2(var) = 
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proc ISS3(var) == 
proc MSS3(var) == 
end 
Figure 7:4 
An SFC to converted WSL 
The SFC will be translated in three stages. The first stage will be to split up the 
document into individual files and procedures; these will then individually be translated 
using the parser. The layout of the code will then be translated and the WSL 
procedures inserted at the correct point. 
7.1 MATH LANGUAGE ASSOCIATED WITH SAFE STATE SFCS 
A safe state SFC is a special SFC that is designed to interrupt the execution of an SFC, 
this is so that an emergency procedure can be performed. Or so that special processing 
can be performed that is out of normal flow of control. There are three types of safe 
state SFCs the ESD and F&G code uses the second type following. 
1. A level safe state S F C which is designed to interrupt the processing of a main or 
subordinate SFC. A level safe state SFC can only interrupt another safe state SFC 
that has a lower priority. 
2. A local safe state SFC which is designed to interrupt the processing of a single SFC 
or and of its subordinates. 
3. A subordinate safe state SFC which is called by another safe state SFC. 
Although an SFC can have more than one local safe state SFC only one of them can be 
active at any point in time. 
245 
There are 7 math commands that are related directly to the use of safe state SFCs. All 
but SSABORT are used in the sample code. 
• SSENTRY this is the point in the normal SFC of re-entry after the safe state SFC 
has finished executing. 
• SSRETURN is the return point from the safe state SFC. 
• SSDEFINE sets which SFC the safe state SFC is local to. 
• SSTRIGGER the Boolean which when true calls the safe state SFC. 
• SSARM indicates when to start looking for SSTRIGGER = TRUE to call the safe 
state SFC. 
• SSDISARM indicates when to stop looking for SSTRIGGER = TRUE to call the 
safe state SFC. 
• SSABORT stops all the SFCs 
7.1.1 SSENTRY (label) 
SSENTRY is written in a step of the main SFC (and there must be only one connected 
to each label) indicating where the control is to return to once the safe SFC has finished. 
SSRETURN is the command that returns the control to the main SFC at the 
corresponding label. The command will be converted into a comment in WSL. 
7.1.2 SSRETURN (label) 
This command transfers the program execution from the safe SFC to the step identified 
by the corresponding SSENTRY command (i.e. with the same label). When the 
SSRETURN command is executed the previously active step in the main SFC and the 
safe SFC are deactivated and the step containing the SSENTRY is activated. The 
command will be converted into a comment in WSL. 
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7.1.3 SSDEFINE 
Used in the initial step of the safe state SFC, and every initial step must contain one and 
only one. It defines the type of safe state SFC and with the case of a local safe state 
SFC it defines which SFC it is local to. The command will be converted into a 
comment in WSL. 
SSDEFINE LOCAL TO sfc_name 
This command will also be converted to a comment, as the calling action system will 
know which safe state action to call. 
7.1.4 SSTRIGGER (identifier) 
This command specifies the condition that triggers the execution of a main safe state 
SFC. I f the trigger condition becomes true while the safe state SFC is disarmed then 
the condition is ignored. I f the trigger condition becomes true when the safe state SFC 
is armed then the control of the program passes to the initial step safe state SFC. The 
identifier is a Boolean, a flag or a digital input. 
7.1.5 SSARM (Safe State SFC name) 
This command 'arms' a safe state SFC and thus makes it possible for the safe state SFC 
to interrupt the execution flow if the trigger value becomes true. Once armed the safe 
state SFC will continually monitor the trigger for when it should interrupt the flow of 
control. 
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A safe state SFC starts executing when:-
1. Safe state SFC is armed 
2. SFC executing is a normal SFC 
3. A trigger condition becomes true. 
SSARM remains in effect until SSDISARM is called. The math language code is 
converted into WSL code see below. 
7.1.6 SSDISARM (Safe State SFC name) 
This command 'disarms' a safe state SFC and thus it no longer monitors the trigger 
condition, and the safe state SFC can no longer perform an interrupt. SSDISARM takes 
precedence over SSARM 
7.1.7 SSABORT 
This command suspends all SFC execution in the current unit. 
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7.1.8 Translation of the commands 
P L C safe state S F C commands WSL safe state SFC commands 
<sfc. _commands> :- SSENTRY <label> <sfc_commands> :-
comment: "SSENTRY <label>" 
1 SSRETURN <label> 1 comment: "SSRETURN <label> " 
1 SSDEFINE LOCAL OF 1 comment: " SSDEFINE LOCAL OF 
<sfc. .name> <sfc_name>" 
1 SSTRIGGER <identifier> 1 comment: " SSTRIGGER <identifier>" 
1 SSARM <safe_sfc_name> 1 comment: " SSARM <safe_sfc_name>" ; 
safe_sfc_name ' [ 'ARM' ] ' := FALSE 
1 SSDISARM <safe_sfc_name> i comment: " SSDISARM <safe_sfc_name>"; 
safe_sfc_name ' [ 'ARM' ] ' := TRUE 
Figure 7:5 
Safe state SFC commands 
REFERENCES 
[1] Siemens, "SIMATIC APT programming manual (4.2.1 and 4.3)," 
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APPENDIX IV 
WEIGH FUNCTION IN EACH OF THE FOUR lEC 1131-3 
LANGUAGES 
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F=.i Funclion WEIGH 
ExampSe functiesn WEEQH provides Iha functions of 8CD-to-b(nafy conversion o( a gross-
wetgtit Snput from a scale, the binary fniogor subtraction of ft tftre weight which has been 
previously converted mi stored In the memofy of the programmable controller, and the 
conversion of lh9 riesurilng net weight back lo BCD forrii, e.g., for an output display. The 
*EN' Input is usdd to indicate fiiat the scale i$ road^ to perform the weighing operation. 
The 'ENO' output indicates that an appropriate command exists (e.g., trom an oporator 
pushbutton), the scale is In proper condttion for the weight lo be read, and each function 
has a corroci result. 
A textual form of the declaration of this function is: 
F ^ n t C n O M H E I C H : KOTO ( * SCO • B C O d . d « } 
VJUlJMPOr {* «SM" i n p u t i » UB»d to indic»t« 'mctX* «r*Mly" * ) 
i » l ^ _ < ; « B » n d : BOCL > 
qxoniijittigb^ ; wyPS ) (* BCD Mcoded •] 
't:»r«__w*lgtit : t>»t ; 
Ttie body of funclion WEIOH in the lU language is: 
LO Wdigh c^-ammand 
JMPC • WEIGH. NOW 
ST ENO (• No W6igwiig. 0 lo "EHO- •) 
RET 
W6EGH„N0W: LD 
BCD TO INT 
SUB t«.f»_»«HglH 
INT_TO_BCO 
The body of function WEIGH In tiie ST language is[ 
13? "•igbt_*«!!»>«J>d TBBM 
Figure 1 
Page 157 of lEC 1131-3 the weigh function [1] 
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An oquivalont graphical docfaratloni of fursi^ tion WEIGH is; 
_ + -
mmti J 
B O O I i — - Iweigh^ccmnancE jict^^weight | —-WORD 
I N T - " - i t a r e _ v e i g h t , i 
The tuncllon body Irt ttia LD language Isr 
1 1 »CD_ 1 1 r H T _ 1 . ) 
1 weiglrs_C£Kaiftand | TO>_INT 1 1 SOB 1 1 T O ^ B a > 1 KNO ' 
1 3 „ ^ _ „ „ | E K : E H O l -
1 1 1 
- J E N E H O I -
! 1 
— I E N mo\ ( ) -+ 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 gEoss^we i ^ S i t — 1 1 -
1 1 
- ! 1-
1 1 • 
— 1 1 •—net^^Keight 1 
1 4-— + 1 1 + . " 1 
I: t a r e ^ w e i g h t -• — - -- 1 1 1 
1 1 
lunclion body in Uid FBD languago Is: 
+-—'—-"+ 
1 BCD_ 1 4 - — " — + 1 i j r r _ J 
1 T O ^ I H T 1 1 SUB 1 1 TOJiCD 1 
weigh_caam!iaod 1 eh iEBO | — - J S J * K M O l — ' l E i J B K O i — E K O 
gro33_^Meight 1 1"" -5 1 1 j — i t s t w e i g h t 
*" + i- 1 . . ^ - ^ — + 
t.«iE<! weight—""""""""""- -I 1 
4 - + 
Figure 2 
Page 158 of lEC 1131-3 the weigh function [1] 
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